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Abstract
T
he pay-as-bid auction, also called the discriminatory price auction, is among the most
common auction formats to price and allocate assets and commodities. Trillions of
dollars each year are traded in pay-as-bid auctions. The format is the natural multi-
unit extension of the first-price auction of a single item. Bidders specify a price for each unit
they want to buy. The market clears at the price where supply intersects aggregate demand
and winning bidders pay their bids for each unit won. In the first chapter of my thesis,
I explain strategic differences and similarities between the single-item and multi-unit case.
In practice, it is rare that multi-unit auctions take place in isolation. The second chapter
introduces a model of interconnected pay-as-bid auctions. The auctions run in parallel and
offer perfectly divisible substitute goods to the same set of symmetrically informed bidders
with multi-unit demand. This connects the demand side of both auctions. The supply side
is linked because the total amounts for sale may be correlated. I show that there exists a
unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium when the marginal distributions of supply have
weakly decreasing hazard rates. I then develop practical policy recommendations on how
to exploit the interconnection across auctions to increase revenues. These theoretic insights
are the basis for the final chapter of my thesis. In collaboration with Jason Allen (Bank
of Canada) and Jakub Kastl (Princeton University) I use data from auctions of Canadian
debt to quantify the extent to which demands for securities with different maturities are
interdependent. Generalizing methods for estimating demand schedules from bidding data
to allow for interdependencies, our results suggest that 3, 6 and 12-month bills are often
complementary in the primary market for Treasury bills. We present a model that captures
the interplay between the primary and secondary markets to provide a rationale for our
findings.
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Chapter 1
P ay-as-bid vs. First-price auctionsSimilarities and differences in strategic behavior
1.1 Introduction
The pay-as-bid auction, also known as discriminatory price auction, is a popular mechanism
for allocating assets and commodities worldwide. It extends the rules of the well-known
first-price auction to the sale of multiple units of the same good: Bidders submit bidding
schedules which specify a price for each unit they demand. Individual demands are then ag-
gregated by the auctioneer to determine the market clearing price above which all bids win.
All winners pay “as-they-bid” for all units they won. The pay-as-bid auction is very popular
among governments and central banks. It is used to allocate Treasury bonds and implement
other operations such as Quantitative Easing on the open market. Outside the financial
sector it distributes carbon credits as well as electricity generation in several countries.1 In
total, trillions of dollars are transferred every year using this type of auction. Despite its
importance, we know little about strategies used by auction participants. Expect in special
circumstances we are even unable to compute best-response strategies (Woodward (2015)).
To a large extent the literature focuses on the case of single-unit demand. Assuming that
each bidder wants at most one unit is a simplifying assumption that is violated in most
real-world applications. A bank bidding in a Treasury auction, for instance, clearly wants
more than just a single dollar worth of the offered Treasury bill. With multi-unit demand
bidding strategies in pay-as-bid auctions are, according to a common understanding of the
recent literature, more complicated than those in its single-unit counterpart, the first-price
auction.2 The reason is that changing one’s n’th bid may affect not only whether the n’th
unit is won, but also the bidder’s belief of where the market will clear. To optimize their
payoffs, bidders have incentives to shade their bids for each unit differently. This behavior,
known as “strategic bid shading” or “demand reduction”, is by design not present in auctions
of a single, indivisible object. It is seen as “the key to why the analogy between single-unit
and multi-unit auctions does not apply”(Ausubel et al. (2014), p. 1367).
1For more details see Brenner et al. (2009), Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997), Ghazizadeh et al. (2007),
Maurer and Barroso (2011).
2“Except in the case where bidders have demand for only a single unit of the auctioned commodity, the
analysis of multi-unit auctions are [...] more difficult than that of single-unit auctions (Hortac¸su (2011), p.
345).”
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In a simple theoretic framework in which bidders with multi-unit demand compete for shares
of a perfectly divisible good, I argue that the complexity of pay-as-bid auctions comes not
from demand reduction but more specifically type-dependent demand reduction. In my
benchmark model N ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders are symmetrically informed. They all share
the same type, known to them but not the seller, but are uncertain about the total amount
of the good that will be for sale.3 I discover the following analogy between pay-as-bid and
first-price auctions: Each of N symmetrically informed bidders shades his bid in the sym-
metric equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction for 1 of N shares of the perfectly divisible good
as if he competed with (N − 1)N bidders for one indivisible good in a canonical first-price
auction with independent private types. This analogy might break when bidders are not
symmetrically informed but have private information, i.e. types. Whether bidding in pay-
as-bid auctions is more complex thus depends on the source of uncertainty bidders face.
With private information it can be optimal for bidders of different types to reduce demand
in different ways. This suggests that it is not demand reduction (or differential bid shading)
per se that makes bidding choices in pay-as-bid auctions more difficult. What gives rise to
complicated equilibrium effects seems to be type-dependent demand reduction instead. Such
type dependency introduces asymmetric trade-offs not only across units of the good, but also
agents. It therewith generates complications that have no equivalent in single-unit auctions.
My findings build on an intuitive bid-representation theorem for pay-as-bid auctions. It
characterizes the functional form of the bidding schedule when bidders are symmetrically in-
formed (benchmark model) and - with some limitations - when they have private information
(model extension). In future work my theorem might serve as basis to construct equilibrium
strategies for other, potentially more general environments, with asymmetrically informed
bidders that have multi-unit demand. Computing such equilibrium strategies for pay-as-bid
auctions is still an open question in the literature (Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012)). To illustrate
how to use my bid-representation theorem to construct equilibria, I conclude the article by
deriving an equilibrium in linear bidding strategies. This equilibrium is new to the liter-
ature. It is the counterpart to Ausubel et al. (2014)’s linear equilibrium without private
information and helps us understand which role private information plays for strategic in-
centives in pay-as-bid auctions: In the symmetric equilibrium, privately informed agents bid
like symmetrically informed agents who all draw the the lowest type, but add a type-specific
discount factor.
More generally, my work could be a first step into establishing a more general theoretic
connection between bidding in first-price and bidding in pay-as-bid auctions with multi-
3This modeling assumption nicely reflects two common features of real-world pay-as-bid auctions. For
one, the amount to be allotted is in some cases, such as Treasury auctions in Germany, Greece, Belgium,
Turkey or Sweden (Brenner et al. (2009)), adaptable during the auction. Secondly, the total supply is often
shaped by so called “non-competitive” tenders. These are irregular bids in that only a quantity is specified.
The price is determined automatically. It is either the average price paid by (regular) bidders or the market
clearing price. How many non-competitive tenders will be served is unknown to the (regular) bidders so that
the total amount for sale that matters for them is random.
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unit demand. Such a methodological link would increase our poor knowledge of pay-as-bid
auctions. We could re-visit the literature on first-price auctions. In contrast to pay-as-bid
auctions, first-price auctions have been at the core of auction theory since the very begin-
ning (Vickery (1961)). They have been studied extensively and are well understood. When
bidders have independent private values, we know, for instance, that first-price auctions can
be revenue equivalent to second-price auctions, and that they are strategically equivalent to
the Dutch auction. For the pay-as-bid auction we know much less. We do not know whether,
and if so under which conditions, it might be strategically or revenue equivalent to another
auction format, for instance the uniform-price auction. It differs from the pay-as-bid auction
only in that bidders pay the market clearing price for all units they win, instead of their
individual bids. The existing literature has not come to a consensus on which of the two
auctions are more efficient or bring higher revenue.4 By finding conditions that influence the
distribution of winning quantities (which is at the center of my analysis) it might be possible
to distinguish cases under which either auction format dominates the other and explain why.
Related Literature. Building on the literature of “share auctions”, put forward by Wilson
(1979) and further developed most notably by Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender
(2002),5 my analysis of the benchmark model with symmetrically informed bidders is com-
plementary to Pycia and Woodward (2017). In independent work, we derived the functional
form of the equilibrium bidding function under the simplifying assumption that bidders are
symmetrically informed. Relative to previous studies, such as Wang and Zender (2002) as
well as Ausubel et al. (2014), our result is more general in that we neither impose marginal
utility to be linear nor total supply to be distributed according to the Pareto distribution.
Instead, our theorem holds under a very broad class of utility functions and distributions.
It is similar to Holmberg (2009) who studies pay-as-bid procurement auctions with gen-
eral cost functions (here utility functions) and perfectly inelastic demand (here supply). He
shows that an equilibrium exists if the hazard rate of demand is monotonically decreasing
and bidders have non-decreasing marginal costs. Pycia and Woodward (2017) go one step
further in bringing attention to more general sufficient conditions under which equilibrium
existence is guaranteed. As such, their work has been acknowledged as the best unique ex-
istence result currently available for pay-as-bid auctions (Hortac¸su and McAdams (2018)).
Before focusing on the design of pay-as-bid auctions by optimally choosing the distribution
of total supply and a reserve price, Pycia and Woodward (2017) show that the equilibrium
is symmetric, strictly monotone and differentiable in quantity rather than assuming those
properties. Contrary to my work, they do not explain the shape of the bidding function in
any detail. This could come from a difference in the way we express the bidding function.
Their representation highlights that a “bid for any quantity is a weighted average of the
4See Ausubel et al. (2014), Pycia and Woodward (2017) for theoretic contributions and Fe´vrier et al.
(2004), Kang and Puller (2008), Armantier and Sba¨ı (2006, 2009), Hortac¸su and McAdams (2010) for
empirical comparisons.
5 Earlier contributions with indivisible goods include Katzmann (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1998),
Swinkels (2001), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (2002), Lebrun and Tremblay (2003), Chakraborty (2004,
2006), Anwar (2007).
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bidder’s marginal values for this and larger quantities, where the weights are independent
of the bidder’s marginal values” (p. 4). Mine, instead, underlines the direct connection of
bidding behavior to the first-price auction. Therewith I am, to the best of my knowledge, the
first to discover this particular linkage. As my main goal is to work out this correspondence
rather than to solve the most general model of pay-as-bid auctions, I will make more strin-
gent technical assumptions that simplify the mathematical derivations than I would need to.
I invite who is interested in a more general framework with symmetrically informed bidders
to consult Pycia and Woodward (2017).
In contrast to Holmberg (2009) and Pycia and Woodward (2017) I make first steps towards
an auction environment in which bidders are asymmetrically informed. In a model extension,
each bidder draws an independent private type. While the benchmark model with identical
bidders is helpful to fix ideas and identify key factors that drive bidding behavior in the
multi-unit auction, it is not so useful for evaluating performance. Auctions are typically
run to extract individual information from agents, so as to allocate resources to those who
benefit the most at the highest price possible. Only a framework with private information
allows us to analyze information aggregation and efficiency. Furthermore, the extension to-
wards a framework with independent private values helps to close the gap between theoretic
and related empirical work which tends to build on models with private values. Starting
with Hortac¸su (2002) researchers have estimated the bidders’ private, marginal willingness
to pay in multi-unit auctions (see also Fe´vrier et al. (2004), Hortac¸su and McAdams (2010),
Kastl (2011, 2012), Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012), Cassola et al. (2012), Hortac¸su et al. (2018)).
The structural estimation approach is based on an implicit characterization of the bidding
function in form of the first-order conditions. For each unit-bid, these necessary conditions
have been recognized to capture a similar trade-off to the one in a first-price auction, where
bidders trade-off the probability of winning against their gain from it (Kastl (2017)). Unfor-
tunately, these first-order conditions are not informative for a theorist. The reason is that
they depend on the distribution of the market clearing price. When bidders have private
types it can be defined only implicitly (for any given set of strategies) via market clearing.
The econometrician is able to simulate this distribution from the data. The theorist is not.
Woodward (2016) nicely reflects the state of the art on pay-as-bid share auctions with pri-
vate types. He proves equilibrium existence in pay-as-bid auctions with private types without
specifying the equilibrium bidding function. He shows that bidders might have incentives to
“iron”, that is flatten, their bidding functions for small amounts which they are certain to
win.
In the remainder of the article, Section 1.2 sets up the benchmark model with symmetri-
cally informed bidders and states the bid-representation theorem. It builds the basis for
the comparison of bidding in the pay-as-bid auction to bidding in the canonical first-price
auction (Section 1.3). I then provide an extension of the main result to an environment with
independent private values (Section 1.4). Before concluding in Section 1.5, Section 1.4.1
focuses on a linear example. All proofs are given in Appendix A. Random variables will be
highlighted in bold throughout the article.
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1.2 Benchmark Model
N ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders participate in a pay-as-bid auction. They share the same type
t drawn from some commonly known distribution. It is unknown to the seller. From the
perspective of the bidder this common type has no strategic relevance because it is known
to all of them. It is fixed at some value t throughout the analysis. Instead, bidders are
uncertain about the total amount of the perfectly divisible good that is for sale, Q. Inde-
pendent of the bidders’ type, it is drawn from some commonly known, non-degenerated and
twice-differentiable distribution FQ(·) with bounded support [0, Q > 0] and strictly positive
density fQ(·).6 Imposing a zero lower bound will simplify the analysis later on. It will rule
out that bidders have incentives to iron their bids when they have private types (see Wood-
ward (2016)). In practice the zero lower bound could come from a non-zero probability that
the auction is cancelled.
Consuming quantity q generates utility for each bidder. The marginal utility v(q) represents
the bidder’s true marginal willingness to pay for this amount. v(·) is strictly decreasing,
and twice differentiable. Agents can have a satiation quantity, qs. This is the amount at
which the agent’s marginal valuation turns 0: v(q) = 0 for q ≥ qs. It is assumed to be large,
qs ≥ Q/N , for simplicity. If qs →∞, winning some more at a price of zero is always better.
Based on his true marginal willingness to pay each bidder submits a weakly decreasing and
differentiable bidding function: bi(·) : R+ → R+. It is an inverse demand, mapping from
the quantity-space into the space of prices. The corresponding demand function maps from
prices to quantities. It is denoted by xi(·) : R+ → R+.
Once all bidders have submitted their individual demands, each market clears at the minimal
price for which the aggregate demand of all bidders meets the realized total supply Q. If the
aggregate demand exactly equals the total supply at the market clearing price pc, each bidder
i wins the quantity he demanded at this clearing price: Q =
∑
i xi(p
c) with pc = bi(q
c
i ). In
that case, all winners pay what they were willing to pay for all units won, abbreviated by
qci ≡ xi(pc):
∫ qci
0
bi(x)dx. Otherwise, if the aggregate demand at the clearing price is higher
than the total supply, bidders have to be rationed according to some tie-breaking rule. In
equilibrium no one will have to be rationed because bidding function will be strictly decreas-
ing. This ensures that the market always clears exactly. Which tie breaking rules is used is
therefore irrelevant.
From an ex-ante perspective agents do not know how much they will win nor at which price
6Relying on an idea by Pycia and Woodward (2017) Appendix A.4 shows that results extend to distri-
butions with unbounded support in presence of an arbitrarily small but positive reserve price. Since the
agents’ true marginal willingness to pay is decreasing by assumption, it will drop below the reserve price at
some point. The support of the quantity that will matter for bidding decisions is therefore bounded endoge-
nously. Without positive reserve price and unbounded support, the bidder’s objective functional might not
be well-defined because the expectation of the bidder’s total surplus might not exist.
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the market will clear. Both the clearing price pc and the clearing price quantity qci depend on
how much there will be for sale Q. This amount is random. The adequate solution concept
is therefore Bayesian Nash Equilibria. I focus on equilibria in pure-strategies. They consist
of a set of bidding functions {b∗i (·)}Ni=1 that maximize each bidder i’s expected total surplus
from winning the ex-ante unknown clearing price quantity qci given all others j 6= i choose
b∗j(·). This total surplus is the difference between the bidder’s total utility from winning the
clearing price quantities
∫ qci
0
v(x)dx and his total payments
∫ qci
0
bi(x)dx
Definition 1. A pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a set of bidding func-
tions such that b∗i (·) ∈ arg maxbi(·) E
[∫ qci
0
v(x)− bi(x)dx
]
∀i ∈ N.
Given the symmetric environment it is natural to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
In such equilibria bidders share the total supply equally. Later on, it will be convenient to
work with the agent’s “equilibrium winning quantity”, instead of the total supply:
q∗ ≡ Q
N
∈
[
0,
Q
N
]
≡ [0, q∗].
Its marginal distribution and density will be denoted by Fq∗(·) and fq∗(·).
Having introduced the environment, I turn to the core of the article. I first derive my
main result for the benchmark model before generalizing it to an environment with private
information.
1.3 Pay-As-Bid vs. First-Price Auctions
My goal is to highlight differences and similarities in bidding strategies between pay-as-bid
and first-price auctions. The following bid-representation theorem will serve as basis for
the discussion. The Appendix shows that the bidding function is equivalent to Pycia and
Woodward (2017)’s Theorem 3.
Theorem 1. Consider distributions of total supply with weakly decreasing hazard rate.
There exists a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all bidders submit
b∗(q) = v(q)−
(∫ q∗
q
[
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]N−1
N
(−1)
(
∂v(x)
∂q
)
dx
)
on [0, q∗] (1.1)
and b∗ (q) = v (q) for q ∈ (q∗,∞).
The equilibrium exists if total supply is drawn from a distribution with weakly decreasing
hazard rate which implies that the distribution of winning quantities Fq∗ has this property.
This existence condition is known in the literature (see Holmberg (2009)). It ensures that
bidders do not have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. Technically it is a
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sufficient condition in the maximization problem that each bidder solves to determine his best
reply. Recently, Pycia and Woodward (2017) have derived a weaker condition. They also
show that (1.1) is the only function that can arise in any (not necessarily symmetric) equi-
librium on the domain of relevant quantities q ∈ [0, q∗]. Higher amounts are unachievable.
Since no agent ever wins these high amounts nor pays for them, they are out of equilibrium.
The bidder’s choice for those high amounts is irrelevant as long as his bidding function is
decreasing on the whole domain R+. Here I consider the most natural equilibrium in which
the agents bid truthfully for unfeasibly large quantities.7
For attainable quantities, the bidding function (1.1) is surprisingly simple. Because the
bidder “pay-as-he-bids” he understates his true marginal willingness to pay for each unit
that he might purchase in equilibrium: v(q). This is similar to an independent private-value
sealed-bid first-price auction, where bidders shade their true types.
The symmetric equilibrium of a canonical first-price auction with N ≥ 2 bidders, each draw-
ing an independent private value s ∈ [0, S] from a common distribution Fs(s), is well known.
Given his true marginal willingness to pay for the indivisible object, v(s) = s, the bidder
submits
β∗(s) = v(s)−
(∫ s
0
[
Fs(x)
Fs(s)
]N−1(
∂v(x)
∂s
)
dx
)
on
[
0, S
]
. (1.1b)
The strategy function maps the agent’s true type into his price offer. Whoever offers the
highest price wins the object.
Comparing the bidding functions (1.1) with (1.1b) reveals the close similarity between bid-
ding behavior in the pay-as-bid and first-price auction. To see it, however, one must eliminate
two differences that distinguishe the two functions due to differences in the two set-ups. First,
the uncertainty that bidders face comes from different sources. In the first-price auctions
agents have private types. The bidder wins if he has the highest private value: s ≥ sj ∀j 6= i.
In the stylized pay-as-bid auction there are no private types. The equilibrium quantities,
each representing a share of the perfectly divisible good, take their place. A bidder now
wins q when the market has not cleared yet: Nq ≤ Q = Nq∗ . To draw the analogy between
both auction formats one must compare the type s with the equilibrium share q∗ and the
corresponding probabilities that determine whether the agent wins or not:
s ↔ q∗ and Fs(·)↔ 1− Fq∗(·). (1.2)
Second, the agent’s true valuation for the object is strictly increasing in the first-price auc-
tion, while it is strictly decreasing in the pay-as-bid auction. This inverts the bounds of
7One other alternative is to submit a flat function at value v (q∗) for unattainable quantities. This
equilibrium, however, is not robust to bidders trembling. In case some agent makes a mistake which leads
some other other to win such large amounts, the later would make a loss winning as he would pay a higher
price than he truly values these additional units.
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the integrals. In the pay-as-bid auction the integrals go from the realization q to its largest
possible value; in the first-price auction, from the smallest value 0 of the realization to the
draw s: ∫ s
0
...v′(x)dx↔
∫ q∗
q
...(−1)v′(x)dx. (1.3)
Bearing (1.2) and (1.3) in mind, the two bidding functions differ in one element only: The
exponent of the bidding function of the pay-as-bid auction is N−1
N
, the one of the first-price
auction is N − 1. In case N − 1 would equal (N − 1)N the bidding function of the first-price
auction would be analogous to the one in the pay-as-bid auction. This gives rise to the
following observation.
Main Result 1. In the symmetric equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction with symmetri-
cally informed bidders, each bidder shades his bid for 1 of N shares as if he competed with
(N−1)N bidders for 1 indivisible good in a first-price auction with independent private values.
The result is intuitive: In a single good first-price auction, uncertainty over types can be
aggregated. A bidder effectively bids against one other bidder whose type is a random
variable with the same distribution as the highest order statistic of the common distribution
of types. In this sense he chooses his bid given the residual demand curve. Crucially for a
first-price auction, he bids as if he wins the auction because he pays his bid if and only if he
wins. What about a multi-unit pay-as-bid auction? Here he also takes the residual demand
of all others as given. In a symmetric equilibrium, he is guaranteed to win Q
N
, so he always
bids as if he wins Q
N
. Now, Q is uncertain, so we have to think of it slightly differently. More
precisely, it is optimal to bid as if he wins the marginal share. In this regard the bidder is
playing like in a single item first-price auction “on the margin”. Low supply looks like a high
type aggregate opponent; the math doesn’t distinguish where this uncertainty comes from.
A natural question to ask is whether this result holds when bidders have private information
in both auction formats.
1.4 Extension: Private Information
I make the following adjustments in the set-up: Each bidder now draws an independent
private type from the same, commonly known distribution with twice differentiable distribu-
tion on bounded support [t > 0, t] and strictly positive density. Bidder type ti derives a true
marginal value v(q, ti) from amount q. As above, it is strictly decreasing and twice differen-
tiable in quantity, plus integrable in the type. If it hits the zero line at some finite satiation
quantity it remains zero. Having observed their type, all agents submit a type-dependent
bidding function bi(·, ti) : R+ → R+. It is weakly decreasing and differentiable in quantity.
With these adaptations, a BNE in pure strategies is defined analogously to Definition 1.
8
Theorem 2. In a symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidders submit
b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
(−1)
(
∂v(q, ti)
∂q
)
dx on q ∈ [0, q∗i ] (1.4)
and b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti) on q ∈ (q∗i ,∞). This equilibrium exists if
(i) distributions of total supply and types are such that the amount an agent wins in the
symmetric equilibrium q∗i is drawn from a distribution Fq∗i with weakly decreasing hazard
rate and strictly positive density on support [0, q∗i ] and
(ii) the corresponding demand schedule x∗(·, ti) = b−1∗(·, ti) is additively separable in ti.
In the symmetric equilibrium with private information, agents no longer split the total sup-
ply equally, q∗ ≡ Q
N
. The amount an agent wins now depends on his type: q∗(ti) abbreviated
by q∗i . The equilibrium bidding function (1.4) has the same shape as function (1.1) without
private information. Whether this equilibrium exists depends on the underlying distributions
of total supply and types as well as the number of participating bidders. Both determine
the distribution of i’s winning quantity Fq∗i (·). Its shape in turn will determine whether
the bidding function of each type (1.4) assumes an inverse function (the demand function)
that is additively separable in the type. Without private types, the existence conditions boil
down to the assumption that total supply (and with it the winning equilibrium quantity)
is drawn from a distribution with decreasing hazard rate (as in Theorem 1). Determining
general conditions on the primitives of the model that guarantee existence of this equilibrium
is beyond the scope of this article. The generalized theorem, instead, is meant to under-
line differences and similarities between pay-as-bid auctions relative to first-price auctions in
presence of private information. In line with the previous section it allows me to make the
following observation.
Main Result 2. In the symmetric equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction with independent
private types, each bidder shades his bid for 1 of N shares as if he competed with (N − 1)N
bidders in a first-price auction with independent private values provided the submitted de-
mand function is additively separable in their type and strictly decreasing in price.
My analysis highlights a complication in multi-unit auctions that has, to the best of my
knowledge, not yet been made explicit in the literature. Strategizing in pay-as-bid auctions
might not be as “simple” as bidding in first-price auctions when agents of different types
submit demands with different slopes.8 Intuitively, a type-dependent slope introduces an
asymmetry in incentives not only across prices but also agents with different types. Now
type ti reduces his true demand at price p by a different amount than type tj. In other
words, bidders do not only reduce their demand differently across prices but each type does
8Even though I do not show that this necessary condition is also sufficient, I expect that it is not possible
to derive an equilibrium bidding function in the pay-as-bid auction that has the discussed similarities to the
one of the first-price auction.
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it differently. It seems to be the type-dependency that creates complicated equilibrium ef-
fects, not demand reduction per se.
As in Pycia and Woodward (2017)’s model without private information, the theorem and
with it the main result extend to auctions with reserve prices R > 0, where total supply or
types may be drawn from distributions with potentially unbounded supports (see Appendix
A.4). This insight could be valuable for the optimal design of pay-as-bid auctions. For
first-price auctions where bidders draw independent private types s ∈ [0, S] from a common
distribution Fs(s) the formula for the optimal reserve-price is well known: R−
(
1−FS(R)
fS(R)
)
= 0.
For pay-as-bid auctions, we do not know how to set reserve prices optimally. My findings
might help to determine an analogous formula for an optimal reserve price in pay-as-bid
share auctions in presence of private information.
1.4.1 Linear Example
To conclude I illustrate how Theorem 2 can be used to find equilibria of pay-as-bid share
auctions in presence of private information. It is, to the best of my knowledge, new to the
literature. My approach of finding it could be used in other set-ups.
My aim is to construct a linear example. In search for an equilibrium with a linear bidding
function, it is natural to assume that the agents’ true marginal willingness to pay is linear:
v(q, ti) = max{ti − ρq, 0} with ρ > 0. Assuming linear marginal values alone, however, is
not enough to generate linear bidding strategies. To see this, recall the bid-representation
of Theorem 2. From there we know that the agent’s function depends nontrivially on the
distribution of his winning quantity Fq∗i (·). With linear marginal valuations function (1.4)
becomes
b∗(q, ti) = ti − ρq − ρ
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
dx. (1.4)
For many distributions the integral, and with it the bidding function, will not be linear in
quantity. For an auction environment without private types, Ausubel et al. (2014) show
that equilibria are linear only if the per-capita supply (here referred to as i’s equilibrium
winning quantity, q∗) is drawn from the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GDP). This result
extends without complications to an environment with private types where q∗i replaces q
∗ .
There are two important differences. First, the distribution of i’s winning quantity becomes
type dependent. More importantly, it is no longer exogenously given by the distribution of
total supply but is endogenous. It is now an equilibrium object itself. In the linear example,
where demand schedules take the following form
x∗(p, ti) = a∗ + c∗ti − e∗p with a∗, c∗ ∈ R, e∗ > 0 (1.5)
it depends, by market clearing, on equilibrium coefficient c∗
q∗i ≡
1
N
[
Q − c∗
∑
j 6=i
tj + (N − 1)c∗ti
]
. (1.6)
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The winning quantity is a transformed convolution of the independent total supply Q and
(N−1) iid types, tj , which are weighted by the equilibrium coefficient, −c∗. As shown in the
following corollary, a linear equilibrium exists when q∗i follows a Generalize Pareto Distri-
bution. Even though I cannot show that there exist distributions of total supply and types
that generate the GDP for i’s winning quantity, I am optimistic that there are examples.
In particular, I conjecture that it is possible to pick suitable Gamma Distributions for total
supply and types. My believe comes from the fact that the GDP belongs to the class of Gen-
eralized Gamma Convolution,9 whose elements can be represented as the distribution of the
sum of two or more non-constant (not necessarily identically distributed) random variables
which are distributed according to a Gamma Distribution.10
Corollary 1. Let v(q, ti) = max{ti − ρq, 0} with ρ > 0, and asume N > Qρt .
For distributions of total supply and types under which the amount an agent wins in the
symmetric equilibrium q∗i is drawn from the Generalized Pareto Distribution
Fq∗i (q) = 1−
[
σ(ξ, ti) + ξq
σ(ξ, ti)
]− 1
ξ
with scale parameter
σ(ξ, ti) = −ξ
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
N(1− ξ)ρ
)
(ti − t)− ξ
(
Q
N
)
and shape parameter
ξ ∈ (−∞,−1]
there exists a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which bidders submit
b∗(q, ti) =

(
1
1−ξ
)
[ti − ξt]−
(
ρ
N(1−ξ)−1
) [
(N − 1)q − ξQ] for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]
v(q, ti) for q ∈ (q∗i ,∞) with q∗i ≡
(
σ(ξ,ti)
−ξ
)
.
The corollary specifies several restrictions on parameters. Before analyzing how agents bid
in equilibrium, I explain why.
Parameter Restrictions. The first restriction, N ≥ Qρ
t
, makes sure that the market clears
at a non-negative price. In particular, it guarantees that the marginal valuation of the lowest
9This class was introduced by Thorin (1977a,b). It is the smallest class of distributions on R+ that
contains Gamma Distributions and is closed with respect to convolution and weak limits. This means that
any element of this class is the weak limit of finite convolutions of Gamma Distributions.
Bondesson (1979) showed that distributions that have a density of the form f(x) = Cxβ−1(1+cxα)−γ , x >
0, 0 < α ≤ 1 belong to the class of Generalized Gamma Convolutions. The density of the Generalized Pareto
Distribution (with location parameter of 0) is f(x) = 1σ
(
1 + ξ xσ
)−( 1ξ+1), where σ > 0. It can be written as
can be written as f(x) =
(
θ+1
δ
) (
1 + θxδ
)−( 1θ+2) with ξ = θθ+1 and σ = δθ+1 . Now, setting c = θδ , α = β = 1
and γ = 1θ + 2 shows that this density takes the form of a of Generalized Gamma Convolution (Hamedani
(2013))
10In statistical terms, one says that the GCC is self-decomposable.
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type is non-negative at the highest quantity he might win in equilibrium: v(q∗i , t) ≥ 0. This
in turn ensures that no type will ever submit a bid-price that is negative.11
The other two conditions restrict the two shape parameters of distribution Fq∗i (·). For one,
ξ must be weakly smaller than −1 to guarantee that no one has incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium. This extra condition is needed because the hazard rate of the Generalized
Pareto Distribution with bounded support (ξ < 0) is increasing. So far, I have focused
on distributions with decreasing hazard rates, where necessary conditions are always suf-
ficient. For distributions with increasing hazard rates they may, or may not be. To avoid
creating confusion that would have distracted from my main points I have simply imposed
the (unnecessarily strict) condition of decreasing hazard rates in the main body of this article.
Secondly, the scale parameter σ(ξ, ti) is not just any positive real number but a function of
ξ and ti. It determines the upper bound of q
∗
i ’s support:
q∗i =
(
σ(ξ, ti)
−ξ
)
. (1.7)
For any fixed types ti, this upper bound is by definition q∗i
(1.6)≡ 1N
[
Q − c∗∑j 6=i tj + (N − 1)c∗ti]
determined by equilibrium coefficient c∗. Since in the equilibrium c∗ is strictly positive, i’s
winning quantity achieves its maximal value when the total supply realizes at its maximum
Q and all other agents draw the minimal type t:
q∗i
(1.6)
=
1
N
[
Q− c∗(n− 1)t+ c∗(n− 1)ti
]
with c∗ =
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
ρ(N − 1)(1− ξ)
)
> 0. (1.8)
The scale parameter σ(ξ, ti) must be such that both (1.7) and (1.8) hold. Notice that the
lowest amount any type may win in equilibrium q∗
i
is always 0 because total supply may be
0.
Explaining Bidding Behavior. The bidding function is increasing in the type and
strictly decreasing in quantity. To derive an intuition for its functional form for relevant
quantities q ∈ [0, q∗i ], I decompose it into three parts. The first is the true marginal valu-
ation of the lowest type v(q, t), the second, a type-specific mark-up M(ti) and the third a
type-independent shading factor S(q):
b∗(q, ti) = v(q, t) +M(ti)− S(q)
with
M(ti) ≡
(
1
1− ξ
)
(ti − t) and S(q) ≡
(
Q−Nq
N(1− ξ)− 1
)
(−ξ)ρ for q ∈ [0, q∗i ].
Consider first the behavior of the lowest type. Since the distribution of types is common
knowledge, the lowest type has no private information. Everybody knows that everyone
11Recall that for large amounts the agent submits his true marginal valuation which is never negative by
construction.
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must at least draw a type of size t. This agent submits his true marginal willingness to pay
v(q, t) in addition to a shading factor S(q). This factor determines the amount by which
his shading differs across quantities (differential bid shading). Such strategic demand re-
duction is optimal because the true marginal willingness to pay is not constant but strictly
decreasing, ρ > 0. Notice that this factor is independent of the type, which was one of the
conditions under which strategizing in pay-as-bid auctions is similar to bidding in first-price
auctions. It is strictly positive for q = 0 and 0 for the highest amount, q∗i , the lowest type
might win.
In contrast, an agent who draws a higher type than the lowest one, values each unit of the
good more. He should bid a higher price. If he bid truthfully, he would submit a mark-up of
(ti − t) for each amount. Since his information is private, however, he does not bid his full
extra valuation, but only a fraction
(
1
1−ξ
)
∈ (0, 1
2
]
of it. This fraction depends on ξ ≤ −1.
It assumes its maximal value of 1
2
when the winning quantity is uniformly distributed, which
is the case for ξ = −1. As ξ decreases it approaches 0. Just as the lowest type any other
agent shades his bids differently across quantities because the true marginal valuation is
strictly decreasing. At the highest winning quantity, the shading factor is strictly positive
for any ti > t. This means that any type higher than the lowest shades the largest amount
he might win in the symmetric equilibrium by a type-specific discount in addition to an
amount coming from differential bid shading.
Interestingly, behavior of privately informed bidders is similar to behavior of bidders without
private information. This is easy to see when comparing my example to previous work by
Ausubel et al. (2014) (see Appendix A.3.1 for details). They derive the unique linear equi-
librium in a pay-as-bid auction in an environment in which agents are only uncertain about
the total amount that will be for sale (Proposition 7). As it turns out, agents with private
types bid like symmetrically informed agents who all draw the same type t, just adding the
type-specific mark-up M(ti). All strategic incentives that come from agents having private
information are captured by this mark-up.
To close the article I come back to its main theme. Regarding the comparison of bid-
ding in pay-as-bid and first-price auctions, the example illustrates the usefulness of my
bid-representation for pay-as-bid auctions. Without it, the similarities of shading behavior
across auction formats, summarized in my main results, is difficult to see. This is because
bidding functions typically look extremely different, even when the agent’s type in the first-
price auction is drawn from the same distribution as i’s winning quantity in the pay-as-bid
auction. Those are the two random variables that must be compared to understand the
connection (as explained in Section 1.2). Under the uniform distribution, for instance,
β∗(s) =
(
N − 1
N
)
s for s ∈ [0, S]
b∗(q, ti) =
(
1
2
)
[ti + t]−
(
ρ
2N − 1
)[
(N − 1)q +Q] for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]
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where q∗i could be normalized to match S, the two bidding functions have not much in
common. By comparing them one would not come to the conclusion that in a pay-as-bid
auction each bidder shades his bid for 1 of N shares as if he competed with (N−1)N bidders
in a first-price auction with independent private types (Main Result).
1.5 Conclusion
Recent literature suggests that strategic incentives in multi-unit auctions differ from those
in single-unit auctions when bidders demand more than one unit. It has been shown that
bidders shade their bids differentially across quantities when they have multi-unit demand.
Such strategic behavior is not present in single-unit auctions and was taken to be the reason
for which analogies between single- and multi-unit auctions break down. I refine this view
and highlight the importance of the type of uncertainty bidders face. Bidding behavior in a
pay-as-bid share auction with symmetrically informed bidders that are uncertain about the
total amount for sale, is actually analogous to bidding in the first-price auction: Each of N
bidders shades his bid for 1 of N shares as if he competed with (N − 1)N bidders for an
indivisible good in a first-price auction. This observation can generalize to an environment
in which bidders are only ex-ante symmetric, each drawing an iid private type. However,
pay-as-bid auctions seem strategically more complex than first-price auctions when agents
flatten their bidding functions for small amounts, or shade bids not only differently across
quantities, but across types.
Future work could concentrate on analyzing bidding behavior with private information. With
our poor knowledge of how equilibria could look like, we know extremely little about how
bidders behave in one of the most commonly used auction formats to allocate assets and com-
modities for high stakes. The complication arises because equilibrium bidding functions are,
except in very rare exceptions, non-linear in quantity. This is an important difference to the
other most commonly used multi-unit auction format, the uniform-price auction and might
be the reason for which we have a much better understanding of bidding in uniform-price
auctions relative to pay-as-bid auctions. In addition to theoretic value, a complete charac-
terization of bidding strategies in pay-as-bid auctions where bidders are not symmetrically
informed would be useful for the related empirical literature (in Industrial Organization)
with recent work by Hortac¸su et al. (2018), Allen et al. (2018) and others. These papers
estimate the true valuations of bidders in multi-unit auctions. A typical goal is to perform a
counterfactual analysis to find out how much could be gained when changing the rules of the
auction, for example, by introducing a reserve price. Lacking a one-to-one mapping between
(estimated) true valuations and (counterfactual) bidding choices, makes it difficult to achieve
this goal. My bid-representation theorem might be useful to determine such mapping.
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Chapter 2
I nterconnected Pay-As-Bid Auctions
2.1 Introduction
Pay-as-bid auctions, also known as discriminatory price auctions, are used globally to al-
locate large classes of assets and commodities. In these auctions participants submit bid
schedules demanding different quantities at different prices. Their individual demands are
aggregated to determine the market clearing price. Each bidder wins the amount he asked
for at the clearing price and pays as he bid for all units he won. In the market for government
securities, dozens of countries including China, Japan, Germany, France, India, Brazil and
Canada use this format to allocate government debt to those willing to purchase it.1 Outside
of the financial sector, the pay-as-bid auction distributes electricity generation and allocates
emission credit in several countries, summing overall to a transferred volume of trillions of
dollars each year.2 Although many of these auctions are held regularly, some even daily, their
analysis has thus far been on a stand-alone basis. Yet, pay-as-bid auctions hardly ever take
place in isolation; they are interconnected. Influential bidders oftentimes participate in not
just one but several of these auctions. One good example is that of Treasury auctions. They
are held on a regular basis to the same group of financial institutions, the primary dealers.
The primary dealers typically form the largest bidder group and are obligated to participate
in the majority, if not all of their nation’s Treasury auctions to keep their dealer status. In
addition, global financial institutions buy Treasury bonds of different countries. In 2014, for
instance, big banks such as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Barclays and HSBC engaged in
all Treasury auctions held by Belgium, France Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain
to purchase more or less substitutable government bonds of different countries or maturities
(Beetsma et al. (2015)). Oftentimes, different Treasury auctions take place in parallel. Since
there are more issuers of government securities than there are days in the week, Treasury
auctions by different countries are regularly run on the same day.3 Furthermore, govern-
ments of large economies like Canada, Brazil, France, Japan, China, and the US, sell bonds
1According to a recent survey by Brenner et al. (2009) 33 out of 48 surveyed issuers of government
bonds use the pay-as-bid auction. The US used the pay-as-bid auction from 1929 until 1992 excluding short
intervals of experimentation. It formally switched to the uniform-price auction in 1992.
2See Brenner et al. (2009), Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997), Ghazizadeh et al. (2007), Maurer and Barroso
(2011).
3The following calendar gives a nice overview of EU countries (updated on 10/07/2018): https://
europa.eu/efc/eu-wide-indicative-issuance-calendar_en
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of different maturities in separate parallel auctions.4 In total, a high volume of identical or
slightly different Treasury notes, bills and bonds is transferred in simultaneous multi-unit
auctions to the same group of bidders. How should agents bid in such interconnected pay-
as-bid auctions? Can sellers exploit the interlinkage across auction markets so as to increase
revenues; and is it a good idea to issue highly substitutable securities in separate, parallel
auctions instead of selling all in one auction?
Providing answers to these question is not possible when considering an auction that is
linked to another one in isolation. Doing so, one neglects relevant strategic incentives that
are propagated by such interconnection. Neither can one give well-founded recommenda-
tions to bidders on how to bid optimally, nor to sellers on how to raise higher revenues. To
study how strategies and policy recommendations change when taking into account poten-
tial spill-over effects across auctions, this paper introduces a framework of two simultaneous
pay-as-bid auctions. Each auction offers a perfectly divisible good to the same group of
symmetric bidders. They are uncertain about the total amount that will be for sale and
purchase shares of both goods (Wilson (1979)). The auctions may be interlinked through
both sides of the market: the demand side because auction participants may value the goods
as substitutes; the supply side because the total amount for sale may be correlated across
markets. I show that there exists a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium when total
supply is drawn from a distribution that assumes weakly decreasing hazard rates, and derive
its functional form (Theorem 3). I then develop practical policy recommendations on how
to exploit the interconnection across auctions to increase revenues. First, by choosing the
type of good that is sold in parallel. It may be more or less substitutable. Secondly, by
manipulating the correlation of total supply across auctions.
In practice the auctioneer can set this correlation directly if he is allowed to adapt the
amount for sale over the course of the auction, so for instance in Treasury auctions by Ger-
many, Greece, Belgium, Turkey or Sweden (Brenner et al. (2009)). In countries in which
total supply must be announced before the auction and cannot be changed, the seller can
typically influence the correlation of supply that goes to (regular) bidders indirectly thanks
to non-competitive tenders. Non-competitive tenders only specify a quantity that will be
purchased at either the average price paid by (regular) bidders or the market clearing price.
How many non-competitive tenders there are and how many of them will be served is un-
known to the (regular) bidders and may be affected by the auctioneer.
To increase revenues sellers should offer independent goods. When goods are substitutes,
total supply should be unequal in size with high probability. Negative correlation of supply
quantities fosters competition among bidders. Interestingly, selling identical goods, or more
4Given the broad variety of financial securities through which it finances its various operations worth
a huge volume of bills and notes each year, it can be very inconvenient and time consuming to sell all
the different types of bonds sequentially. Simultaneous sales provide an easy solution, in particular for
large economies. All of the named countries but the US run pay-as-bid auctions. The US Treasury runs
uniform-price auctions.
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loosely speaking, perfect substitutes of negatively correlated supply in two separate parallel
auctions generates higher revenues than offering all in one integrated auction. This finding
provides a rationale for federal governments to hold Treasury auctions of identical or very
similar bonds and bills in parallel, provided the implementation costs of each auction are
sufficiently low. As such, it could help to explain why so many Treasury auctions of highly
liquid bills take place at the same time - a common practice which seems odd from the
perspective of mechanism design.
While this article is purely theoretic, it contributes to a related empirical literature. Fol-
lowing Hortac¸su (2002) and Kastl (2011), researchers recover the willingness-to-pay that
rationalizes each observed bid building on necessary conditions for equilibrium behavior of
stand-alone auctions. A discretized version of the necessary condition I derive in this article
is ideal for such structural estimations. It allows Allen et al. (2018) to quantify the extent
to which the demands for government securities of different maturities are interdependent in
the primary market of Treasury bills, using data from Canadian Treasury auctions.
The remainder of the article is structured as followed. The subsequent section reviews the
related literature. Having set up the model in Section 2.3, Section 2.4 focusses on the
equilibrium analysis, while Section 2.5 discusses how bidding and revenue depends on the
interconnection across acutions. Section 2.6 concludes. All proofs are given in Appendix B.
2.2 Related Literature
Two lines of research are most closely related to my work. The first is the literature on
isolated multi-unit auctions with perfectly divisible goods, so called share auctions. It builds
the methodological fundament for my model of interconnected share auctions. Share auc-
tions were introduced by Wilson (1979) and further developed, most notably, by Back and
Zender (1993), Wang and Zender (2002).5 Most literature of share auctions concentrates
on the uniform-price auction (Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Vives (2011) and Rostek and
Weretka (2012)). It is the direct competitor of pay-as-bid auction, and the second of the
two most frequently used multi-unit auction formats. In fact, surprisingly little is known
for (stand-alone) pay-as-bid auctions. Except in in special circumstances the literature still
struggles “to even compute best-response strategies” (Woodward (2015), p.1). My frame-
work allows me to shut down the interconnection between markets. In doing so, my model is
very similar to Pycia and Woodward (2017) who build on Ausubel et al. (2014) and others.
We all rely on the simplifying assumption that bidders are symmetrically informed in that
they all share the same type. This assumption is also the starting point in Wittwer (2018c)
which highlights differences and similarities between pay-as-bid and first-price auctions.
The second line of research consists of few contributions that go beyond the analysis of
stand-alone auctions in taking potential interlinkages across auctions into account. In this
5Smith (1966) was the first to discuss a framework which can be interpreted as a divisible-good model.
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regard the literature on single-unit auctions is more advanced than the literature on multi-
unit auctions: Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), Rosenthal and Wang (1996), Jeitschko and
Wolfstetter (2002), Menezes and Monteiro (2003), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2014) and
others analyze environments in which substitutes or complements are auctioned simulta-
neously or sequentially in several single-unit auctions to so called global bidders. None of
them concentrates on the question of how bidding changes in the degree of substitutability
or complementarity. Oftentimes the modeling set-up does not easily allow for such analysis
(e.g. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2014)).
In the literature of multi-unit auctions, interconnections across auction markets have been
neglected so far, with few exceptions. Wittwer (2018a) is most closely related to this article;
yet both the auction format and research focus differ. Wittwer (2018a) derives an equilibrium
for simultaneous uniform-price double auctions each offering one good. The main finding is
an irrelevance result that tells us under which conditions such a disconnected market design
generates the same allocation as a connected market that allows both goods to be traded in
one single (multi-object) uniform-price double auction. Furthermore, the literature on energy
procurement auctions studies environments in which a homogeneous commodity (electricity)
is produced and consumed in local markets that are connected through transmission net-
works (e.g. Wilson (2008)), Holmberg and Philpott (2012)). Local bidders (firms) supply
energy which is traded globally subject to capacity constraints on the transportation channel.
This set-up is not fitting for auctions in the financial sector. They differ substantially from
electricity procurement auctions. First, bidding firms do not participate in several auctions,
but stay in their local market. This is one of the key features of my set-up. Bidders go to
several auctions. A second feature is that, unlike electricity, the goods for sale in different
auction markets do not have to be the same. The bidders’ preferences for the products of
different auctions play a key role. Different from the bidding firms in a procurement auction,
who do not care in which market their product is consumed, bidders in the financial sector
care which good they buy.
Finally, a line of research developed by computer scientists relates to my work. They are
interested in quantifying the cost of selling related indivisible objects in separate auctions
that are run in parallel, relative to allocating the objects according to some mechanism that
achieves the fist-best.6 Complementary to the economic literature which “generally focus
on exact and optimal solutions”, they derive “approximation guarantees for equilibria of
auctions in complex settings” (Roughgarden et al. (2017), p. 59). Most of their work con-
centrates on single-unit auctions (e.g. Feldman et al. (2015a)). Two exceptions are Syrgkanis
and Tardos (2013) and Feldman et al. (2015b). The first show that m simultaneously run
uniform-price auctions achieve “at least” e−1
4e
≈ 0.158 of the expected optimal effective wel-
fare. The latter let such a market grow large. None of the contributions I am aware of cover
simultaneous pay-as-bid auctions.
6They do so by computing the “(Bayesian) price of anarchy”, pioneered by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
(1999) and Christodoulou et al. (2011). This price is “the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium
and the social optimum” (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), p. 404). For more background consider
Roughgarden et al. (2017)’s survey.
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2.3 Model
I first describe the supply and then the demand side of the model. Throughout random
variables are highlighted in bold.
Supply Side. Two pay-as-bid auctions, indexed m = 1, 2, are run in parallel. Each offers
one perfectly divisible good.7 The total supply quantities of both goods {Q1 ,Q2} are drawn
from a commonly known, joint distribution F (·, ·) with marginal distributions FQm(·). All
distribution functions are twice differentiable,8 and assume density functions f(·, ·), fQm(·)
that are strictly positive on bounded support [0, Q1]× [0, Q2]. Building on Pycia and Wood-
ward (2017) one can extend the model to distributions with unbounded support in presence
of arbitrary small but strictly positive reserve prices. Those bound the distribution of supply
endogenously.
My main theorem does not rely on any particular functional form for the joint distribution
of total supply. When analyzing the role of the market’s interconnectedness I want to isolate
the spill-over effects on the demand from the one on the supply side. The following joint
distribution, known as generalized Farie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula, enables me to
separate the two effects of interests. It allows for a variation in the correlation parameter
(the connection on the supply side) without affecting the marginal distributions, which - as
we will see later - determine bidding behavior (and with it the connection on the demand
side):9
F (Q1, Q2) = FQ1(Q1)FQ2(Q2) {1 + θ(ρ)[1− FQ1(Q1)][1− FQ2(Q2)]} (FMG)
where
θ(ρ) ≡ ρ
(
σ1σ2
c1c2
)
such that |θ(ρ)| ≤ 1
given
σ2m ≡ V ar(Qm) and cm ≡
∫
FQm(x)[1− FQm(x)]dx > 0.
7Similar to the frequent assumption that the set of available prices is dense in the literature on single-unit
auctions, the assumption of perfect divisibility is a continuous approximation of a discrete set of quantities
(Woodward (2015)). With imperfect divisibility of goods or buyers who can submit only a maximal amount
of bids the analysis becomes more complex due to discontinuities and rationing. This has been demonstrated
recently by Hortac¸su and McAdams (2010) and Kastl (2011, 2012). Earlier contributions with indivisible
goods include Katzmann (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1998), Swinkels (2001), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn (2002), Lebrun and Tremblay (2003), Chakraborty (2004, 2006), Anwar (2007). Besides, Armantier
et al. (2008) and others approximate equilibria for multi-unit auctions.
8Twice differetiability is needed for the sufficient condition. The necessary condition hold for distributions
which are only differentiable.
9Notice that for given marginal distributions, condition |θ(ρ)| ≤ 1 puts a restriction on the range of
correlation parameters. There are other copula functions that achieve a larger range of correlation. Yet,
they are more complex and make the analysis mathematically much more involved without bringing greater
insights.
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Demand Side. N ≥ 2 bidders participate in both auctions. They all share the same,
potentially two-dimensional type s ≡ (s1 s2). Unknown to the seller(s), it is drawn from
an arbitrary distribution FS(·, ·). From the bidders’ perspective the type is just a number.
It is kept fixed throughout the article.
Abstracting from asymmetric information across bidders, which may, for instance, come from
private information, is a simplifying assumption. First I avoid having to cope with strategic
bid-flattening. So called strategic ironing has recently been discovered to play a role in any
equilibrium of a private-value stand-alone pay-as-bid auction under weak assumptions (The-
orem 2 by Woodward (2016)). It has been ignored in the previous literature and complicates
the analysis dramatically. Second, it allows me to solve for a closed form solution of the
bidding function analogous to Pycia and Woodward (2017) and Wittwer (2018c). The nec-
essary condition on which it builds, however, generalizes to much more flexible environments,
including those with private information. It holds for a very broad class of utility functions.
To understand how bidding depends on the degree of substitutability across auctions, I let
V (q1, q2) =
∑
m=1,2
Wm(qm)− δq1q2 with δ ≥ 0 (2.1)
with strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable (C2) functions Wm(·). Without
loss, I normalize Wm(0) = 0. Parameter δ measures the degree of substitutability between
the goods. This is best understood by looking at the bidder’s true marginal willingness to
pay (MWTP) for quantity qm. It represents the bidder’s true inverse demand in auction m
and is given by the partial utility the bidder receives from consuming amount qm conditional
on purchasing amount q−m of the other good:
vm(qm, q−m) = wm(qm)− δq−m for m = 1, 2;m 6= −m (2.2)
with wm(qm) ≡ ∂Wm(qm)∂qm . The higher δ, the less the bidder is willing to pay for good m, the
more he has of the other good −m. Substitutability increases. Setting δ = 0 one can shut
down any interconnection between markets to be back to the case of a stand-alone auction.
Market Clearing & Equilibrium Concept. In each auction each bidder chooses a strictly
decreasing and differentiable bidding function. It is an inverse demand specifying a bid price
for each possible quantity qm ∈ [0, Qm]
pi,m(·) :[0, Qm]→ [0,∞) for m = 1, 2. (2.3)
A point on the bidding function will be called marginal bid. It is the bid price offered for
a particular amount qm. Notice that, even though the bidder has preferences over both
goods V (q1, q2) he cannot purchase both in the same market. By definition of a pay-as-bid
auction only units of the same good are for sale within one auction. It is therefore impossi-
ble to make price offers in market m dependent of quantities for sale in the other market q−m.
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In a more general version of the model bidders would be allowed to submit bidding functions
that are only weakly decreasing, and might in addition have discontinuities. This increases
the mathematical complexity without adding major insights to the policy analysis. Allen
et al. (2018) demonstrate how the model extends when bidders submit step-functions. To
keep the analysis simple I further disregard participation constraints and assume that all
bidders must be active in both auctions. In the example of Treasury auctions, where pri-
mary dealers have to participate in all auctions in many countries, for example, in Canada,
this is a fitting assumption.
It will be convenient to express the bidding strategies of the other players j 6= i in terms of
quantity per bid price (as demand) rather than bid prices per quantity (as inverse demand)
xi,m(·) :[0,∞)→ [0, Qm] for m = 1, 2. (2.4)
Once all bidders have submitted their bids, an auctioneer determines the minimal price at
which aggregate demand meets aggregate supply, called the market clearing price, pcm. If
there is no excess demand each bidder wins the amount he asked for at this price, his clearing
price quantity, qci,m, and pays
∫ qci,m
0 pi,m(x)dx.
Both the market clearing price and quantity are, for given strategies of all agents, implicitly
defined by market clearing. Taken together they constitute a point on the residual supply
curve of agent i, RSi,m(·). This curve specifies what is left of the total supply once all other
agents than i have demanded their shares. From an ex-ante perspective, it is unknown to
the agent as it depends on the random total supply.
Definition 2. At market clearing he wins amount qci,m at price p
c
m defined by
qci,m = RSi,m(p
c
m) ≡ Qm −
∑
j 6=i
xj,m(p
c
m) with p
c
m = pi,m(q
c
i,m). (2.5)
The support of i’s clearing quantity is denoted [0, qci,m], where q
c
i,m solves (2.5) for Qm = Qm.
Since agents do not know how much they will win, an adequate solution concept is the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. I restrict my attention to pure-strategy equilibria. They con-
sist of a set of bidding functions {p∗i,1(·), p∗i,2(·)}Ni=1 that maximize each bidder’s expected
total surplus (utility net of total payment) from winning the ex-ante unknown clearing price
quantities given all others j 6= i choose {p∗j,1(·), p∗j,2(·)}.
Definition 3. A pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a set of bidding func-
tions such that
{p∗i,1(·), p∗i,2(·)} ∈ argmax
pi,1(·),pi,2(·)
V(pi,1(·), pi,2(·)) ≡ E
[
V (qci,1 , q
c
i,2)−
∑
m=1,2
∫ qci,m
0
pi,m(x)dx
]
∀i ∈ N
where qci,1 , q
c
i,2 are the clearing price quantities, implicitly defined by (2.5).
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Given the symmetric environment of this article, in which all bidders have the same type, it is
natural to focus on symmetric equilibria where all bidders choose the same pair of functions
{p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} and share the total supply of both auctions equally. Following Wittwer (2018c),
it will be convenient to work with the (random) equilibrium winning quantity instead of the
total supply: q∗m ≡ QmN ∈
[
0, Qm
N
]
≡ [0, q∗m] with marginal distribution Fq∗m(·) and density
fq∗m(·) for m = 1, 2.
Equilibrium bidding will depend on how much the bidder expects to value one good given
he wins the equilibrium amount in the other auction, E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm].
Assumption 1. The expected true marginal willingness to pay for amount qm
E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm] (2.2)= wm(qm)− δE[q∗−m |qm] (2.6)
is (i) strictly decreasing and (ii) non-negative for all qm ∈ [0, q∗m] for m = 1, 2; m 6= −m.
Condition (ii) ensures that no agent wants to offer negative bids for quantities that he can
win. Given condition (i) this condition is fulfilled as long as the aggregate valuation of all
bidders N for the very first units vm(0, 0) is sufficiently high. Intuitively, it says that the
market’s total demand for the very first unit must be high enough. Thanks to condition (i),
no bidder has an incentive to submit an increasing bidding function in the symmetric equi-
librium. Such functions would not be valid by the rules of the auction. The condition always
holds when auctions are isolated (δ = 0) because Wm(qm) is strictly concave by assumption.
When they are interconnected, it gives a lower bound of negative correlations (δ > 0) when
the joint distributions generates a conditional expectation E[q∗−m |qm] that increases mono-
tonically in the correlation coefficient.10 This is, for instance, the case for the generalized
Farie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula distribution (FMG), where
E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm] = wm(qm)− δ{E[q∗−m ]− ρ(σmσ−mcm
)[
1
N
]
[1− 2Fq∗m(qm)]
}
. (2.7)
To see why the parameter space needs to be restricted when δ and ρ take opposite signs,
consider the case of negatively correlated substitutes (ρ < 0, δ > 0). Due to substitutability,
the true marginal willingness to pay in market m, vm(qm, q−m), decreases in q−m. Moreover,
the conditional expectation E[q∗−m |qm] is decreasing because the supply is negatively corre-
lated. The stronger the negative correlation, the steeper its slope. Together this implies that
the expected marginal willingness to pay is decreasing only if |δ| and |ρ| are sufficiently low.
2.4 Equilibrium
The first part of the article derives the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Before stating
the main theorem, I explain how agents choose their bids in any, not necessarily symmetric,
10Notice, that not all distributions feature a conditional expectation that is increasing in the correlation
coefficient. The opposite restriction of the parameters holds if it decreases as the correlation increases. When
it is non-monotone in the correlation coefficient, the assumption has no intuitive appeal.
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equilibrium. To build an intuition for bidding incentives in simultaneous pay-as-bid auctions
it helps to review how bidders behave in an isolated pay-as-bid auction.
Bidding incentives in a stand-alone pay-as-bid auction are similar to those in the well-known
first-price auction. In the later, agents only buy one unit of the object, that is, the object it-
self, placing one bid. In the pay-as-bid auction, they pick several bid prices for several units.
When the good is perfectly divisible, a unit becomes a quantity, qm. Each unit-bid must be
chosen optimally. It satisfies a necessary condition, which may be seen as the “multi-unit
counterpart of the equilibrium condition for bidding in a first-price auction” (Kastl (2017)
p. 7). It describes the trade-off an agent faces when choosing a unit-bid: He “trades off
the expected surplus on the marginal (infinitesimal) unit versus the probability of winning
it” (Kastl (2017) p. 7). The following Lemma formalizes this trade-off. It is taken from
Hortac¸su and McAdams (2018) who themselves builds on Fe´vrier et al. (2004) and Hortac¸su
(2002) with slight modifications to fit the model and notation presented here.
Lemma 1. Consider an isolated auction of good m, in which agent i is willing to pay vm(qm)
for amount qm. A BNE {p∗i,m(·)}Ni=1 must, for all qm and i ∈ N satisfy
[vm(qm)− pcm]
(
∂Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm)
∂pm
)
= Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm) (2.8)
and clear the market: pcm = p
∗
i,m(qm).
The right-hand side of optimality condition (2.8), Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm), represents the prob-
ability of winning the bid. More precisely, it specifies the probability that the bidder wins
at least amount qm when submitting a bid such that p
∗
i,m(qm) = p
c
m. In other words, it
is the likelihood that the market will clear at some price lower than pcm. The left-hand
side represents the expected surplus on the marginal (infinitesimal) unit. It is the differ-
ence between the agent’s true marginal valuation for amount qm and the price he pays p
c
m,
[vm(qm) − pcm], weighted by the probability that the market actually clears at this price,
∂Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm) /∂pm.
Bidding incentives in interconnected pay-as-bid auctions are similar. The key difference is
that the agent now participates in two pay-as-bid auctions which offer two perfectly divisible
goods. Since these two goods might be substitutable to the agent, the agent’s true marginal
willingness to pay for amount qm depends on how much he wins in the equilibrium of the
other auction, q∗i,−m. As both auctions take place simultaneously, the agent does not know
how much he ends up winning of good −m when choosing his bids in auction m. In the
optimum, he takes the best guess. In the event of purchasing quantity qm, he expects a
marginal gain of E[vm(qm, q∗i,−m)|qm]. Hereby he anticipates that all agents will play the
equilibrium strategy in the other auctions.
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Lemma 2. Consider an interconnected auction of good m, in which agent i is willing to pay
vm(qm, q−m) for amount qm conditional on winning q−m. A BNE {p∗i,1(·), p∗i,2(·)}Ni=1 must for
all {q1, q2} and i ∈ N satisfy
[E[vm(qm, q∗i,−m)|qm]− pcm]
(
∂Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm)
∂pm
)
= Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm) (2.9)
for m = 1, 2;−m 6= m, and clear both markets pcm = p∗i,m(qm).
Notice that in the stand-alone auction Pr (RSi,m(p
c
m) ≥ qm) is given by the one-dimensional
distribution of the good’s clearing price. In the interconnected environment it becomes the
marginal distribution, yet again to be evaluated at pcm. Unless auctions are stochastically
independent, this marginal distribution must be derived from the joint distribution.11
In the symmetric framework assumed in this article, where all bidders know their type and
only total supply is unknown, all agents split the total amount for sale equally in equilibrium.
Each wins q∗2 ≡ Q2N . In a more general environment, there might be other factors than the
total supply that agents are uncertain about. They could, for instance, each have a private
type. The optimality condition generalizes to such environments. Neither does it depend on
any particular functional form of the utility or the joint distribution of the clearing prices.12
Thanks to its generality, Allen et al. (2018) use a discretized version of it to estimate the
interdependencies across pay-as-bid auctions.
Abstracting from other types of uncertainty allows me to prove the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium and derive a closed form solution of the bidding function. In a nutshell, the
necessary conditions become a linear differential equation when imposing symmetry across
all bidders. They have a unique solution from which no bidder has an incentive to deviate.
Theorem 3. Let total supply quantities be drawn from a (joint) distribution with weakly
decreasing (marginal) hazard rates. There exists a ‘unique’ symmetric Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in which all agents submit
p∗m(qm) = E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm]+ ∫ q∗m
qm
(
∂E
[
vm
(
x,q∗−m
) |x]
∂qm
)[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
dx (2.10)
for relevant quantities [0, q∗m] and both goods m = 1, 2,−m 6= m.
Similar to Holmberg (2009) the existence of my equilibrium hinges on the assumption that
total supply has a (here marginal) distribution with weakly decreasing hazard rate. More re-
cently Pycia and Woodward (2017) have derived a weaker condition for equilibrium existence
11The joint distribution specifies the probability that the bidder wins at least quantity q1 when submitting a
bid such that b∗i,1(q1) = p
c
1 in auction 1 and at least quantity q2 when submitting a bid such that p
∗
i,2(q2) = p
c
2
in auction 2: Pr (RSi,1(p
c
1)) ≥ q1 and RSi,2(pc2) ≥ q2).
12To be more precise, it holds for any utility function that is twice differentiable and has continuous
cross-partial derivatives, and all distribution functions which are differentiable.
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in stand-alone pay-as-bid auctions. Unfortunately their proof does not generalize to simul-
taneous auctions because it is not possible to solve for the bidder’s best reply by maximizing
point-wise for each quantity. There are two reasons for why point-wise maximization is no
longer feasible when considering simultaneous auctions that are stochastically interdepen-
dent. First, the bidder’s objective functional of Definition 3, V(pi,1(·), pi,2(·)), which can be
expressed as
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0 F(q1, q2, pi,1(q1), pi,2(q2))dq1dq2, is not additively separable in pi,1(q1) and
pi,2(q2). It is not possible to determine optimal bidding functions separately in first fixing q1
to find p∗1(q1) and then fixing q2 to find p
∗
2(q2). Second, since the bidding function in auction
1 cannot depend on the amount of auction 2, one cannot fix both q1 and q2 and optimize
point-wise over pi,1(q1) and pi,2(q2). Instead of point-wise maximization one must maximize
over the entire functions. As this article focuses on deriving policy recommendation rather
than providing the most general theory of interconnected pay-as-bid auctions I leave it for
future work to specify weaker existence conditions than supply distributions with weakly
decreasing hazard rates.
The strictly decreasing bidding function (2.10) is unique on the set of relevant quantities
qm ∈ [0, q∗m]. Higher amounts are infeasible in equilibrium, and are therefore uninteresting.
Bidders may choose any bid prices for those high amounts as long as their bidding function
is differentiable and decreasing on the whole domain [0, Qm]. One intuitive possibility is the
case where all behave truthfully for infeasible amounts:
p∗m(qm) = E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm] for qm > q∗m.
When δ = 0 goods are independent agents behave like in a stand-alone auction selling good
m in which they each have a true marginal willingness to pay of wm(qm):
δ = 0 : E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm] (2.6)= wm(qm).
The equilibrium bidding function coincides with Pycia and Woodward (2017). It is, in ad-
dition, analogous to Holmberg (2009)’s equilibrium in a procurement auction where bidders
are firms with non-decreasing marginal costs (here decreasing valuations) and submit up-
ward sloping supply functions (here decreasing demand functions). Because a bidder pays as
he bids he understates his true marginal willingness to pay for each quantity point qm that
he might purchase in equilibrium wm(qm). This is similar to an independent private-value
sealed-bid first-price auction, where bidders shade their true types (see Wittwer (2018c) for
more details).
When δ 6= 0, the bidder’s marginal willingness to pay for qm depends on how much he will
purchase of the other good in equilibrium: vm(qm, q
∗
−m). The problem is that he does not
know how much he receives in the other market because both transactions take place simul-
taneously. He makes the best guess, exploiting the existing correlation between the random
supply quantities across auctions
δ 6= 0 : E[vm(qm, q∗−m |qm)]
(2.6)
= wm(qm)− δE[q∗−m |qm].
In what follows I analyze how the connection across auctions influences bidding and affects
expected revenues.
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2.5 On the Interconnection between Auctions
Recall that there are two types of interlinkages. The first comes from the demand side of
the market. It is generated by the bidders’ preferences for the goods. They may be seen
as substitutes (δ). The second is on the supply side. It is determined by the correlation
(ρ) between the total supply offered in each auction. To isolate the second effect, I specify
the joint distribution as generalized Farie-Gubmbel-Morgenstern copula (FMG). It relates
any two marginal distributions by a single parameter that reflects correlation and therefore
allows me to alter ρ without affecting anything else. To stress the dependence on the two
parameters of interest, δ, ρ, I refer to the bidding function as pm(·, δ, ρ) throughout this
section.
2.5.1 Bidding in Simultaneous Auctions
To analyze how bidding behavior responds to changes in δ and ρ, I decompose the bidding
function into two parts: one which is invariant to changes in either parameter, and one that
varies Dm(qm, δ, ρ). The invariant term coincides with the equilibrium bidding function of a
stand-alone auction with true MWTP of wm(qm).
Corollary 2. Let pSAm (·) be the equilibrium bidding function of an isolated pay-as-bid auction
in which each agent is willing to pay wm(qm) for amount qm.
In the symmetric equilibrium of an interconnected pay-as-bid auction, each agent submits
pm(qm, δ, ρ) = p
SA
m (qm)−Dm(qm, δ, ρ)
with
Dm(qm, δ, ρ) ≡ δ
{
E
[
q∗−m
]
+ ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
N(2N − 1)
]}
.
Notice that the bidding function is - for the vast majority of marginal distributions - not
linear even when the true marginal willingness to pay is linear. This property is already
known from isolated pay-as-bid auctions. Here the equilibrium is linear if and only if sup-
ply is distributed according to the generalized pareto distribution (Ausubel et al. (2014)).
When auctions are interconnected (δ 6= 0), the bidding function is non-linear even for many
marginal distributions within this class of distributions. This is because most distributions
assume non-linear conditional expectations, E[q∗−m |qm], which in turn leads to a discount fac-
tor that is non-linear. From the formula, we see that Fq∗m(qm) has to be linear for Dm(qm, δ, ρ)
to be linear. This is the case for very few exceptions, as, for example, the uniform distri-
bution. It gives rise to linear bidding functions in isolated and interconnected pay-as-bid
auctions.
12Schucany et al. (1978) relate parameter θ to the correlation parameter. They define cm (which they call
δj) in expression (4) on p. 650 as cm = −
∫
Qm[1 − 2FQm(Qm)]dFQm(Qm) and show it is strictly positive.
Crane and van der Hoek (2008) implicitly express cm as cm =
∫
FQm [1−FQm ]dQm when deriving equivalent
formulas for the condition expectation on p. 56.
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The two parameters that measure the auctions’ interconnectedness, δ and ρ, influence bid-
ding behavior only via the discount factor Dm(qm, δ, ρ). To understand how bidders react to
more closely connected auction markets we consequently must understand how it depends
on these parameters. The higher it is the lower the marginal bid.
Corollary 3. Let δ > 0.
(i) Dm(qm, δ, ρ) > 0, (ii) Dm(qm, δ, ρ) = δE[q∗−m ] for ρ = 0,
(iii) ∂Dm(qm,δ,ρ)
∂δ
> 0 ∀ρ 6= 0, (iv) ∂Dm(qm,δ,ρ)
∂ρ
> 0, (v) ∂Dm(qm,δ,ρ)
∂qm
> 0 if ρ > 0, < 0 if ρ < 0.
Intuition suggests that competition weakens when bidders have access to another market that
offers a substitute. Indeed, marginal bids for substitutes are discounted more strongly relative
to a stand-alone auction (statement (i)). The closer the substitutes, the less aggressive the
bidding (statement (iii)). The higher the likelihood of equally sized total supply quantities
the weaker the competition among bidders (statement (iv)). When supply is independently
drawn across markets (ρ = 0), the bidder discounts a bid for a particular quantity of good
m precisely by how much he expects to value the good less because it is a substitute to the
one for sale in the other market (statement (ii)). The bidding function shifts downward in
parallel. More interesting is the analysis when auctions are stochastically connected (ρ 6= 0).
Now the bidders no longer simply discount each of their marginal bids by their expected
marginal loss or gain in utility. Instead, they exploit the existing correlation between supply
quantities to reduce the uncertainty that they are facing. This generates bid shading that
differs across quantities. The bidding function no longer simply shifts downward but changes
its slope (statement (v)). When competing for positively correlated substitutes, bidders
submit a steeper bidding function than they would in a stand-alone auction. Two factors
drive this behavior: When the bidder wins a lot in one auction he is likely to win a lot also
in the other auction since supply is positively correlated. The more he wins of the substitute
good in the other auction the less he values the amount in the auction at hand. As a result,
the bidder bids less aggressively for higher quantities. The opposite holds when supply is
negatively correlated.
2.5.2 Policy Recommendations
So far I have analyzed the auctions from the view point of the bidders. We have seen how
they bid optimally in interconnected pay-as-bid auctions and react to changes in the environ-
ment. A seller can anticipate such bidding behavior. Can he thereby raise higher revenues?
In equilibrium, a seller always sells the entire quantity he puts up for sale. To increase rev-
enues he therefore only cares about the prices bidders pay, not the quantity they demand.
Taken the market design as given, he has two possibilities to exploit the feature that his auc-
tion is interconnected to another auction to abstract more rent from the bidders. First, he
can choose the type of good he puts up for sale. If possible, he should offer an independent
good. More generally revenue increases the lower the degree of substitutability as higher
competition among bidders drives up their marginal bids ((iii) of Corollary 3). Secondly, he
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can coordinate his decision on how much to sell with the seller of the other auction. If he
himself organizes both auctions, such coordination is not even needed. To increase revenues
supply should be negatively correlated ((iv) or Corollary 3). Put differently, the amount for
sale should be uneven in size with high probability.
Policy Recommendation 1.
(a) Offer independent goods to foster competition across auctions.
(b) When goods are substitutes, supply should with high probability differ in size:
The lower the correlation of supply quantities, the higher the revenue in each auction.
Provided issuers of government securities know the degree of substitutability across goods
these recommendations can easily be put into practice. Consider the example of Treasury
auctions. Say two securities which differ more strongly in terms of risk and maturities are less
substitutable to one another than two that are more similar. According to recommendation
(a) governments should sell the 12-week bills in parallel with the 30-year bonds rather than
with the 36-week bills to raise the necessary funds at an overall lower cost. This is not in
line with common practices of most governments. They tend to cluster securities which are
similar.13 The US, for instance, sells the most liquid securities (bills) always separately from
securities with longer maturities (notes and bonds).14 Similarly, neither France nor Canada
mix across security categories. While there might be reasons for this policy that my model
abstracts from, such as promoting more favorable price dynamics in the secondary market,
my work suggests a revision of such practices.
In addition, the government could increase higher revenues by issuing total supply quanti-
ties that are negatively correlated (recommendation (b). In countries in which the auctioneer
has the right to adapt the total amount for sale during the auction, this recommendation
can be implemented directly by drawing from a joint distribution that features a negative
correlation. When the total supply is known to all bidders, and cannot be changed during
the auction, the seller must find an indirect way to take the recommendation to practice.
One way is to stimulate the participation of non-competitive tenders in one auction and dis-
courage it in the other. Recall that non-competitive tenders specify a quantity that is won
with certainty. From the perspective of a regular, competitive bidder this would have the
same effect as fine-tuning the correlation parameter directly. He only cares about the total
amount for sale net of non-competitive tenders, which would with high probability differ in
size.
Perfect Substitutes. When two auctions sell the same good, sellers could go one step
further than coordinating. They could join forces and organize one big pay-as-bid auc-
tion. By definition, a pay-as-bid auction sells units of the same good. Without changing
13Japan is an exception. It regularly sells T-bills together with long-term bonds (see https://www.mof.
go.jp/english/jgbs/auction/calendar/index.htm, updated July 2018)
14See the tentative auction calendar for 2018 under https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
data-chart-center/quarterly-refunding/Documents/auctions.pdf
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the auction design such integration is therefore only possible when goods are identical, or
more loosely speaking perfectly substitutable. Coming back to my motivating example of
Treasury auctions, European countries could issue a single European government bond in a
single Treasury auction. Furthermore, countries like France or Canada could combine their
simultaneous, but separate auctions for bonds with the same or very close maturity dates.
To find out whether integrating both markets increases revenues, I compare bidding behavior
in two separate auctions, each selling the same good, with behavior in one integrated auction.
To do so, I adapt the framework as follows: First I make the two goods identical by specifying
V (q1, q2) =
∑
m
[
s− δ
2
qm
]
qm − δq1q2. (2.11)
Now either partial utility vm(qm, q−m) = s − δqm − δq−m decreases in good m by the same
amount it decreases in the other good. Moreover, to create perfectly symmetric market
conditions, I let the supply of each of the two separate auctions be drawn from the same
marginal distribution FQ(·) on [0, Q]. The combined auction sells twice as much of the good.
Its total amount for sale is drawn from a distribution F2Q(·) on support [0, 2Q]. It is identical
to FQ(·) just stretched out over the larger support.
With these changes to the set-up, consider first the separate auctions. As a starting point
assume that the total supply quantities are perfectly positive correlated. Since both markets
are ex-post identical, a bidder expects to win q also in the other auction conditional on
observing q: E[q∗−m |q] = q. According to Theorem 3, the bidder submits
p(q) = s− 2δq − 2δ
∫ q∗
0
[
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]N−1
N
dx
for q ∈ [0, q∗] in the symmetric equilibrium in both auctions. In comparison, consider the
integrated auction, which sells double the amount of the good all in one auction. Since there
is only one market that offers the good, there is no need to differentiate where the amount is
purchased: q1 = q2 ≡ q. The total utility from purchasing q+q = 2q is V (q, q) (2.11)= 2sq−2δq2.
The bidder’s true marginal willingness to pay for this amount is ∂V (q,q)
∂q
= 2s − 4δq. From
Theorem 3 with δ = 0 it follows that he bids
pIA(2q) = 2s− 4δq − 4δ
∫ 2q∗
0
[
1− F2q∗(2x)
1− F2q∗(2q)
]N−1
N
dx
for 2q ∈ [0, 2q∗]. Since, by construction, the integrals of both bidding functions are identical
pIA(2q) = 2p(q). On the aggregate, bidders thus submit the same price in the two separated
auctions as they do in the integrated market. The following corollary summarizes.
Corollary 4. In two separate auctions which offer supply quantities of the same good that
are perfectly positive correlated, agents bid as if they competed in just one single auction that
sells all at once. They split their bid offers equally across markets.
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For the sellers, this result has an important implication: For any fixed realization of supply,
they achieve as much revenue in an integrated auction as they do on the aggregate in two
separate auctions given supply is perfectly correlated. From Corollary 3 (iv) we know that
the revenue of each of these separated but interconnected auctions can be raised by decreas-
ing the correlation of total supply. Together this implies that sellers can do strictly better
when leaving the auctions separated as long as they do not offer the same total supply with
certainty. Integrating two auctions into one turns out to be revenue decreasing.
Policy Recommendation 2. Selling a perfectly divisible good in two separate pay-as-bid
auctions leads to higher revenue than selling all units of the good in one single auction, as
long as the total amounts for sale are not perfectly positively correlated across auctions.
This is good news for many issuers of government securities. It provides a rationale to offer
highly substitutable securities at the same time, yet in separate parallel auctions. Those
securities could to be the most liquid bills that only differ slightly in maturity dates. They
are already issued in parallel auctions in many large economies.
2.6 Conclusion
This article introduces a model of interconnected pay-as-bid auctions, which simultaneously
sell each a perfectly divisible good to the same group of bidders, who are uncertain about the
total supply for sale in each auction that is issued at random. I focus on two sources of in-
terconnection. The first comes from the bidders’ preferences for the two goods for sale; they
might view them as substitutes. The second is on the supply side of the market. It is deter-
mined by the correlation between the total supply across auctions. I show that marginal bids
for substitutes decrease the higher the substitutability across auctions or the more positive
the correlation between supply. To raise higher revenues, sellers should offer independent
goods and issue uneven sizes of total supply with high probability when goods are substitutes.
Auctioneers of identical goods should split its total supply and sell it in parallel auctions
to foster competition among bidders. Taken into real life, this finding provides a rationale
for governments and central banks to hold parallel auctions of closely substitutable securities.
There are multiple avenues for further research both theoretically and empirically. One could
study how the pay-as-bid auction compares the uniform-price auction. My analysis general-
izes without complications to the other most popular multi-unit auction format. Given that
the literature on stand-alone auctions has not found a consensus on which auction format
is superior, a comparison of the two in presence of substitutes could bring valuable insights.
Finally, the model can be taken to the data so as to structurally estimate its parameters,
or back out the bidders’ marginal valuations. Allen et al. (2018) use a discretized version
of the necessary condition presented above to quantify interdependencies in the demand for
government securities with data from Canadian Treasury auctions.
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Chapter 3
I dentifying Dependenciesin the Demand for Government Securities
with Jason Allen1 and Jakub Kastl2
3.1 Introduction
The objective of the Office of Debt Management (ODM) of the U.S. and of the corresponding
offices in most countries is to achieve the “lowest cost of financing over time.” In order to
fulfill this objective, the ODM has to decide how to sell the debt: what format to use, which
securities to offer and how to allocate a given target amount across different securities. Since
the securities are clearly not independent, it is important to evaluate the full demand system
when making such decisions. Previous literature, discussed further below, has addressed the
issue of the choice of format. The focus of this paper is to propose a method for identifying
the dependencies of demands across different securities in order to help policymakers make
a more informed decision on how to split the supply across securities of different maturities.
A central issue that arises when estimating demand systems is unobserved heterogeneity:
how to make sure that variation in quantity choices is attributable to variation in prices and
not something omitted that is correlated with price, for instance quality in case of a typical
discrete choice model. This is usually addressed by employing instruments aimed at isolating
such exogenous variation by making the appropriate exogeneity and validity assumptions.
We, instead, utilize a particular institutional feature that is surprisingly common in auctions
of government debt such as those run by the US, Japan, Brazil, France, China and Canada:
different securities (i.e., Treasury bills and bonds of different maturities) are sold simulta-
neously in parallel auctions. We extend previous results on identifying willingness to pay
from bidding data in auctions to allow for the willingness to pay to depend on not only the
allocation of the underlying security, but also on holdings of securities of other maturities.
This setup enables us to estimate a full demand system in the primary (i.e., auction) market,
allowing for any potential substitution patterns across securities, including complementari-
ties.
1Bank of Canada: The presented views are those of the authors, not necessarily of the Bank.
2Princeton University, NBER and CEPR
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More specifically, we use data on all 3, 6, 12-month Canadian Treasury bill auctions from
2002 to 2015 to estimate a model of simultaneous pay-as-bid auctions. We extend recent
techniques for estimating bidders’ marginal willingness to pay in individual multi-unit auc-
tions developed by Hortac¸su (2002) and Kastl (2011) who build on the pioneering work of
Guerre et al. (2000).3 The related theoretic literature is more advanced in this regard (e.g.
Wittwer (2018a,b)). Typically, multi-unit auctions are held simultaneously, or sequentially,
but over a very short time-span. Valuations that the auction participants attach to the
different securities are, among other things, a function of the options available in the parallel
auctions. These valuations, therefore, should be estimated jointly.
We find non-negligible interdependencies in the bidders’ demand for government securities.
The most liquid security (the 3-month bill) is complementary to either of the two longer ma-
turities (the 6 and 12-month bill). We estimate that the marginal valuation for a 3-month
T-bill increases when going from an allocation with no other T-bills of other maturities at all
to an allocation corresponding to the average observed allocations of 6 and 12-month bills
(about 200 million each) by about 0.5 basis points. Seemingly small in absolute size this
“cross-market” effect is actually relatively large compared to the “own-market” effect: the
marginal value for the 3-month bill drops by about 1 basis point when going from none to
400 million of these bills. Moreover, financial institutions who participate in the auctions for
longer maturities exhibit a shift in preferences over the course of our sample period (2002-
2015). During the global financial crisis (2007-2010) the 3-month bill was a substitute for
bidders in the 6-month as well as the 12-month auction. Going from none to the observed
average allocation of the 3-month bill decreases the bidder’s willingness to pay in the 6/12-
month auction by about 0.5/1.2 basis points, respectively. However, after the crisis we find
that they are no longer substitutable. In the most recent years (2011-2015) all maturities
have become complementary for bidders in all auctions with one exception. For participants
in the 12-month auction, the 3-month bill behaves essentially as an independent good. Com-
pared to the period before the crisis, the degree of complementarity has increased across all
maturities.
This result may seem surprising. Securities that are highly similar in terms of risk are typi-
cally classified as substitutes. Dating back to the 1960s, there has been a long lasting debate
in monetary economics about the degree of substitutability of “cash-like” assets. One exam-
ple is Sertelis and Robb (1986). They estimate the degree of substitution between Canadian
monetary assets (namely narrow money, other checkable deposits, savings and time deposits)
in a model with a money-in-the-utility function. In line with most articles of this early lit-
erature, they find a low degree of substitution.4 The more recent financial literature most
3Using economic models, researchers recover the marginal willingness to pay that rationalizes each ob-
served bid (e.g. Fe´vrier et al. (2004), Armantier and Sba¨ı (2006), Hortac¸su and McAdams (2010), Hortac¸su
and Kastl (2012), Cassola et al. (2012), Hortac¸su et al. (2018)). These papers then proceed to analyze
whether the auction mechanism is revenue-maximizing, whether it leads to an efficient allocation, or to ad-
dress other economic questions of interest, such as quantifying the information advantage of observing the
order flow of customers.
4See Feige and Pearce (1977) for an early survey on “the degree of substitution between money and
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commonly uses term-structure models to study interdependencies across maturities. Green-
wood and Vayanos (2014), for instance, argue that an increase in the government’s supply
of long-term bonds would raise the spread between long and short rates. Oftentimes a posi-
tive correlation of yield curves for Treasury securities is taken as a sign of substitution. To
identify such correlations, various papers have relied on changes in the supply of Treasury
securities. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) and D’ Aamico et al. (2012), for
example, analyze how changes in the supply of T-bills affect yield spreads of different se-
curities, suggesting imperfect substitutability between short and long-term maturities. In
a similar vein, Carlson et al. (2016) use exogenous shifts in the supply of Treasury bills to
document substitutability between public and private short-term debt. Lou et al. (2013),
instead, focuses on the link between the primary and secondary market. They document
that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days
leading up to Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter. This is true not only for the
government security that is about to be issued, but also for related maturities.5 Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2011) study the impact of Quantitative Easing on interest
rates and argue that dependencies of prices (yields) across different asset classes is key when
evaluating the policy - a point which we further build upon in this paper.
To explain why bills might be complementary in the primary market we introduce a formal
model. On the one hand, those with direct access to the auction might keep some of the
bills they win to use them as collateral in other financial markets or to fulfill their regula-
tory requirements.6 On the other hand, they can sell them in the secondary market. The
quantity they demand in the primary market is, therefore, to a large extent driven by the
expectations about future demand for the bills after the auction. In the secondary market,
different clients demand different maturities. To avoid having to turn any of them down, to
borrow the bills in the repurchase market or buy them at higher prices after the auction,
bidders want to purchase enough bills of different maturities at auction. This generates
complementarities across maturities in the primary market even if bills are substitutes in the
secondary market. Our findings can be viewed as complementary to the existing research:
Our focus is on the primary market and how to determine the supply of various maturities
there. Different securities can be complementary for the primary dealers while behaving as
substitutes in the aggregate.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the institutional
environment and the data set. Section 3.3 presents our evidence for interdependencies across
maturities. Section 3.3.1 begins by documenting some patterns in the raw data that point
towards interdependencies; Section 3.3.2 gives a preview of how we identify interdependen-
near-moneys” (p. 441).
5According to their hypothesis, “primary dealers hedge the risk they are expected to acquire at auctions
by short selling similar securities, thus exerting downward price pressure in the secondary markets before
these auctions” (p. 16).
6Participants in the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation, for instance, have minimum requirements
to post treasuries as collateral.
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cies and summarizes the key identifying assumptions; Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 describe the
structural model and our estimation strategy. Estimation findings are presented in Section
3.3.5. Section 3.4 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix C.1.
3.2 Institutional Environment and Data
3.2.1 Institutional Environment
In Canada, Treasury bills are issued with three maturities: 3, 6 and 12 months. Since 1998
they are sold every second Thursday by the Bank of Canada (BoC) in three separate pay-
as-bid auctions which run in parallel. All three securities have a face value of 1 million
(Canadian) dollars which must be paid back at the time the security matures. There are
two groups of bidders: “dealers” and “customers.” Dealers are either primary dealers or
government securities distributors. Customers are institutions that choose not to become
primary dealers, but are large enough that the Bank of Canada requires to track their hold-
ings separately. They can only submit bids through primary dealers. They choose not to
register as dealers, perhaps to sidestep the necessary additional monitoring or to avoid the
obligations dealers must fulfill to maintain their dealer status.7 One example is Desjardin
Securities. As the securities division of one of the largest Canadian financial institutions with
over C$258.4 billion total assets in 2017,8 it is a primary dealer in the bond market, but only
a customer in the Treasury market. Similarly, both Casgrain & Company and JPMorgan
are not registered as primary dealers and yet are very important players in the Canadian
government securities markets (Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012), p. 2514).
From the time the tender call opens until the multi-unit auction closes, bidders may submit
and update their bids. There are two types of bids: competitive and non-competitive. A
competitive bid is a step-function with at most 7 steps. “These bids must be stated in
multiples of a $1,000, subject to the condition that each individual bid be for a minimum
of $100,000. Each bid shall state the yield to maturity to three decimal places” (Bank of
Canada (2016), p. 2). For the most part for this paper we convert yields into prices, using
yield =
(
face value− price
price
)(
365
days
)
(3.1)
with a face value of $C1 million and days denoting the days left to maturity. Using prices
instead of yields makes bidding as well as demand schedules decreasing rather than increas-
ing. The bid step-function specifies how much a bidder offers to pay for specific amounts
of the asset for sale. Figure 3.1a depicts an example - the choice of the median dealer in
a 12-month auction.9 He offers to pay 98.68 thousand dollars for the first 50 million units.
7For more details see Sections 10 and 11 in Bank of Canada (2016).
8See https://www.desjardins.com/ca/about-us/desjardins/who-we-are/quick-facts/index.jsp
9The median step-function is computed as follows: Determine the median number of steps in all com-
petitive bid functions submitted by dealers, and then take the median over all (price, quantity) tuples
corresponding to each step that were submitted by a dealer who submitted the median number of steps.
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Figure 3.1: Bids
(a) Comp. Bid for 12M (Median Dealer)
(b) Time to Deadline
(very early & late bids excluded)
For the next 50 he offers to pay less, and so on. In addition to a competitive bid, each
bidder may submit one non-competitive tender. This is a quantity order, which the bidder
will win for sure, but for which he needs to pay the average price of all accepted competitive
bid prices. It is capped at 3 million dollars for dealers and 5 million dollars for customers,
and hence it is trivial relative to the competitive order sizes - with one exception: the Bank
of Canada itself. It utilizes non-competitive bids to reduce the previously announced total
amount for sale.10 When the auction closes, the final bids are aggregated and the market
clears where aggregate demand meets total supply. Everyone wins the amount they asked for
at the clearing price (subject to pro-rata rationing on-the-margin in case of excess demand
at the market clearing price) and pays according to what he bid. The payments for the small
non-competitive tenders are computed as weighted average of accepted competitive bids. In
the example of Figure 3.1a, the bidder wins roughly 100 million dollars and pays about 98, 68
thousand dollars per 1 million of face value for the first 50 units and a little less than 98.67
for the next 50.
3.2.2 Data
Our data set consists of all 366 Canadian T-bill auctions between 2002 and 2015. Table 3.1
summarizes the data. On average the Bank of Canada announced issuances of C$6.41 billion
for 3-month bills and C$2.47 billion for the 6 and 12-month bills per auction, of which it ac-
tually distributed roughly C$5.76 (3M) and C$2.12 billion (6/12M). The total amount issued
per year was C$81 billion for the 3-month bills and C$29 billion of the longer maturities.
10The amounts purchased are typically divided across maturities as a proportion of what is supplied. The
amounts purchased depend on the Bank’s projection of expected future demand for notes and the amount
of T-bills maturing over the following weeks. See Statement of Policy, 2015
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Figure 3.2: Time Series of Total Supply and Individual Demand
The gray bar marks the crisis period from 2007-08-09 until 2009-04-02.
(a) Distributed Total Supply (b) Avg Indiv. Dem. & Net position of 12M bill
Figure 3.2a displays the time series of distributed supply per maturity. Since the distributed
amounts of the two longer maturities are nearly identical, the red dots corresponding to
the 6-month bills are virtually perfectly masked by the yellow ones for the 12-month bills.
The gray bar highlights the period of the financial crisis, from 9 August 2007 (when BNP
Paribas froze three of its U.S. funds) until 2 April 2009 (when the G20 countries announced
the stimulus package), during which the BoC increased its supply.
We can identify each bidder individually through a bidder ID and we know if the institution
is a dealer or a customer. In total we observe 21 dealers and 76 customers over the sam-
ple period. The average auction has about 11-12 dealers and 5-6 customers participating.
Roughly 71% of participants bid for all three maturities. Such “global participation” is even
more regular among dealers. To keep their bidder status as government security distributor
or primary dealer they have to be active in the primary market.11 Consequently, almost all
who are active in a given auction week go to all three auctions (95%).
We observe all bids submitted from the opening of the tender call until the auction closes.
The entire updating period lasts one week, although, as shown in Figure 3.1b, most bids
come in within 10 to 20 minutes prior to auction close. Figure 3.1b depicts box plots of the
11“At every auction, a primary dealer’s bids, and bids from its customers, must total a minimum of 50
per cent of its auction limit and/or 50 per cent of its formula calculation, rounded upward to the nearest
percentage point, whichever is less. [. . .] Each government securities distributor must submit at least one
winning competitive or non-competitive bid on its own behalf or on behalf of customers, every six months.”
(Bank of Canada (2016), p. 12).
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Table 3.1: Data Summary of 3M/6M/12M Auctions
The sample starts January 2002 and ends December 2015. There are 366 auctions per maturity. The total
number of competitive bids (including updates) in the 3,6,12-month auctions is 66382, 48927, and 56721, re-
spectively. These individual steps make up 18272, 15514 and 17077 different step-functions. The total number
of non-competitive bids across maturities is 2477, 2378, and 1932. From the raw data we drop competitive
bids with missing bid price (133) and competitive or non-competitive tenders with missing quantities (69).
Global participation is the probability of attending the remaining auctions, conditional on bidding for one
maturity. Dollar amounts are in billions of C$.
Mean SD Min Max
3M 6M 12M 3M 6M 12M 3M 6M 12M 3M 6M 12M
Issued amount 5.76 2.12 2.12 1.68 0.52 0.52 3.05 1.22 1.22 10.40 3.80 3.80
Dealers 11.88 11.79 11.03 0.90 0.93 0.83 9 9 9 13 13 12
Global participation 93.67 93.84 98.84 24.34 24.04 10.67 0 0 0 100 100 100
Customers 6.26 5.68 5.35 2.69 2.94 2.54 1 0 0 14 13 15
Global participation 35.66 40.13 39.46 47.90 49.02 48.88 0 0 0 100 100 100
Comp demand as %
Of announced sup. 16.29 16.91 17.02 7.96 7.61 7.31 0.002 0.019 0.005 25 25 25
Submitted steps 4.83 4.23 4.35 1.86 1.78 1.75 1 1 1 7 7 7
Updates by dealer 2.89 2.18 2.48 3.58 2.87 3.18 0 0 0 31 31 42
Updates by customer 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.58 0 0 0 4 3 9
Non-comp dem. as %
Of announced sup. 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.10 5/105 4/105 2/103 0.24 0.58 0.58
time at which bids arrive prior to the deadline, excluding very early outliers and bids that
go in after auction closure. There are very few bids that arrive after the deadline (231 out
of 57,650).12 22 of them win despite being late. We therefore keep late bids in our sample
for estimation. Typically a dealer updates his bid (competitive or non-competitive) once or
twice. The median number of updates is one. The higher average (2.26) is driven by outliers,
with a maximum number of 42 updates. Customers are less likely to update with an average
number of 0.1 (and a median of 0, i.e. no updates).
An average step-function of a competitive tender has 4.5 steps with little difference across
maturities. Non-competitive tenders are rather small in size. On average bidders only
demand 0.1% of the total (announced) supply via non-competitive tender, with a maximal
share of 0.58%. Given their small magnitude, competitive tenders do not seem to play an
important role in the decision process of regular participants. Our structural model will
abstract from non-competitive bids, and focus solely on the decision of placing competitive
bids. The BoC, on the other hand, demands substantial amounts in form of non-competitive
bids to reduce the total supply on the day of the auction, which generages substantial
uncertainty about the available supply - and our model will need to account for this. On
average, it takes away 11.13%, (3M) 14.35% (6M), 14.26% (12M) with a maximum of 20.45%
(3M), 41.66% (6M), 25.00% (12M) of the total supply it previously announced.
12Bids can show up as late in our data if a bidder manually phones the Bank of Canada to place a bid
just before closing and the Bank takes some time to process it.
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3.3 Interdependencies
Parallel auctions of different maturities might be interconnected on the supply and the
demand side. On the supply side, the Bank of Canada might determine the total amounts
for sale at each auction jointly, which leads to non-zero correlations of the sold amounts
across maturities. To understand where interdependencies on the demand side may come
from, it is useful to take a step back and ask what motivates financial institutions’ activity in
Treasury auctions. For one, they might want to keep some of the bills in their own inventory.
Treasury bills serve as collateral in interbank markets and repo transactions and are popular
to fulfill capital or liquidity requirements for save assets. Second, most bidders (primary
dealers) are obligated to act as market makers in the secondary market. Therefore they buy
securities of different maturities in order to sell them to clients on the secondary market.
To avoid having to turn down clients with demand for different maturities in the days that
follow the auction, dealers want to buy bundles of maturities. How much each bidder values
the securities depends on the bank’s own balance sheets and other factors that are internal
to the institution. It is the presence of such private information that makes it complicated
to measure interdependencies on the demand side. Bidders with private information (that
might be correlated across maturities) have incentives to shade their bids so as to minimize
the prices they will have to pay for each unit they win. To estimate how complementary or
substitutable bills are, we first have to back out how much bidders are truly willing to pay.
Without modeling how banks bid, it is not possible to measure interdependencies their true
demand. In the following section, we provide suggestive empirical evidence. Although these
results should be examined with caution, they do present some initial evidence in the raw
data of interdependencies in the Treasury bill primary market.
3.3.1 Reduced-Form Empirical Evidence of Interdependencies
To begin our analysis, Table 3.2 displays correlations on the supply (3.2a) and demand side
(3.2b) of Canadian Treasuries. The amount that the BoC announces to supply exhibits per-
fect positive correlation across maturities. In fact, over our long sample it always announces
the exact same issuance amount for the 6 and 12-months bills. The amount it actually
distributes on the auction day is also almost perfectly correlated, ranging between 0.99 and
1.13 We observe a similar pattern on the demand side. The total amount financial insti-
tutions demand individually (via competitive or non-competitive tender) when the auction
closes is highly positively correlated across maturities, about 0.91 − 0.92. This pattern is
13Canadian policy markers perform stochastic simulations to determine a debt management strategy that
is desirable in the longer horizon, e.g. 10 years. The model (publicly available at https://github.com/
bankofcanada/CDSM) trades off risks and costs of different ways to decompose debt over the full spectrum of
Canadian government securities. Part of the simulation routine is to specify ratios between maturities, for
instance 1/4th of each of the 3/6/12-month bills and 1/16th of each of the 2/5/10/30-year bonds (see Table
2 on p. 35 in Bolder (2003)). Final issuance decisions are taken based on model simulations and judgment.
“The typical practice [of the Bank of Canada] is to split the total amount purchased by the Bank, so that the
Banks purchases approximate the same proportions of issuance by the government across the three maturity
tranches” (Bank of Canada (2015) p. 5).
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suggestive of banks having preferences for buying assets in some fixed proportion, pointing
towards complementarities. Since the correlation between quantities actually won drops to
0.54 − 0.57 (for all maturities) it seems that the banks do not always succeed in achieving
this goal.
Table 3.2: Cross-Market Correlations
(a) Supply Side
Q¯3M Q¯6M Q¯12M Q3M Q6M Q12M
Q¯3M 1.00 Q3M 1.00
Q¯6M 1.00 1.00 Q6M 0.99 1.00
Q¯12M 1.00 1.00 1.00 Q12M 0.99 1.00 1.00
Q¯m is the announced, Qm the distributed supply for m = 3, 6, 12M
(b) Demand Side
qD3M,i q
D
6M,i q
D
12M,i q
∗
3M,i q
∗
6M,i q
∗
12M,i
qD3M,i 1.00 q
∗
3M,i 1.00
qD6M,i 0.92 1.00 q
∗
6M,i 0.57 1.00
qD12M,i 0.91 0.91 1.00 q
∗
12M,i 0.54 0.57 1.00
qDm,i is bidder i’s demand, q
∗
m,i the amount won for m = 3, 6, 12M
Another piece of evidence suggesting dependencies across auctions concerns updating behav-
ior by dealers. Observing their customer orders, dealers may update their own bids. This
can be because the customer bids provide information just about competition or also about
the fundamental security value (Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012)). The demand for bills across
auctions are likely interconnected if dealers, upon observing a customer order flow (which
may be concentrated only in one maturity), update their own bids across all maturities.
To be more concrete, say a dealer observes a customer bid in the 3-month auction. This
triggers the dealer to update his own bid for the 3-month bill. If his demand for 3,6 and
12-month bills are interrelated, this should then also lead to an update of bids for the other
maturities. To get a preliminary look at this pattern we run the following Probit regression
on competitive bids placed by dealers:
updatei,m = αi +
∑
m
Im (βmcustomerm + δm,−mcustomer−m) + εi,m. (3.2)
To avoid double counting, we count each step-function (as in Figure 3.1a) as one observation.
The dependent variable update takes value 1 if the dealer updated his bid in an auction,
and 0 otherwise. Im is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the update occurs in the auction
for maturity m. The independent variables customerl (for l = m or −m) are also indicator
variables. They are created in two different ways. In the more conservative specification (1)
customerl takes value 1 only if the dealer received a competitive order by his customer for
maturity l immediately before he takes action in auction m himself. The second specification
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builds on this benchmark but takes a longer sequence of events into account. It acknowledges
that it takes time to calculate bids, enter them manually (which until 2019 is the rule rather
than exception) and transfer them electronically. Table 3.3 provides an example of such a
sequence. It shows the last 10 minutes of events of a dealer before auction closure on the
10th February of 2015. Having observed a customer in the 3-month auction, he takes action
himself and places several bids in a row. Specification (1) assigns value 0 to customer3M in
the 6-month auction because the dealer has not received an order for the 3-month maturity
immediately before bidding on his own behalf for the 6-month bills (second to last column).
He first bids for the 12-month bills. The second specification assigns a value of 1 (last col-
umn). Here customerl is 1 for all bids the dealer places in a sequence (each with a time
difference of 20 seconds) if he has received an order for maturity l within one minute before
he places his own bid in auction m, or the latest order the dealer achieved is for maturity l.
Table 3.3: Sequence of Events of a Dealer on 02/10/2015 in last 10 Min Before Closure
Update in 12M for order of 3M Update in 6M for order of 3M
Bid by Time Maturity (1) (2) (1) (2)
Customer 10:19:52 3M . . . .
Dealer 10:21:59 1Y 1 1 0 0
Dealer 10:22:17 6M 0 0 0 1
Dealer 10:22:34 3M 0 0 0 0
Dealer 10:26:52 1Y 0 0 0 0
Dealer 10:27:16 1Y 0 0 0 0
Customer 10:28:34 3M . . . .
Dealer 10:28:44 3M 0 0 0 0
Table 3.4 displays the coefficients, estimated from specifications (1) and (2) in columns
(1) and (2), respectively. The significant positive βˆm coefficients support existing evidence
by Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012) on dealer updating. They found that dealers respond to
customer orders by updating their bids within the same auction. The significantly positive
δˆm,−m suggest that dealers update their bids in other maturities as well. As expected, the
level of significance increases when taking into account the fact that dealers’ bids are in
practice hardly ever simultaneous, but instead placed in close sequence. Taken together, the
evidence suggests cross-maturity updating by dealers.
3.3.2 A Preview of Our Identification Strategy
The exploratory reduced form regressions described above are clearly insufficient to quantify
the substitution patterns satisfactorily. Our goal is to consistently estimate a parameter that
measures by how much a bidder’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for some quantity of
T-bills with maturity m changes the more he owns of the other maturities −m. As a first step
we must understand what drives the MWTP in the primary market. Below we introduce a
formal model that captures the key motives for purchasing bills in the primary market. We
show that the true MWTP can be approximated by a linear function. To be more precise, let
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Table 3.4: Probability of Dealer Updating Bids
Dependent variable:
update
Coefficient Verbal description (1) (2)
βˆ3M update in 3M after order for 3M 0.533
∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.053)
δˆ3M,6M update in 3M after order for 6M 0.405
∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.061)
δˆ3M,12M update in 3M after order for 12M 0.303
∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.054)
δˆ6M,3M update in 6M after order for 3M 0.086 0.248
∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.059)
βˆ6M update in 6M after order in 6M 0.848
∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.070)
δˆ6M,12M update in 6M after order in 12M 0.729
∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.074)
δˆ12M,3M update in 12M after order for 3M 0.556
∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.066)
δˆ12M,6M update in 12M after order for 6M 0.120
∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.056)
βˆ12M update in 12M after order for 12M 0.828
∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.059)
Constant 0.476∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 39,271 39,271
Log Likelihood −23,593.080 −23,350.990
Akaike Inf. Crit. 47,206.170 46,721.990
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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bidder i of type sgm,i,τ in bidder group g ∈ {d = dealer, c = customer} at time τ during the
auction week have the following willingness to pay for amount qm in auction m conditional
on winning q−m of the other two maturities and keeping a share (1−κm) on its own balance
sheet
vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ) = α + (1− κm)sgm,i,τ + λmqm + δm · q−m. (3.3)
The vector of δm parameters measure the interdependencies across maturities. Take the
example of the m = 3M auction, where q−m ≡
(
q6M q12M
)′
and δm ≡
(
δ3M,6M δ3M,12M
)
.
If δ3M,6M < 0, bidders are willing to pay less for any amount of the 3-month maturity the
more they purchase of the 6-month bills, hence the bills are substitutes. When δ3M,6M > 0
they are complementary, and independent if δ3M,6M = 0.
Estimating our parameters of interest consistently is challenging for two main reasons. First,
the bank has private information about how much it values the securities. In our model,
sgm,i,τ is the bank’s private signal (or an index aggregate of a multidimensional signal). This
generates incentives to misinterpret the true MWTP. Just like in the well-known first-price
auction, bidders shade their bids to reduce the total payments they must make to win. By
looking at the bids we are thus unable to differentiate between bidders reducing their bids
for strategic reasons or because they are purchasing a substitute or complementary good
at the same time (Problem 1: Bid-shading).14 Secondly, even if the bidder wanted to re-
port his true MWTP vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ), the disconnected auction design does not allow it.
By the rules of the auction, a bidder can, in auction m, only submit a one-dimensional
bidding step-function (such as in Figure 3.1a) that depends on amounts of security m not
on securities −m (Problem 2: Disconnected market design). Summarizing both challenges:
We observe bidding functions that specify a price for amounts of one maturity only, qm, not
the true MWTP that is a function of all maturities vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ) without knowing s
g
m,i,τ .
Our two-stage estimation procedure solves both of these problems. First, we estimate the
joint distribution of market clearing prices and recover how much each bank would bid if
it were bidding truthfully. This solves the problem of strategic bid-shading. Here we ex-
tend the structural estimation techniques developed by Hortac¸su (2002), Kastl (2011) and
Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012) to the case of simultaneous auctions of potentially related goods.
Our estimates are consistent under the identifying assumptions that (i) private information
about all maturities sgi,τ ≡
(
sg3M,i,τ s
g
6M,i,τ s
g
12M,i,τ
)
of each bidder i at each time τ he
updates his bid is conditional on observed auction and date characteristics iid across bid-
ders i and auction days, and (ii) that all bidders are ex-ante symmetric within their bidder
group (dealer or customer) and play a (type-) symmetric BNE each time new bills are issued.
14Generally so-called “ demand-reduction” can be a sever problem in multi-unit auctions in which bidders
have demand for more than one unit (e.g. Ausubel et al. (2014)). In our case, however, bid-shading should
play a minor role. This is because Treasury bills are highly liquid in secondary market trading. Conditional
on observables, such as the when-issued price of these bills, or the spot price in the secondary market, bidders
can infer one another’s preferences fairly accurately.
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Given the disconnected market design, the bidding schedule a bidder would submit if it were
truthful, call it v˜m(qm, s
g
m,i,τ ), is not his true MWTP vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ). This is because his
actual marginal benefit from winning amount qm depends on how much he will win of the
other assets: q∗−m,i. Since auctions take place in parallel, he does not know how much he will
win. In equilibrium, these random quantities q∗−m,i need to be integrated out:
v˜m(qm, s
g
m,i,τ ) = E[vm(qm, q∗−m,i , s
g
m,i,τ )| win qm].
In the first stage of our estimation procedure we estimate v˜m(qm, s
g
m,i,τ ). In addition, we
estimate the joint distribution of market clearing prices which allows us to estimate the
conditional expectation E[q∗−m,i | win qm]. Given the true MWTP is linear as assumed in
(3.3) we can then estimate the parameters of interest, δm, in a linear regression with bidder-
auction-time fixed effects that control for α + (1− κm)sgm,i,τ .
We now proceed to describing the model and estimation strategy, before presenting our
estimation results. Throughout, random variables will be denoted in bold.
3.3.3 The Model
M perfectly divisible goods, indexed m are auctioned in M separate pay-as-bid auctions, run
in parallel. In each auction, there are two groups (g) of bidders: dealers (d) and customers
(c). We assume that the total number of potential dealers Nd and customers Nc is commonly
known, and denote the total number of bidders by N = Nc + Nd. Over the course of the
auction, new information may arrive at a discrete number of time slots τ = 0, ...,Γ. How
much each bidder bids each τ depends on how much he is actually willing to pay. Before
setting up the auction game we introduce a simple model that captures the key driving
factors of individual demand in the primary market.
Micro-Foundation of Individual Demand
For simplicity in this section, we restrict the number of maturities to M = 2. Generalizing
our micro-foundation to more than two maturities is straightforward but mathematically
cumbersome and brings no major, additional insights.
As highlighted above, financial institutions participate in Treasury auctions for different
purposes. They have private information about how much they need the bills. Formally,
we let a bidder i of group g draw a private signal at the time τ he places his bid: sgi,τ ≡(
sg1,i,τ . . . s
g
M,i,τ
)
. This type might be multi-dimensional. To account for differences between
bidder groups, it may be drawn from different distributions for customers and dealers.
Assumption 2. Dealers’ and customers’ private signals sdi,τ and s
c
i,τ are for all bidders i
independently drawn from common atomless distribution functions F d and F c with support
[0, 1]M and strictly positive densities fd and f c.
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The private type determines how much a bidder benefits from keeping a share (1−κm) ∈ [0, 1)
of the purchased bill m in his own inventory or to fulfill existing customer orders. Similar
to the type, κm (as well as all other exogenous parameters of our model) could be bidder
group-specific. A bidder of type sgi,τ obtains the following gross benefit from “consuming”
amounts (1− κ1)q1 and (1− κ2)q2:
U(q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) = s
g
1,i,τ (1− κ1)q1 + sg2,i,τ (1− κ2)q2. (3.4)
Bidders, in particular dealers, function as market makers in the secondary market where
they distribute the rest of the bills {κ1q1, κ2q2} among other investors who are yet to ar-
rive. To incorporate future resale opportunities we let there be a second stage following
the primary auction. In the secondary market a (mass of) client(s) with random demand
{x1 ,x2} arrives to the bidder. Equivalently you may imagine that there are two types of
clients, each with a random demand for one of the two maturities. For simplicity we as-
sume that each of {x1, x2} is on the margin uniformly distributed on [0, 1] but allow both
amounts to be correlated. More specifically, {x1, x2} assumes the following (cupola) density
f(x1, x2) = 1 + 3ρ(1 − 2F1(x1)(1 − 2F2(x2)) with marginal distributions Fm(xm) = xm and
correlation parameter ρ ∈ [−1
3
,+1
3
]
.15
The bidder sells to clients who arrive as long as he has enough of the maturities for resale:
xm ≤ κmqm. Selling xm brings a payment of pmxm. The prices depend on the clients’
willingness to pay, or the aggregate demand in the secondary market more generally. For
simplicity we assume that it is linear and symmetric across maturities. More specifically, the
inverse demand schedule for maturity 1 in the secondary market takes the following form:
p1(x1, x2|q1, q2) =

a− bx1 − ex2 for x1 ≤ κ1q1 and x2 ≤ κ2q2
a− bx1 for x1 ≤ κ1q1 and x2 > κ2q2
0 for x1 > κ1q1 and x2 > κ2q2.
(3.5)
The price function for maturity 2 is analogous. It splits into three cases. In the first, clients
for both bills arrive and the bidder has enough of both in his portfolio for resale. The bidder
charges a bundle price of {p1(x1, x2|q1, q2), p2(x1, x2|q1, q2)} for selling {x1, x2}. In the second
case the bidder can only sell maturity 1. This might be because only clients with demand for
this maturity arrive or because the bidder does not have enough of the other maturity in his
inventory for resale, x2 > κ2q2. The price the bidder charges is independent of the maturity
he does not sell, p1(x1, x2|q1, q2) = a − bx1. Finally, if the bidder does not hold enough of
either bill to satisfy the demand of client(s) who arrive he cannot sell at all. Notice that
the magnitudes of the resale prices are characterized by three parameters {a, b, e}. A higher
intercept a > 0 increases the bidder’s bargaining power, and with it the price he can charge
for each unit he sells. Parameter b > 0 governs the price-sensitivity of clients. Large clients
(who demand more) have more negotiating power and can drive down the price. When e > 0
bills are substitutes in the secondary market, and vice versa for complements.
15In the literature this joint distribution is known as Farie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula.
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Selling {x1, x2} generates a resale revenue of
revenue(x1, x2|q1, q2) = p1(x1, x2|q1, q2)x1 + p2(x1, x2|q1, q2)x2. (3.6)
Turning down clients is costly for the bidder. An unhappy client is, for instance, less likely
to contact the bidder again in the future. In reality, a bidder might even want to lend the
security a client demands in the repo market so as to avoid loosing his customer in the longer
run. This is costly for the bidder because it is expensive to borrow or buy additional Treasury
bills from other financial institutions in the secondary market when demand is high. In our
model, bidders face the following cost function:
cost(x1, x2|q1, q2) =

0 if x1 ≤ κ1q1 and x2 ≤ κ2q2
γx1 if x1 > κ1q1 and x2 ≤ κ2q2
γx2 if x1 ≤ κ1q1 and x2 > κ2q2
γx1x2 if x1 > κ1q1 and x2 > κ2q2.
(3.7)
The cost function captures the idea that it is more costly to turn down larger clients, i.e.
those with larger demand. The important feature for our results is that it is supermodular
in x1, x2, i.e. has increasing differences.
16 This means that the marginal cost from turning
down a client who demands one maturity is higher the larger the order for the other maturity.
Taken together, a bidder expects to derive the following payoff from winning q1, q2 at time
τ in the primary market:
V (q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) = U(q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) + E [revenue(x1 ,x2 |q1, q2)− cost(x1, x2 |q1, q2)] . (3.8)
The gross payoff determines how much a bidder is willing to pay on the margin. Consider
auction 1. At time τ the bidder is willing to pay v1(q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) =
∂V (q1,q2,s
g
i,τ )
∂q1
for amount q1
conditional on winning q2 of the other maturity. The appendix shows that v1(·, ·, sgi,τ ) is a
third-order polynomial for any sgi,τ . It can be approximated by a linear function. Taking the
first Tayler expansion around (E[x1 ],E[x2 ]) = (1/2, 1/2) we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. The marginal willingness to pay of a bidder with type sgm,i,τ for amount qm
conditional on winning q−m in the other auction can be approximated by
vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ) = α + (1− κm)sgm,i,τ + λmqm + δmq−m for m = 1, 2−m 6= m (3.3)
where α, λm, δm are polynomials of the exogenous parameters {κ1, κ2, γ, ρ, a, b, e}.
The higher the private marginal benefit sg1,i,τ from keeping a share (1 − κ1) of the bill for
personal usage, the more the bidder is willing to pay. Bills might be substitutable or com-
plementary depending on the underlying exogenous parameter.
16Supermodularity is for functions that map from Rn → R equivalent to increasing differences:
cost(x′1, x
′
2|q1, q2)− cost(x1, x′2|q1, q2) ≥ cost(x′1, x2|q1, q2)− cost(x1, x2|q1, q2) for x′1 ≥ x1 and x′2 ≥ x2.
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To build an intuition for this result, let us contrast the extreme cases where the bidder sells
all of maturity 1 (κ1 = 0), all of maturity 2 (κ2 = 0), or keeps all of both (κ1 = κ1 = 1) and
the demand of clients is stochastically independent (ρ = 0). Then
v1(q1, q2, s
g
1,i,τ ) =

sg1,i,τ if κ1 = 0
1
4
κ1(bκ
2
1 − 2γ) + (1− κ1)sg1,i,τ + κ21((a− bκ1) + 12γ)q1 if κ2 = 0
1
8
(2(b+ e)− 6γ) + ((a− b)− 1
4
e+ 7
8
γ)q1 +
1
4
(3γ − 2e)q2 if κ1 = κ2 = 1.
When buying only for its own account (κ1 = 0) a bidder is willing to pay the marginal value
that the bill bring his own institution sg1,i,τ . When he anticipates that he will sell at least
some of maturity 1 his MWTP in auction 1 decreases in q1 as long as his clients are suffi-
ciently price-elastic (i.e. b is sufficiently high). If he sells all of both maturities (κ1 = κ2 = 1)
the MWTP is independent of his private type sg1,i,τ . How much he is willing to pay for
one maturity now hinges on the amount he wins of the other maturity. Whether bills are
substitutes or complements in the primary market depends on how large γ is relative to e.
More generally one can derive the following corollary which will be useful when interpreting
our estimation results later on. It holds for the general case where clients’ demand might be
correlated (ρ 6= 0) and the bidder keeps any amounts of the bills (κ1, κ2 ∈ [0, 1]).
Corollary 5. Securities in the primary market become more complementary when
(i) they are weaker substitutes in the secondary market (e ↓),
(ii) it is more costly to turn down clients (γ ↑), or
(iii) it is more likely that clients with demand for different maturities arrive (ρ ↑).
The Auctions
In modeling the auction process we build on Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012)’s model of a stand-
alone auction. Motivated by the previous section, we assume that the marginal willingness
to pay is linear.
Assumption 3. The marginal willingness to pay of a bidder with type sgm,i,τ for amount qm
conditional on purchasing q−m of the other two securities −m is
vm(qm, q−m, s
g
m,i,τ ) = α + (1− κm)sgm,i,τ + λmqm + δm · q−m. (3.3)
with λm < 0, |δm| < λm and α sufficiently high such that the marginal willingness to pay
does not drop below 0 for any amount that might be for sale.
A bid in auction m consists of a set of quantities in combination with prices. It is a step-
function which characterizes the price the bidder would like to pay for each amount.
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Assumption 4. In auction m each bidder has the following action set each time he places
an offer:
Am =

(bm, qm, Km) : dim (bm) = dim(qm) = Km ∈ {1, ..., Km}
bm,k ∈ [0,∞) and qm,k ∈ [0, 1]
bm,k > bm,k+1 and qm,k > qm,k+1∀k < Km.
Notice that qm,k ∈ [0, 1]. It represents the share of total supply. This allows us to compare
bids in auctions with different sizes of supply. A bid of 0 denotes non-participation.
To capture the updating process of bids prior to auction closure, we assume that new infor-
mation may arrive at each time slot τ . At τ = 0, a bidder draws an iid random variable
Ψi ∈ [0, 1]. It is one dimension of the bidder’s private signal and thus unobservable to his
competitors. It corresponds to the mean of an iid Bernoulli random variable, Ωi, which
determines whether the bidder’s later bids will make it in time to be accepted by the auc-
tioneer. More specifically, for τ > 0, the bidder’s information set includes the realizations
ωi ∈ {0, 1} of Ωi, where ωi = 1 means that the bid of time τ will make it in time. This
gives an incentive to bid at each arrival of new information because there might not be an
opportunity to bid successfully later on due to an adverse Bernoulli draw.
At each time τ all customers who want to place an order are matched to a dealer given
that the rules of the auction do not allow for customers submitting their own bids. The
dealer can observe his customer’s bid. This provides him with additional information at
time τ - one that is unavailable to other dealers or customers. A dealer might have had the
same or a different customer in all three auctions. Denoting the information obtained from
observing a customers’ bids at time τ in auction m by Zm,i,τ , dealer i’s information set is
θgi,τ = (s
g
i,τ , Z1,i,τ , Z2,i,τ , Z3,i,τ ). If he only has a customer in one auction, say for maturity
1, θgi,τ = (s
g
i,τ , Z1,i,τ ), and so on. Notice that by Assumption 2 (s
g
i,τ ,Zi,τ ) are independent
across dealers and time. However, sgi,τ and Zi,τ can be correlated within a dealer across τ ,
for example as further customer orders arrive later in addition to the earlier ones.
Definition 4. A pure-strategy is a mapping from the bidder’s set of private information at
each time τ to the action space of all three auctions: Θgi,τ → A1 × A2 × A3.
A choice in auction m by a bidder with information θgi,τ may be summarized as bidding
function bgm,i,τ (·, θgi,τ ) or equivalently as demand function ygm,i,τ (·, θgi,τ ). The latter specifies
how much the agent demands at each admissible price. When auction m closes at τ = Γ,
the auctioneer aggregates the individual demands of the bidders’ final bids. The market
clears at the lowest price P cm at which aggregate demand, denoted
∑Nc
i=1 y
c
m,i,Γ(pm, θ
c
i,Γ) +∑Nd
i=1 y
d
m,i,Γ(pm, θ
d
i,Γ) satisfies aggregate supply. The latter is the amount for sale announced
prior to the auction net of what the Bank of Canada demands in form of non-competitive
bids during the auction plus all other competitive tenders by bidder i’s competitors.
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Assumption 5. Supply {Q1 ,Q2 ,Q3} is a random variable distributed on [Q1, Q1]×[Q2, Q2]×
[Q
3
, Q3] with strictly positive marginal density conditional on s
g
i,τ ∀i, g = c, d and τ .
If aggregate demand equals total supply exactly there is a unique market clearing price P cm.
Each bidder wins how much he demanded at the market clearing price and pays for all units
according to his individual price offers. When there are several prices at which total supply
equals aggregate demand by all bidders, the auctioneer chooses the highest one. Finally,
in the event of excess demand at the market clearing price, bidders are rationed pro-rata
on-the-margin.17
Denoting the amounts bidder i gets allocated by qci =
(
qc1,i q
c
2,i q
c
3,i
)
when submitting
bgi,τ (·, θgi,τ ) ≡
(
bg1,i,τ (·, θgi,τ ) bg2,i,τ (·, θgi,τ ) bg3,i,τ (·, θgi,τ )
)
his total surplus is
TS(bgi,τ (·, θgi,τ ), sgi,τ ) = V (qci , sgi,τ )−
3∑
m=1
∫ qcm,i
0
bgm,i,τ (x, θ
g
i,τ )dx (3.9)
in the event in which τ is the time of his final bid, with V (qci , s
g
i,τ ) given by (3.8). It is
the total utility he achieves from obtaining the amounts he wins minus the total payments
he must make (the area below his bidding function up to the amount he wins). Ex-ante,
when placing the bid, the bidder neither knows how much he will win nor at which price the
market will clear. His optimal choice maximizes the total surplus he expects to gain.
Definition 5. A BNE is a collection of functions bgi,τ (·, θgi,τ ) that for each bidder i and almost
every information θgi,τ at each time τ maximizes the expected total surplus, E[TS(b
g
i,τ (·, θgi,τ ), sgi,τ )].
We will focus on type-symmetric BNE of the auction game in which bidders who are ex-ante
identical play the same strategies. Dealers who draw the same type play the same function,
and similarly for customers:
bdi,τ (·, θdi,τ ) = bd(·, θdi,τ ) and bci,τ (·, θci,τ ) = bc(·, θgi,τ ) ∀i, τ.
Across bidder groups strategies might be asymmetric.
17“Under this rule, all bids above the market clearing price are given priority, and only after all such
bids are satisfied, the remaining marginal demands at exactly price P c = p are reduced proportionally by
the rationing coefficient so that their sum exactly equals the remaining supply. An alternative rationing
rule would, for example, not give bids at higher prices priority.” (Kastl (2011), p. 980-981). The rationing
coefficient satisfies Rm(P
c
m) =
Qm−TD+m(Pmc )
TDm(P cm)−TD+m+(P cm)
where TDm(P
c
m) denotes the total demand at price P
c
m,
and TD+m(P
c
m) = limpm↓P cm TDm(pm).
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3.3.4 Estimation Strategy
First Stage of the Estimation Strategy
To solve the problem of strategic bid-shading we recover what the bidder would bid if he were
truthful in the first stage of our estimation strategy by extending Hortac¸su (2002), Kastl
(2011, 2012) and Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012) to the case of simultaneous auctions of po-
tentially related goods. To find out which marginal valuations rationalize the observed bids
we must first characterize the optimality conditions for the type-symmetric BNE of the game.
Bidding incentives in simultaneous pay-as-bid auctions are similar to those in an isolated
auction (see Wittwer (2018b)). To fix ideas, we begin the discussion with the benchmark
case of auctions of independent goods. Securities in our model are unrelated if all δ param-
eters are equal to 0. In this case gross utility is additively separable across maturities and
the willingness to pay for one maturity vm(qm, s
g
m,i,τ ) is independent of the amount allocated
to this bidder in auctions of other maturities. In addition, both markets clear separately. A
bid price offered for good 1 will not affect the payment the agent has to make for good 2
because the agent’s demand for good 1 can, by the rules of a standard pay-as-bid auction,
only depend on the price for good 1 and not the price of good 2. Since neither utility nor
payments are interrelated, strategic incentives are identical to those in an isolated auction
m. In determining his best reply to all others, the bidder can, therefore, focus on each
auction in isolation. If the bidder knew the residual supply curve when choosing his bids, he
would just pick a point on this curve that maximizes his total surplus. Yet, when making
his choices, he does not know this curve as it depends on the random total supply and the
private information of his competitors. He thus has to integrate out the uncertainty about
the market clearing price and evaluate marginal benefits and costs of changing a bid. The
marginal cost is losing the surplus on the last infinitesimal unit demanded, which happens
exactly when price is between bids defined by the kth and k+ 1st step. The marginal benefit
is saving the difference between these bids whenever the market clearing price ends up being
actually weakly lower than bk+1.
Proposition 2 (Independent Goods). Consider a bidder i of group g with private informa-
tion θgi,τ who submits Kˆm(θ
g
i,τ ) steps in auction m at time τ . Under Assumptions 2-5 in any
type-symmetric BNE every step k in his bid function bgm(·, θgi,τ ) has to satisfy
vm(qm,k, s
g
m,i,τ ) = bm,k +
Pr
(
bm,k+1 ≥ P cm |θgi,τ
)
Pr
(
bm,k > P
c
m > bm,k+1|θgi,τ
)(bm,k − bm,k+1) ∀k < Kˆm(θgi,τ )
and bm,k = vm(q¯m(θ
g
i,τ ), s
g
m,i,τ ) at k = Kˆm(θ
g
i,τ ) where q¯m(θ
g
i,τ ) is the maximal amount the
bidder may be allocated in the equilibrium.
This equation allows us to estimate the marginal valuations on the left-hand-side that ra-
tionalize the bids we observe for all steps bm,k of all bidders at all times and auctions.
Following the idea in Hortac¸su (2002) the approach is to estimate the distribution of the
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market clearing price using a resampling procedure. It relies on the assumption that private
information is not interdependent across bidders, so that “each bidder i cares about others
bidding strategies only insofar as they affect the distribution of bidder i’s residual supply”
(Hortac¸su and McAdams (2010), p. 842). The choice of bid by bidder i transforms the
distribution of the residual supply into the distribution of the market clearing price. In the
easiest set-up of a standard multi-unit auction with no updating of bids in which N po-
tential, ex-ante symmetric bidders who draw independent private information and play the
symmetric BNE in T auctions with identical covariates, the resampling procedure works as
follows: Fix bidder i. For all bidders that did not bid in an auction, augment the data with
their bids being 0. Draw a random subsample of N−1 bid vector with replacement from the
sample of NT bids in the data set. Construct bidder i’s realized residual supply were others
to submit these bids to determine the realized market clearing price. Repeating this rou-
tine many times gives a consistent estimate of the distribution of the market clearing price.
Our setup is, even if there are no interdependencies across auctions, more complicated than
this benchmark. First, we have two bidder groups (dealers and customers) which may be
ex-ante asymmetric. Second, bidders may update their bids within an auction with dealers
observing their customers’ bids. Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012) have extended the resampling
procedure for this more complex environment.18 We describe how we extend their method
for stand-alone auctions to the cases of parallel auctions below.
It is highly unlikely that demands for Treasury bills of different maturities are indepen-
dent, in particular when the maturities are similar. Bidders take this interconnection across
auctions into account when determining their optimal bidding strategies. Consider an auc-
tion for maturity m = 1. When preferences are no longer separable across maturities,
the agent’s marginal willingness to pay for amount q1 depends on how much of the other
goods he gets allocated, v1(q1, q−1, s
g
1,i,τ ). Ideally, he would want to condition his price
b1,k for amount q1,k on how much he will purchase of the other securities in equilibrium,
q∗−1,i ≡
(
q∗2,i q
∗
3,i
)′
. Since the rules of the auction do not allow the participants to express
their preferences in this way, they have to integrate out the uncertainty. Conditional on
winning q1,k, which happens when b1,k ≥ P c1 > b1,k+1, a bidder expects a marginal benefit
of E
[
v1
(
q1,k, q
∗
−1,i , s
g
1,i,τ
)∣∣ b1,k ≥ P c1 > b1,k+1, θgi,τ]. Analogous to the decision process in an
isolated auction, the agent equates the benefit of winning the bid with its marginal cost.
Since auctions clear separately the cost is identical to the cost in an isolated auction with
one difference. With stochastic dependence across auction markets market clearing prices
are connected. With M maturities, they are drawn from a joint M -dimensional distribution.
18Their procedure works as follows: Start by drawing Nc customer bids from the empirical distribution
of customer bids. If a customer did not participate, replace his bid by a 0. For each customer bid vector,
draw a corresponding dealer bid. If a zero customer bid is drawn, draw from the pool of uninformed dealers
(those who did not observe any customer bids). If a nonzero customer bid is drawn, draw from the pool of
dealers’ bids, which have been submitted having observed a “similar” customer bid with equal probabilities.
Those are customer bids whose quantity-weighted bid price are sufficiently close (according to a pre-defined
bandwidth). The resulting estimate of the distribution of clearing prices is consistent (Hortac¸su and Kastl
(2012)).
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Proposition 3 (Related goods). Consider a bidder i of group g with private information
θgi,τ who submits Kˆm(θ
g
i,τ ) steps in auction m at time τ . Under Assumptions 2-5 in any
type-symmetric BNE every step k in his bid function bgm(·, θgi,τ ) has to satisfy
v˜m(qm,k, s
g
m,i,τ |θgi,τ ) = bm,k +
Pr
(
bm,k+1 ≥ P cm |θgi,τ
)
Pr
(
bm,k > P
c
m > bm,k+1|θgi,τ
)(bm,k − bm,k+1) ∀k < Kˆm(θgi,τ )
with
v˜m(qm,k, s
g
m,i,τ |θgi,τ ) ≡ E
[
vm
(
qm,k, q
∗
−m,i , s
g
m,i,τ
)∣∣ bm,k ≥ P cm > bm,k+1θgi,τ]
for m = 1 . . .M with −m 6= m, and bm,k = v˜m(q¯m(θgi,τ ), sgm,i,τ |θgi,τ ) at k = Kˆm(θgi,τ ) where
q¯m(θ
g
i,τ ) is the maximal amount the bidder may be allocated in an equilibrium.
Analogous to the stand-alone auction, we can estimate the marginal valuations (LHS) by
estimating the distribution of residual supply curves, now jointly for all maturities. With
M = 3 parallel auctions, the benchmark resampling procedure of Hortac¸su (2002) must be
changed in that a choice of a bidder is now a triplet of bidding functions submitted on a given
auction day. Fixing such a triplet of bids submitted by a bidder, one then draws a random
subsample of N − 1 bid vector triplets with replacement from the sample of NT bids in the
data set, and constructs bidder i’s realized residual supply ∀m were others to submit these
bids to determine the realized clearing prices P c =
(
P c3M P
c
6M P
c
12M
)
, and the amount i
would have won q∗i =
(
q∗3M,i, q
∗
6M,i, q
∗
12M,i
)
for all q∗i , P
c. Repeating this procedure a large
number of times provides an estimate of the joint distribution of market clearing prices and,
equally important, the corresponding amount of each security i would win.
Our more complex environment with dealers and customers who may update their bids
requires a more complicated procedure (see Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012)). There are two
complications when auctions are not considered separately. First, bids in different auctions
are not submitted at the exact same time given electronic or human delays (see the example
in Table 3.3 above). In our procedure, we define bids to be “simultaneous” if they are the
closest bids of all bids a bidder places within 200 seconds, or they are the last bids he makes
before the auction deadline, i.e. his final bids. Setting an upper bound of 200 seconds seems
sensible when looking at the number of seconds between bids across maturities which we
know were determined “simultaneously”. Those are cases where the bidder does not update
his bids over the course of the auctions. On average 551/383 seconds pass between such bids
for different maturities by dealers/customers. Excluding outliers, the time reduces as shown
in the box plots of Figure 3.3.
Second, a customer might place his order via different dealers in an auction week. He might,
for instance, go via one dealer in the 3-month auction and via another in the 6-month auc-
tion. Furthermore, two bids for the same maturity but by different customers might go
through the same dealer. Neither of these two cases happens more than a handful of times.
Therefore, we assume that the information set of dealers who observe the same customer is
independent across maturities, conditional on his own signal. In addition, we restrict the
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Figure 3.3: Time Between Bids of Those Who Do Not Update
number of possible observed customer bids to two. Given that most customers only submit
one bid and that there are many more dealers than customers in a typical auction, this
simplifying restriction should not be problematic.
With these simplifications our procedure goes as follows: Start by drawing Nc customer bids
from the empirical distribution of customer bids at date t. If a customer did not participate
in one auction, replace his bid by 0. For each customer, find the dealer(s) who observed
this customer’s bid(s). If the customer submitted only one bid, take the dealer who ob-
served it. If the customer submitted more than one bid, draw uniformly over dealer-bids
having observed this customer. Finally, if the total number of dealers drawn is at this point
lower than the total number of potential dealers, draw the remaining bids from the pool of
uninformed dealers, i.e. those who do not observe a customer bid in any of the three auctions.
In our main specification we impose marginal valuations v˜m(·, sgm,i,τ |θgi,τ ) to be weakly de-
creasing. Increasing valuations would imply increasing equilibrium bidding functions, which
cannot be submitted by the rules of the auction. Furthermore, to correct for outliers that
occur occasionally due to small values of the denominator in the estimated (marginal) haz-
ard rate of the market clearing price, Pˆr
(
bm,k > P
c
m > bm,k+1|θgi,τ
)
, we trim our estimated
marginal values. More specifically, we restrict each one of them to be lower than the bid-
der’s maximal bid plus a markup of about 0.5 basis points (C$50 for 1Y, C$25 for 6M,
C$12.5 for 3M). Our results are robust with regards to the restriction on valuations, and
not sensitive to the choice of this markup as long as it is not too high (see Appendix C.2 for
more details).
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Figure 3.4: Steps by Bidder Groups
Second Stage of the Estimation Strategy
Our resampling procedure delivers a consistent estimate of the joint distribution of market
clearing prices and the amount bidder i wins in equilibrium conditional on the information
he has at time τ . This allows us to estimate how much he expects to win of the other
maturities if he were to win a given quantity in maturity m.
qˆ∗t,−m,i,τ,k = E
[
q∗t,−m,i |bt,m,i,τ,k ≥ P ct,m > bt,m,i,τ,k+1, θt,i,τ
]
+ εqt,m,i,τ,k (3.10)
Moreover, using Proposition 3, we can use the marginals of this joint distribution to obtain
an estimate of how much bidder i would be willing to pay at step k at time τ in auction m
of week t given the observed bid.
vˆt,m,i,τ,k = E
[
vm
(
qt,m,i,τ,k, q
∗
t,−m,i , s
g
m,i,τ
)∣∣ bt,m,i,τ,k ≥ P ct,m > bt,m,i,τ,k+1, θt,i,τ]+ εvt,m,i,τ,k (3.11)
Assuming linearity of the marginal willingness to pay (Assumption 3), we can now estimate
the following linear regression with auction-bidder-time fixed effects ut,m,i,τ ≡ α + (1 −
κm)s
g
t,m,i,τ
vˆt,m,i,τ,k = ut,m,i,τ + λmqt,m,i,τ,k + δm · qˆ∗t,−m,i,τ,k + εt,m,i,τ,k (3.12)
for m = 1 . . .M,m 6= m on a subsample with competitive bids of more than one step to
identify the parameters of interest. Figure 3.4 shows that it is the case for virtually all dealer
bids: almost all submit more than one step.
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3.3.5 Estimation Results
Our data covers the time period from 2002 until 2015. It includes the years of the financial
crisis, during which one may worry that participants’ preferences may have been different
than in normal times. In what follows we first discuss estimation results based on the full
time period. Thereafter we split the sample into the years prior to the crisis (2002-2006),
the financial crisis (2007-2010) and the years that followed (2011-2015) to analyze whether
preferences change across time.
In our main specification we restrict attention to dealers. This is only in order to avoid
potential issues arising from possible selection on the customers’ side due to a relatively
small sample of customer bids with two or more steps. We also restrict our sample to bids
that arrive less than 30 minutes to auction closure. This covers the vast majority of bids
(recall Figure 3.1b, p. 35) and avoids possible confounds due to unobserved heterogeneity
(e.g., public information arriving over time). It excludes really early bids and occasional
instances where dealers updated their bids many times. Typically they update once or twice.
While our theory allows for many updates, in order to simplify our resampling algorithm we
restrict the number of possible observed customer bids to two. In Appendix C.2 we display
several other specifications that use bids submitted by dealers and customers and different
time restrictions. In addition we run all regressions (3.12) using bt,m,i,τ,k to complement our
results using vˆt,m,i,τ,k. If bidders are truthful (at every step), the bids they place should be a
good approximation for their marginal valuations conditional on that step being marginal.
Using the submitted price bids rather than our estimated marginal valuations as independent
variable therefore has two purposes. First, it provides a sanity check of our estimated
marginal values. Estimates should not differ tremendously in size. Second, it gives an idea
of whether bid-shading (bt,m,i,τ,k − vˆt,m,i,τ,k) is sensitive to interdependencies across auctions.
Full Time Period
Estimation results of regression (3.12) are displayed in Tables 3.5 - 3.7. In line with our
model, we report all findings with bids and marginal valuations expressed in C$ (prices) not
in basis points (of yields). Whenever we quote a number in basis points it is the estimated
value from the corresponding regressions performed with yields (not prices).19 All quantities
are expressed in C$10 million (the 10×face value). The first column uses our estimated
valuations as independent variable, the third the bids we observe.
Before discussing the estimated degree of interdependency (the δ parameters), consider first
by how much a dealers’ MWTP for maturity m changes in qm (the λ parameters of the first
column in all tables). This helps provide a sense of the parameter magnitudes. As expected,
marginal utility is strictly decreasing (all λ’s are significantly negative). They are not large
in magnitude, however, indicating that valuations are fairly flat with respect to quantity.
Increasing the amount of the 3-month bills by 10 million, for example, decreases a dealers’
marginal benefit from owning the 3-month bill by C$0.744 or about 0.03 basis points. Given
19As a rule of thumb, 100/50/25 C$ of a 12M/6M/3M bill are approximately 1 basis point of a yield.
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Table 3.5: 3M Auction (Full Time Period)
Estimated Valuation Observed Bid
λ3M −0.744∗∗∗ (-165.83) −0.747∗∗∗ (-171.51)
δ3M,6M +0.334
∗∗∗ (6.80) +0.393∗∗∗ (8.25)
δ3M,1Y +0.355
∗∗∗ (6.69) −0.366∗∗∗ (7.11)
Constant 995533.2∗∗∗ (2574206.36) 995528.8∗∗∗ (2652525.62)
Observations 45994 45994
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.6: 6M Auction (Full Time Period)
Estimated Valuation Observed Bid
λ6M −3.095∗∗∗ (-132.97) −3.060∗∗∗ (-135.55)
δ6M,3M +0.0051 (0.13) +0.119
∗∗ (3.14)
δ6M,1Y +0.0934 (0.84) +0.399
∗∗∗ (3.69)
Constant 991509.1∗∗∗ (1494437.31) 991500.2∗∗∗ (1540913.01)
Observations 34267 34267
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.7: 12M Auction (Full Time Period)
Estimated Valuation Observed Bid
λ1Y −6.476∗∗∗ (-154.51) −6.086∗∗∗ (-154.61)
δ1Y,3M −0.629∗∗∗ (-8.51) −0.261∗∗∗ (-3.76)
δ1Y,6M +0.846
∗∗∗ (4.34) +1.614∗∗∗ (8.82)
Constant 981316.6∗∗∗ (841131.53) 981280.2∗∗∗ (895599.08)
Observations 42830 42830
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the large average allocated amounts (about C$544 million of 3M bills per dealer), however,
there is a more sizable difference between the value of the first and last Treasury bill: about
1.49 basis points. The other two maturities exhibit similar patterns: In the 6-month bill
auction, the bidder’s marginal valuation drops by C$3.095. This translates to a difference in
values for the first and last won Treasury bill (on average C$204 million per dealer) of about
1.32 basis points. For one year T-bills, the difference is about 1.38 basis points. Estimates are
similar when using the observed bids as approximation of the true valuation (third column).
Given the small price variation in the submitted bid step-functions (recall Figure 3.1a) this
finding should not be that surprising. Intuitively, financial institutions have a rather precise
idea of the price at which the primary market will clear since all securities we consider are
highly liquid. To avoid paying unnecessarily high prices, they submit bids that vary closely
around the clearing price they expect conditional on publicly available information (such as
current yield curves in the when-issued or secondary market).
With these “own” effects in mind, we can turn to the discussion of our main parameters of
interest. We find significant interdependencies in the 3-month and 12-month T-bill auctions.
Relative to the λ parameters, these interdependencies are not negligible in size. Consider
first the 3-month bills (first column of Table 3.5). In the 3-month auction both δ parameters
are positive, suggesting that the 3-month bill is complementary to the longer maturities.
Estimates are similar when using bids as independent variables (third column). When a
bidder expects to win 10 million more of the 6-month (12-month) bill, his true value in the
3-month auction increases by C$0.334 (C$0.355), which is a bit less than half of the amount
it decreases in response to winning 10 million more of the 3-month bill. This effect implies
an increase in the valuation for 3-month T-bill when going from an allocation with no other
T-bill of other maturity to an allocation corresponding to the observed averages of about 0.5
basis points. For bidders in the 12-month bill auction, the 6-month bills are complementary
whereas the 3-month bill is a substitute (first column of Table 3.7). A similar conclusion
can be drawn when using the observed bids as independent variable (third column). This is
not the case for the 6-month bill auction. When using our estimated valuations we find no
evidence for interdependencies over the full sample period (Table 3.6). As we will show in
the next section, however, this may be driven by changes in preferences during the financial
crisis. When using the observed bids as independent variables (third column), both δ pa-
rameters are significantly positive, hinting towards complementarities.
Generally, the estimates when using the estimated true valuations (first column) and those
where we approximate this valuation by the submitted bid (third column) are not that
similar for the longer maturities. One lesson to draw from this exercise is that bids might be
directly informative about the slope of marginal valuation with respect to own quantity, but
are on their own not very informative about interdependencies. For the most liquid maturity,
the price bid seems to be a fairly good approximation of the true valuation. Estimates of
the two specifications are very similar. For the longer maturities, however, there are more
differences. These differences might be driven by higher bid-shading in the auctions for the
6 and 12-month bills.
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Financial Crisis
We now split our sample into a period prior the crisis, the crisis and years that followed.
Generally, banks might have unusual needs for securities in turbulent times, for instance
because of they are more cautious to take on risk. For Canada Allen et al. (2011) document
an increase in demand for liquidity following the demise of Lehman Brothers. Furthermore,
the most recent financial crisis triggered an enforcement in stricter liquidity and capital re-
quirements which might have caused structural change in the demand for Treasury securities.
Tables 3.8 - 3.10 report estimation results of regression (3.12) in our main specification.
During the crisis years the 3-month bill was a (weak) substitute for bidders in the 6-month
as well as the 12-month auction. Going from none to the observed average allocation of
the 3-month bill (C$632 million per dealer) decreases the bidder’s willingness to pay in the
6/12-month auction by about 0.5/1.2 basis points. The magnitude of all parameters (in-
cluding the slope with respect to own quantity) is larger with the exception of δ6M,1Y . In
the 3-month auction (Table 3.8), for example, λ3M decreases from −0.677 before the crisis
to −1.044 during the crisis and then increases again to −0.589. The size of the δ3M,6M pa-
rameter changes from 0.278 to 0.420 to 0.374. More generally, compared to before the crisis,
all δ parameters, but δ1Y,6M which remained about the same, increased. After the crisis, all
maturities are complementary, if interdependent. According to our theory complementari-
ties in the primary market increase when it is more costly to turn down clients, demand for
different maturities after the auction is with higher probability similar in size, or bills are
weaker substitutes/stronger complements in the secondary market (Corollary 5).
Table 3.8: 3M Auction (Pre/During/Post Crisis)
Pre Crisis Post
λ3M −0.677∗∗∗ (-95.27) −1.044∗∗∗ (-98.18) −0.589∗∗∗ (-111.95)
δ3M,6M +0.218
∗∗∗ (3.77) +0.420∗∗∗ (4.12) +0.374∗∗∗ (5.16)
δ3M,1Y +0.310
∗∗∗ (5.27) +0.419∗∗∗ (3.54) +0.328∗∗∗ (4.33)
Constant 992189.8∗∗∗ (1920929.74) 994346.6∗∗∗ (1011262.51) 997787.0∗∗∗ (2139133.26)
Observations 10822 12530 22642
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: 6M Auction (Pre/During/Post Crisis)
Pre Crisis Post
λ6M −3.113∗∗∗ (-80.97) −4.328∗∗∗ (-70.30) −2.529∗∗∗ (-103.48)
δ6M,3M +0.0257 (0.43) −0.374∗∗∗ (-3.85) +0.231∗∗∗ (5.22)
δ6M,1Y +0.265
∗ (2.19) +0.546∗ (2.11) +0.774∗∗∗ (4.79)
Constant 985555.4∗∗∗ (1141446.47) 989994.8∗∗∗ (555714.09) 995766.8∗∗∗ (1297220.30)
Observations 9072 9221 15974
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: 12M Auction (Pre/During/Post Crisis)
Pre Crisis Post
λ1Y −6.834∗∗∗ (-100.91) −9.482∗∗∗ (-84.46) −5.184∗∗∗ (-109.77)
δ1Y,3M −0.366∗∗∗ (-3.47) −1.748∗∗∗ (-9.76) +0.0180 (0.19)
δ1Y,6M +1.104
∗∗∗ (4.96) +3.090∗∗∗ (6.77) +0.966∗∗∗ (3.31)
Constant 969569.1∗∗∗ (641567.61) 977987.2∗∗∗ (315592.78) 990597.3∗∗∗ (671392.12)
Observations 12753 10247 19830
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we study interdependencies in the demand for securities of different maturities.
Using data from Canadian Treasury bill auctions over a 15 year period, we find that 3, 6
and 12-month bills are oftentimes complementary in the primary market for Treasury bills.
To explain our findings we present a model that captures the interplay between the primary
and secondary market. We argue that the typical bidder of a primary auction buys bills
not only for his own balance sheets but also (or even primarily) to distribute them in the
secondary market where different clients demand different maturities. He anticipates that it
will be costly to turn down clients in case he did not buy sufficiently many bills at auction,
or to satisfy their demand by purchasing the bills from other financial institutions at higher
prices. This generates complementarities in the primary market even if T-bills are substi-
tutes in other financial markets.
In future work we plan to derive and discuss policy recommendations for the auctioneers.
Since demand interdependencies are likely to arise in many (if not most) applications of multi-
unit auctions due to various reasons (such as budget constraints), our goal is to demonstrate
that taking them seriously and identifying them explicitly can help auctioneers in achieving
their objectives. In the context of auctions of government debt, this objective is to raise
revenue (sell debt) at lowest possible cost (i.e., lowest interest rate). More specifically,
we plan to use our estimates to conduct a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual exercise to
quantify how much the government could have saved (in terms revenue extracted) if the Bank
of Canada had decided on the split of T-bills across the three maturities more strategically.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A
Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is equivalent to Theorem 2 when types are drawn from a degenerated distribu-
tion. To prove Theorem 1 it suffices to make the following changes in the proof of Theorem
2: First, replace the equilibrium winning quantity q∗i , its distribution and density by the
per-capita supply q∗ , its distribution and density. Second, notice that the hazard rate of q∗
is weakly decreasing by the assumption that total supply is drawn from a distribution with
decreasing hazard rate. Similarly, the second condition for equilibrium existence of Theorem
2 is always satisfied without private types because ∂x(b(q))∂p =
(
∂b(q)
∂q
)−1
. I invite who would like
to see a full proof for the environment with symmetrically informed bidder, to consult Pycia
and Woodward (2017)’s proof of Theorem 3 (pp. 46-49).
Theorem 1 in relation to the existing literature (Pycia and Woodward (2017), Holm-
berg (2006, 2009)):
Pycia and Woodward (2017) derive the following bid-representation
b∗(q) =
∫ Q
Nq
v
( y
N
)
dFNq,N(y) with FQ,N(y) ≡ 1−
[
1− FQ(y)
1− FQ(Q)
]N−1
N
for Q < Q. (A.1)
In what follows I show that our bidding functions coincide by re-formulating mine
b∗(q) = v(q)−
∫ q
q
[
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]N−1
N
(−1)
(
∂v(x)
∂q
)
dx on [0, q∗] (1.1)
to match theirs. First integrate the (−1)· integral of function (1.1) by parts:∫ q
q
[
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]N−1
N
v′(x)dx = −v(q) +
∫ q
q
[
N − 1
N
] [
fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
] [
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]−[ 1N ]
v(x)dx
to obtain
b∗(q) =
∫ q
q
[
N − 1
N
] [
fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
] [
1− Fq∗(x)
1− Fq∗(q)
]−[ 1N ]
v(x)dx.
60
Now change the variable of integration to y = xN and use the distribution function of the
total supply, FQ(y) = FQ(Nx) = Fq∗(x) and fQ(Nx) =
1
N
fq∗(x):
b∗(q) =
∫ Q
Nq
[
N − 1
N
] [
fQ(y)
1− FQ(Nq)
] [
1− FQ(y)
1− FQ(Nq)
]−[ 1N ]
v
( y
N
)
dy.
Note that this is the analogue to Holmberg (2006, 2009)’s bidding function in a pay-as-bid
procurement auction (see Holmberg (2006) equation (6) on page 8 with p¯ = 0).
Finally use ∂
∂y
{
1−
[
1−FQ(y)
1−FQ(Nq)
][N−1N ]}
=
[
N−1
N
] [ fQ(y)
1−FQ(Nq)
] [
1−FQ(y)
1−FQ(Nq)
]−[ 1N ]
and pull v
(
y
N
)
forward
b∗(q) =
∫ Q
Nq
v
( y
N
) ∂
∂y
{
1−
[
1− FQ(y)
1− FQ(Nq)
][N−1N ]}
dy.
To obtain Pycia and Woodward (2017)’s representation (A.1), it suffices to use their auxiliary
distribution function FQ,N(y).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof I work with the distribution of i’s clearing price quantity qci . This is
the quantity the agent wins at market clearing. When all choose the equilibrium quantities
it coincides with the distribution of i’s equilibrium winning quantity q∗i , but not otherwise.
Definition 6. Define the probability that bidder i obtains at most quantity q when submitting
bi(·, ti) such that bi(q, ti) = p as
Gi(p, q) ≡ Pr
(
Q −
∑
j 6=i
x(p, tj ) ≤ q
)
. (A.2)
Denote its support by [0, qci ] and the corresponding density by gi(p, q).
Notice that the lower bound of the support is 0 because total supply may realize at Q = 0.
The upper bound is endogenous. Since total supply and types are bounded, however, there
is a maximal amount that the bidder can win even when submitting a price of 0.
The goal is to show that there exists a pure-strategy BNE in which bidders submit
b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
(−1)
(
∂v(q, ti)
∂q
)
dx on q ∈ [0, q∗i ] (1.4)
and b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti) on q ∈ (q∗i ,∞) given that
1. the distributions of total supply and types are such that the amount an agent wins in
the symmetric equilibrium q∗i is drawn from a distribution Fq∗i with weakly decreasing
hazard rate and strictly positive density on support [0, q∗i ]
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2. and the corresponding equilibrium demand schedule b∗(·, ti)−1 is additively separable
in the type on the range of relevant quantities q ∈ [0, q∗i ].
The second condition restricts the class of functions that I can look for: I want to find an
equilibrium of the following form
b∗(q, ti) =
{
b(q, ti) for q ∈ [0, qci ]
bT (q, ti) for q ∈ (qci ,∞)
(A.3)
with
b(q, ti) = y
−1(q − η(ti)) (A.4)
where y(·) and bT (·, ti) are twice differentiable and strictly decreasing and qci is the maximal
amount the agent can win at market clearing (Definition 6). Assuming (A.4) guarantees
that demand schedules are additively separable in type. To see this, solve b(q, ti) = p with
q = x(p, ti) to obtain
x(p, ti) = η(ti) + y(p). (A.5)
A.2.1 The Core of the Argument
The proof is long and mathematically tedious so that it helps to lay out the main line of
argument before carrying it out in all details: Take the perspective of bidder i, fix his type
ti, and let all others j 6= i choose as in equilibrium. My candidate equilibrium function (A.3)
splits into two parts. Consider the second part first: bT (q, ti) for q ∈ (qci ,∞). Quantities
higher than the maximal amount i can win at market clearing are unachievable. The agent
never wins nor pays higher amounts than qci . They are irrelevant. It therefore does not
matter which prices the agents bids for these amounts, provided the bidding function is
differentiable and decreasing on the whole domain R+. In the equilibrium of the theorem I
consider best replies in which the agent just behaves truthfully for irrelevant amounts:
bT (q, ti) = v(q, ti) for q ∈ (qci ,∞) = (q∗i ,∞) in the equilibrium. (A.6)
Now consider the first part: b(q, ti) for q ∈ [0, qci ]. The core of the proof is to show that
function (1.4) is played in the symmetric equilibrium on the domain of relevant quantities
[0, qci ] which in equilibrium become [0, q
∗
i ]. I must show that it is optimal for agent i to choose
(1.4) in responds to all others playing it. He chooses his best reply so as to maximize his
expected total surplus subject to two constraints, so-called end-point or boundary conditions.
The lower bound may be some arbitrary finite price p. The upper bound is given by the
bidder’s true marginal willingness to pay, as explained above.
max
bi(·,ti)
V(bi(·, ti)) subject to bi(0, ti) = p <∞ and bi(qci , ti) = v(qci , ti) (M)
where
V(bi(·, ti)) =
∫ qci
0
[∫ q
0
v(x, ti)− bi(x, ti)dx
]
gi(q, bi(q, ti))dq.
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First, I derive a necessary condition for equilibria with strictly decreasing and differentiable
bidding functions (Lemma 3). Since the agent must choose the same strategy as all others I
can solve for the solution explicitly: When imposing symmetry across agents [0, qci ] of (A.3)
becomes [0, q∗i ] and the necessary condition a linear differential equation (Lemma 4). The
bidding function (1.4) of the Theorem is its unique solution (Lemma 5). Three auxiliary
lemma then show that this candidate is indeed a BNE (Lemma 6). Auxiliary Lemma 1
verifies that function (1.4) is strictly decreasing and differentiable, Auxiliary Lemma 2 that
the function fulfills the sufficient conditions of a local maximum and Auxiliary Lemma 3
that it is globally maximizing the bidder’s objective functional.
A.2.2 Full Proof
Throughout the proof I will often drop the superscript ∗ and treat all functions as functions
of quantity only since the type is fixed. I denote the first and second derivatives w.r.t. to
quantity (or price respectively) by ′ and ′′, for instance: b′(q, ti) =
∂b(q,ti)
∂q
.
Lemma 3. Consider a set of strictly decreasing and differentiable functions {bi(·, ti)}Ni=1.
If they constitutes a BNE it must be that
0 = −
(
∂Gi(q, bi(q, ti))
∂bi(q, ti)
)
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)]− [1−Gi(q, bi(q, ti))] (E)
is satisfied point-wise for all q ∈ [0, qci ] and all i = 1...N .
Proof. In order to derive necessary conditions, I first re-state the objective functional
so that it depends on the distribution function of i’s clearing price quantity instead of its
density. Integrating by parts I obtain
V(bi(·, ti)) =
∫ q
0
[v(x, ti)− bi(x, ti)]dxGi(q, bi(q, ti))
∣∣∣∣qci
0
−
∫ qci
0
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)]Gi(q, bi(q, ti))dq.
Since Gi(0, bi(0, ti)) = 0, Gi(q
c
i , bi(q
c
i , ti)) = 1 for any function and type, and [bi(0, ti) −
v(0, ti)] <∞ by the end-point condition,
V(bi(·, ti)) =
∫ qci
0
[v(x, ti)− bi(x, ti)]dx−
∫ qci
0
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)]Gi(q, bi(q, ti))dq
=
∫ qci
0
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)] [1−Gi(q, bi(q, ti))]dq. (V)
To determine the necessary conditions of the following functional
V =
∫ qci
0
F(q, bi(q, ti))dq s.t. bi(0, ti) = p <∞ and bi(qci , ti) = v(qci , ti) (V)
where F(q, bi(q, ti)) ≡ [v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)] [1−Gi(q, bi(q, ti))] (F)
one constructs a class of comparison functions, bi(q, ti) + εκ(q), around the extremal bi ≡
bi(q, ti). V ’s first variation (the analogue of the first derivative) must be 0 for any variation
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κ(q). The resulting necessary condition is famously known as Euler-Lagrange Equation. In
this special case where F does not depend on b′i(q, ti) it simplifies to 0 = ∂F(q,bi)∂bi . Given F ’s
functional form:
0 = −
(
∂Gi(q, bi)
∂bi
)
[v(q, ti)− bi]− [1−Gi(q, bi)]. (E)
In the standard case, in which F depends on the slope of bi(·, ti), the Euler-Equation involves
two arbitrary coefficients. To find them, one uses the boundary conditions through which
the function must run. Here, where F is independent of the functions’ slope, 0 = ∂F(q,bi)
∂bi
must pass through the end points (0, p) and (qci , v(q
c
i , ti)) (Elsgolc (1961) p. 31).
Lemma 4. Consider a strictly decreasing and differentiable function b(·, ti).
If it constitutes a symmetric BNE then
[v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)] = −
[
N
N − 1
] [
1− Fq∗i (q)
fq∗i (q)
]
b′(q, ti) for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]. (N)
Proof. To evaluate the Euler-Lagrange Equation at the guessed, symmetric solution (A.4),
recall that the equilibrium demand function x(·, tj) is of the following form
x(p, tj) = η(tj) + y(p). (A.5)
Given that all others choose such strategy, agent i’s necessary condition must be satisfied if
he himself also plays this strategy, i.e.
bi(q, ti) = y
−1(q − η(ti)). (A.4)
Imposing this symmetry across agents enables me to simplify the necessary condition. The
trick is to re-state the condition using the distribution of i’s winning quantity in the symmet-
ric equilibrium Fq∗i , instead of i’s clearing price quantity. The later determines the probability
that i wins at most quantity q when offering some price for this amount. The second is this
probability when choosing the equilibrium price.
To do so I first calculate the amount i wins when playing the equilibrium guess (A.5):
Q = q∗i +
∑
j 6=i
x(pc , tj ) with p
c = bi(q
∗
i , ti) by market clearing
q∗i = Q −
∑
j 6=i
η(tj )−
∑
j 6=i
y(y−1(q∗i − η(ti))) by (A.4), (A.5)
⇒ q∗i =
[
1
N
]{
Q −
∑
j 6=i
η(tj ) + (N − 1)η(ti)
}
. (A.7)
Definition 7. The probability that bidder ti wins at most quantity q ∈ [0, q∗i ] in the symmetric
equilibrium is
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Fq∗i (q) = Pr (q
∗
i ≤ q) with q∗i ≡
[
1
N
]{
Q −
∑
j 6=i
η(tj ) + (N − 1)η(ti)
}
(A.7)
Denote the corresponding density by fq∗i (q).
To replace Gi by Fq∗i , recall the definition of i’s clearing price quantity:
Gi(q, p)
(A.2),(A.5)
= Pr
Q −∑
j 6=i
η(tj ) ≤ q + (N − 1)y(p)
 for any (q, p). (A.15)
At p = b(q, ti) = y
−1(q−η(ti)) the distributions of the clearing price and winning quantity coincide:
Gi(q, b(q, ti)) = Pr (q
∗
i ≤ q) = Fq∗i (q). (A.8)
To determine the partial derivative of Gi(q, bi(q, ti)) w.r.t. to price bi = bi(q, ti), I insert
the guessed equilibrium function, apply the chain rule and change the random variable from[
Q −∑j 6=i η(tj )] to q∗i to obtain
∂Gi(q, b(q, ti))
∂bi
=
[
N − 1
N
]
fq∗i (q) y
′(b(q, ti)). (A.9)
By the definition of an inverse and the chain rule y′(p) =
(
1
b′(q,ti)
)
, so that
∂Gi(q, b(q, ti))
∂bi
=
[
N − 1
N
]
fq∗i (q)
(
1
b′(q, ti)
)
. (A.10)
With (A.8) and (A.10) I can evaluate the Euler-Lagrange equation at the guessed symmetric
solution where q¯ci = q
∗
i . (E) becomes
0 = −
[
N − 1
N
]
fq∗i (q)
(
1
b′(q, ti)
)
[v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)]− [1− Fq∗i (q)] for q ∈ [0, q∗i ].
Since fq∗i (·) is strictly positive on its support by the assumption that all densities are strictly
positive on their respective support, I can rearrange this equation to obtain (N ′).
Lemma 5. ∃! function that fulfills the necessary conditions for a symmetric BNE:
b(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
(−1)v′(x, ti)dx for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]. (1.4)
0 By assumptions all j 6= i play the guessed equilibrium x(p, tj) = η(ti) + y(p). By definition of an
inverse, x(b(q, ti) = y(b(q, ti)) + η(tj) = q. By the chain rule
(
∂y(b(q,ti))
∂p
)
b′(q, ti) = 1, so that
(
∂y(b(q,ti)
∂p
)
=
b′(q, ti)−1 . Differentiating x(b(q, ti) = y(b(q, ti)) + η(tj) = q a second time gives
(
∂2y(b(q,ti)
∂p2
)
b′(q, ti)2 +(
∂y(b(q,ti)
∂p
)(
∂2b(q,ti)
∂2q
)
= 0. Inserting the last equation to obtain
(
∂2y(b(q,ti)
∂p2
)
= −
(
∂2b(q,ti)
∂2q
)
b′(q, ti)−3.
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Proof. The solution to differential equation (N ′) for q ∈ [0, q∗i ) is
b(q, ti) = [Fq∗i (q)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
C +
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ q
q0
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx
]
with q0 ∈ [0, q∗i ).
C is chosen to ensure that the solution passes through (q∗i , v(q
∗
i , ti)). Here I will guess
C = −
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ q∗i
q0
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx (C)
and verify at the end that the resulting solution indeed goes through the upper end-point
condition. Inserting (C) into the bidding function and simplifying gives the following unique
solution
b(q, ti) = [Fq∗i (q)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
−
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ q∗i
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx
]
.
To simplify the bidding function I integrate its integral by parts and use Fq∗i (q
∗
i ) = 1.
N − 1
−N
∫ q∗i
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]
−1
N fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx = [Fq∗i (q)− 1]
N−1
N v(q, ti) +
∫ q∗i
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]
N−1
N v′(x, ti)dx
The bidding function becomes
b(q, ti) = [Fq∗i (q)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
[Fq∗i (q)− 1][
N−1
N ]v(q, ti) +
∫ q∗i
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1][
N−1
N ]v′(x, ti)dx
]
.
It simplifies to the bidding function of the theorem
b(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
(−1)v′(x, ti)dx for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]. (1.4)
It remains to show that the function goes through (q∗i , v(q
∗
i , ti)). For this I must show that
lim
q→q∗i
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
v′(x, ti)dx = 0.
To do so, separate
lim
q→q∗i
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
v′(x, ti)dx = lim
q→q∗i
[
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
−N lim
q→q∗i
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
]N−1
N v′(x, ti)dx.
Applying Hospital’s rule in combination with the Fundamental Theorem of calculus:
= − lim
q→q∗i
[
N − 1
N
fq∗i (q)
−1
N
]−1
lim
q→q∗i
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
]N−1
N v′(x, ti)
∣∣∣q∗i
q
The first limit is different from zero since fq∗i (q) > 0 on the full support. The second limit is
0 because Fq∗i (q
∗
i ) = 1 and v(·, ti) is bounded by 0. Putting both parts together, this shows
that the limit is 0.
Lemma 6. Function (1.4) is a BNE.
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Proof. Function (1.4) is a BNE if (i) it is strictly decreasing and differentiable and (ii)
agent i has no profitable deviation from submitting another function than the one that fulfills
the necessary conditions of his maximization problem. The proof splits into three auxiliary
lemma.
Auxiliary Lemma 1. Function (1.4) is strictly decreasing and twice differentiable.
Proof. Twice differentiability of b(·, ti) follows immediately from the assumptions that all
distribution functions and v(·, ti) are twice differentiable. That b(·, ti) is strictly decreasing
in q can easily be verified by taking the derivative:
∂b(q, ti)
∂q
< 0 for q ∈ [0, q∗i ) iff
∫ qci
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
]N−1
N
(
∂v(x, ti)
∂q
)
dx < 0.
This always holds given 1− Fq∗i (x) > 0 and
(
∂v(x,ti)
∂q
)
< 0 on x ∈ [0, q∗i ) by assumption. At
the boundary point where b(q∗i , ti) = v(q
∗
i , ti), the function is strictly decreasing since the
marginal valuation is strictly decreasing in quantity by assumption.
Auxiliary Lemma 2. Function (1.4) fulfills the sufficient conditions of a local maximum.
Proof. Sufficient conditions in variational calculus problems are generally tricky. One
needs to show that the second variation (the analogue to the second derivative when max-
imizing w.r.t. a variable) of functional V defined on page 78 is positive for all values of
variation κ(q) over the interval 0 ≤ q ≤ qci .1 Here, where F is independent of b′i(q, ti) the
second variation is
δV2 =
∫ qci
0
κ(q)2
[
∂2F(q, bi(q, ti))
∂2bi
]
dq.
In what follows I show that ∂
2F(q,bi)
∂2bi
evaluated at the solution bi(q, ti) = b(q, ti) is at all
relevant points negative:
∂2F(q, b(q, ti))
∂2bi
< 0 for all q ∈ [0, q∗i ]. (S)
For this I must first specify the functional form of ∂
2F
∂2bi
. From above we already know
∂F(q, bi(q, ti))
∂bi
= −
(
∂Gi(q, bi(q, ti))
∂bi
)
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)]− [1−Gi(q, bi(q, ti))].
1In the standard case, in which F ≡ F (q, bi(q, ti), b′i(q, ti)) depends on the slope of the function one
maximizes over, b′i, the second variation is known to be (Kamien and Schwartz (1993), p. 42)
δV2 =
∫ qci
0
{
κ2
∂2F
∂2bi
+ 2κκ′
(
∂2F
∂bi∂b′i
)
+ (κ′)2
[
∂2F
∂2b′i
]}
dq.
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Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. price bi(q, ti) = bi gives
∂2F(q, bi(q, ti))
∂2bi
= 2
(
∂Gi(q, bi(q, ti))
∂bi
)
−
(
∂2Gi(q, bi(q, ti))
∂2bi
)
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)] .
Analogous to above the sufficient condition simplifies when re-formulating it using the dis-
tribution of i’s equilibrium winning quantity q∗i : Transform the random variable from Q −∑
j 6=i η(tj ) to q
∗
i , and recall Gi(q, p) = Pr
(
Q −∑j 6=i x(p, tj ) ≤ q) = Pr(Q −∑j 6=i η(tj ) ≤ q + (N − 1)y(p))
to obtain
∂Gi(q, b(q, ti))
∂bi
=
[
N − 1
N
]
fq∗i (q) y
′(b(q, ti)) (A.9)
and
∂2Gi(q, b(q, ti))
∂2bi
=
1
N2
(
∂fq∗i (q)
∂q
)
[N − 1]y′(b(q, ti))2 + 1
N
fqi (q) [N − 1]y′′(b(q, ti)). (A.11)
By definition of an inverse and the chain rule
y′(b(q, ti))
0
=
(
1
b′(q, ti)
)
(A.12)
y′′(b(q, ti))
0
= −
(
b′′(q, ti)
b′(q, ti)3
)
. (A.13)
Inserting equations (A.9), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) into the sufficient condition (S) and multi-
plying both sides of the equation by N
N−1b
′(q, ti)2 > 0 gives
−[v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)]
{
(N − 1)
[
∂fq∗i (q)
∂q
]
− fq∗i (q)
[
b′′(q, ti)
b′(q, ti)
]}
+ 2b′(q, ti)fq∗i (q) < 0 (A.14)
for q ∈ [0, q∗i ]. For the boundary point, q = q∗i , we immediately see that this condition holds.
The first term drops out since v(q, ti) = b(q, ti) and the second term is strictly negative.
To check whether the condition is satisfied for q ∈ [0, q∗i ) I use (N ′) to substitute out for
b′(q, ti) in combination with its fist and second derivative to substitute out for
[
b′′(q,ti)
b′(q,ti)
]
. The
sufficient condition simplifies to
d
dx
ln
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
fq∗i (x)
]∣∣∣∣
x=q
>
[
v′(q, ti)
v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)
]
for q ∈ [0, q∗i ). (S)
The RHS is always negative, because [v(q, ti) − b(q, ti)] > 0 for q ∈ [0, q∗i ) and v(·, ti) is
strictly decreasing. The sufficient condition is therefore fulfilled whenever the LHS is weakly
positive. This is the case when the winning quantity is drawn from a distribution with
weakly decreasing hazard rate, which holds by assumption.
I conclude that the second variation is negative for all admissible functions κ(·). The critical
function b(·, ti) is a local maximum.
Auxiliary Lemma 3. Function (1.4) is a global maximum.
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Proof. In what follows I first show that there is at most one function that satisfies the
necessary condition of the agent’s maximization problem (Part 1). From Lemma 5 we know
that there is such a function, namely function (1.4). To prove that this unique local maxi-
mum is a global maximum, I verify that it cannot be optimal to choose a function that lies
on the boundaries of the function space in the final step (Part 2).
Part 1. There is at most one function that satisfies the necessary condition for a symmetric
equilibrium.
First, following Pycia and Woodward (2017) we know that any best reply must be strictly
decreasing on relevant quantities [0, qci ]. In a sequence of lemmas they prove that bidding
functions in pay-as-bid auctions in which agents are uncertain about the total supply and all
share the same type are strictly decreasing (pp. 34-37). Their Lemmas 1-4 extend to my envi-
ronment with private information with minor modifications: Fix a type profile t ≡ (t1, ...tN)
and consider agent i. The type-dependent valuation vi(·, ti) and bidding function bi(·, ti)
replace vi(·) and bi(·) in Pycia and Woodward (2017). The clearing price now maps from
total supply and the fixed profile of all types into the space of prices: p(Q, t). The set of
relevant quantities is [0, qci ]. Its upper bound is denoted by ϕ
i(p(Q) in Pycia and Woodward
(2017).
It remains to show that there is at most one function that fulfills the necessary conditions
within the class of strictly decreasing functions. For this recall that any such function bi(·, ti)
must be such that for any fixed q ∈ [0, qci ],
0 = −
(
∂Gi(q, bi(q, ti))
∂bi(q, ti)
)
[v(q, ti)− bi(q, ti)]− [1−Gi(q, bi(q, ti))]. (E)
In other words, (E) must hold point-wise, for all relevant quantities q ∈ [0, qci ]. To show that
there is at most one critical function I must show that for any fixed q ∈ [0, qci ] there is at
most one bid price bi ≡ bi(q, ti) that makes the condition bind. Since all candidate functions
are strictly decreasing in quantity, I can equivalently show that for any fixed relevant price
bi there is at most one q that guarantees (E). To show this, I first simplify the condition
using the assumption that players j 6= i choose x(p, tj) = y(p) + η(tj). Then I fix some
relevant price bi and show that the condition is strictly increasing in q by the assumption
that i’s equilibrium winning quantity has a decreasing hazard rate. This implies that for
any relevant bi there is at most one q.
To simplify (E), recall that for any fixed {q, p} and given x(p, tj) = y(p) + η(tj)
Gi(q, p)
(A.5)
= Pr
(
Q −
∑
j 6=i
η(tj ) ≤ q + (N − 1)y(p)
)
(A.15)
Gi(q, p) = FZ (q + (N − 1)y(p)) with Z ≡ Q −
∑
j 6=i
η(tj ) (A.16)
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where FZ , fZ denote the CDF and density of auxiliary variable Z . Applying the Chain Rule,
condition (E) becomes
0 = −fZ(q + (N − 1)y(bi))(N − 1)y′(bi) [v(q, ti)− bi]− [1− FZ (q + (N − 1)y(bi))] (A.17)
for any {q, bi} such that z = q + (N − 1)y(bi) lies in the support of Z . By assumption all
random variables have strictly positive density on their respective supports so that fZ > 0 on
its support. I can therefore divide by the density. Furthermore I can divide by (N − 1)y′(bi)
as y′(bi) < 0 and N > 1. The condition rearranges to
0 =
[
1− FZ (q + (N − 1)y(bi))
fZ(q + (N − 1)y(bi))
](
1
(N − 1)(−1)y′(bi)
)
− [v(q, ti)− bi] . (E)
Now, fix some relevant price bi. By assumption i’s winning equilibrium quantity, defined
q∗i =
[
1
N
] {Z + (N − 1)η(ti)} by combining Definition 7 and (A.16), has a decreasing hazard
rate. Since it is a monotone transformation of Z , Z must have a decreasing hazard rate as
well. It’s inverse is increasing. In condition (E) the inverse hazard rate of Z is evaluated
at z = q + (N − 1)y(bi) which for any fixed bi is increasing in q. Together this implies that[
1−FZ(q+(N−1)y(bi))
fZ(q+(N−1)y(bi))
]
is increasing in q for any fixed bi. Since, in addition, y
′(bi) < 0 the first
term of (E) increases in q. The second term of (E) is strictly decreasing in q given v(·, ti)
strictly decreases in q. Taken together this shows that the RHS is strictly increasing in q.
Part 2. The optimum lies in the interior of the function space.
To prove that the unique local maximum is a global maximum, I must verify that it cannot
be optimal to choose a function that lies on the boundaries of the function space.2 Corner
solutions in variational calculus problems (or more generally optimal control theory) are
points at which the functional (or Hamiltonian) is not differentiable. By assumption any
function on which the functional depends is differentiable. There are no such points and
with it no corner solutions. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Let v(q, ti) = max{ti − ρq, 0} with ρ > 0, assume N > Qρt , and consider distributions
of total supply on support [0, Q > 0] and types on [t > 0, t] under which q∗i is drawn
from the Generalized Pareto Distribution Fq∗i (q) = 1 −
[
σ(ξ,ti)+ξq
σ(ξ,ti)
]− 1
ξ
with scale parameter
σ(ξ, ti) = −ξ
(
N(1−ξ)−1
N(1−ξ)ρ
)
(ti− t)− ξ
(
Q
N
)
and shape parameter ξ ∈ (−∞,−1]. The goal is to
show that
b(q, ti) =

(
1
1−ξ
)
[ti − ξt]−
(
ρ
N(1−ξ)−1
) [
(n− 1)q − ξQ] for q ∈ [0,−(σ(ξ,ti)ξ )]
v(q, ti) for q ∈
(
−
(
σ(ξ,ti)
ξ
)
,∞
) (A.18)
2This is analogous to finding global maxima when optimizing functions (not functionals) that are defined
over a finite interval. From there we are used to checking that the value of the objective function at the
boundaries of the interval is not higher than the value it takes at the interior maximum.
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is a symmetric equilibrium. The proof is split into two parts, summarized in two lemmas.
The proof follows a guess and verify approach. I guess that there is such an equilibrium and
compute how much an agent wins q∗i when all play this strategy. With this I can use Theo-
rem 2 to compute the bidding function that an agent submits when q∗i follows the assumed
Generalized Pareto Distribution. I verify that this function coincides with the guess (Lemma
7). If the hazard rate of q∗i was decreasing, this would conclude the proof. Yet, the hazard
rate of the Generalized Pareto Distribution with bounded support (ξ < 0) is increasing. The
theorem does not apply directly. What remains to show is that the agent has indeed no
profitable deviation because the necessary conditions which defined his bidding function are
also sufficient (Lemma 8).
Lemma 7. Function (A.18) fulfills the necessary conditions of a symmetric BNE.
Proof. Assume all play equilibrium guess (A.18). By Theorem 2 a candidate function for
a symmetric equilibrium takes the following form
b(q, ti) = ti − ρq − ρ
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
dx on [0, q∗i ].
To verify that the guess is a valid equilibrium candidate we must compute (i) the winning
quantities and (ii) their support.
(i) To calculate how much an agent wins in equilibrium q∗i , first, invert b(·, ti) to determine
the corresponding demand functions
x(p, ti) = y(p) + η(ti) with y(p) ≡ a∗ − e∗p and η(ti) ≡ c∗ti (1.5)
and equilibrium parameters
c∗ =
e∗
(1− ξ) =
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
ρ(N − 1)(1− ξ)
)
(A.19)
e∗ =
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
ρ(N − 1)
)
(A.20)
a∗ =
(
ξ
N − 1
)[
Q−
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
ρ(1− ξ)
)
t
]
(A.21)
Now sum over all agents to obtain the market clearing price
Q = x(pc , ti) +
∑
j 6=i
x(pc , tj )
(1.5)
= Na∗ + c∗ti + c∗
∑
j 6=i
tj −Ne∗pc
⇒ pc = a
∗
e∗
+
c∗
Ne∗
[
ti +
∑
j 6=i
tj
]
− Q
N
and evaluate i’s submitted demand at the clearing price:
q∗(ti) ≡ x(pc , ti) = 1
N
[
Q − c∗
∑
j 6=i
tj + (N − 1)c∗ti
]
.
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In the main text I call this amount q∗i for notational ease.
(ii) The support [q∗(ti), q∗(ti)] is given by the support of the total supply and the types.
Since c∗ > 0
q∗(ti) = max
{
0,
1
N
[
0− c∗(N − 1)[t− ti]
]}
(A.22)
q∗(ti) =
1
N
[
Q− c∗(N − 1)[t− ti]
]
with c∗ =
(
N(1− ξ)− 1
ρ(N − 1)(1− ξ)
)
(A.23)
Now, from basic statistics we know that the support of a standard Generalized Pareto
Distribution with bounded support (i.e. with ξ < 0), location parameter α ∈ R, and
scale parameter σ > 0 is
[
α, α−
(
σ
ξ
)]
. In my framework, where total supply may be 0,
the lower bound of i’s winning quantity, and with it the location parameter, is 0.3 To
see this, consider the lowest winning quantity the highest type t can achieve: q∗(t)
(A.22)
=[
0− c∗(N − 1)[t− t]] = 0. Since quantity is bounded below by 0, all lower types also win 0
in the worst case scenario: q∗(ti)
(A.22)
= 0 for all ti. The upper-bound of the support is, for
all ti, given by the scale parameter
(
σ(ξ,ti)
ξ
)
. For any fixed ξ, it is easy to verify that the
σ(ξ, ti) = −ξ
(
N(1−ξ)−1
N(1−ξ)ρ
)
(ti − t)− ξ
(
Q
N
)
of the Corollary fulfills q∗(ti)
(A.23)
= −
(
σ(ξ,ti)
ξ
)
. The
scale parameter σ(ξ, ti) is weakly positive since ρ > 0, ξ < 0, N ≥ 2, Q > 0.
(iii) Now I can use the bid-representation theorem to calculate the bidding function:
b(q, ti) = ti − ρq − ρ
∫ q∗i
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
dx
b(q, ti) =
(
1
1− ξ
)
[ti − ξt]−
(
ρ
N(1− ξ)− 1
)[
(n− 1)q − ξQ] .
The solution coincides with the guess (A.18). Notice that it is strictly decreasing in quantity
(since ξ < 0, N ≥ 2, ρ > 0, N(1− ξ)− 1 > 0), and that condition N > Qρ
t
ensures that
v(ti, q
∗
i (ti)) = t+
(
ti − t
(ξ − 1)N
)
− Q
N
ρ ≥ 0 ∀ti.
Therefore the bidding function never drops below 0.
Lemma 8. Function (A.18) is a BNE.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6 in the proof of the theorem. Here
I only replace the parts which rely on the assumption that the distribution of i’s winning
quantity has a decreasing hazard rate (Auxiliary Lemma 2 and Part 1 of Lemma 3). The
hazard rate is now weakly increasing.
Auxiliary Lemma 4 (Analogous to Auxiliary Lemma 2). Function (A.18) fulfills the suf-
ficient conditions of a local maximum on q ∈ [0, q∗i ] =
[
0,−
(
σ(ξ,ti)
ξ
)]
.
3Notice that this is the easiest case, at it eliminates type-dependence of the lower bound of q∗(ti).
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Proof. Recall the sufficient condition for a local maximum from page 68:
−[v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)]
{
(N − 1)
[
∂fq∗i (q)
∂q
]
− fq∗i (q)
[
b′′(q, ti)
b′(q, ti)
]}
+ 2b′(q, ti)fq∗i (q) < 0. (A.14)
It is always satisfied when the hazard rate is decreasing, and might hold when the hazard
rate is increasing. Inserting all functional forms of the corollary, the sufficient condition
(A.14) becomes(
(N − 1)Nρ2(1− ξ)
(N(1− ξ)− 1)(−ξ)
)(
1
f2(ti)
)− 1
ξ
f1(q, ti)
−[ 1+ξξ ](−2 +N(1 + ξ)) < 0 (A.24)
∀q ∈ [0, q∗(ti)), ti with
f1(q, ti) ≡ −(ti − t− (1− ξ)(ρQ−N(ρq − ti + t))) decreasing in q and increasing in ti
f2(ti) ≡ (ti − t)(N(1− ξ)− 1) +Qρ(1− ξ) increases in ti.
In what follows I show that this condition is fulfilled for ξ ≤ −1. To see this I simplify it.
The first term is strictly positive since ξ < 0, N ≥ 2, ρ > 0, Q > 0.(
(N − 1)Nρ2(1− ξ)
(N(1− ξ)− 1)(−ξ)
)
> 0
Also the second term is strictly positive for all types,
(
1
f2(ti)
)− 1
ξ
> 0. This is because
f2(t) > 0⇒ f2(ti) > 0 ∀ti since f2(·) is increasing in ti.
Canceling the two terms that are strictly positive, the sufficient condition (A.24) becomes
f1(q, ti)
−[ 1+ξξ ](−2 +N(1 + ξ)) < 0 ∀q ∈ [0, q∗(ti)), ti.
I must show that this inequality holds for all types and all relevant quantities. This is not
straightforward because the LHS may increase or decrease in quantity and type, depending
on the sign of the exponent −
[
1+ξ
ξ
]
and (−2 + N(1 + ξ)). The remainder of this section
shows that it holds for ξ ∈ (−∞,−1].4
If ξ = −1, the sufficient condition is always satisfied. If ξ < −1 the exponent is negative,
i.e. −
[
1+ξ
ξ
]
< 0. ξ < −1 further implies that (−2 + N(1 + ξ)) < 0, so that the sufficient
condition simplifies to
f1(q, ti)
−[ 1+ξξ ] > 0 ∀q ∈ [0, q∗(ti)), ti.
Since f1(q, ti)
−[ 1+ξξ ] is increasing in q and decreasing in ti, it is fulfilled for all q ∈ [0, q∗(ti)), ti
when:
f1(0, t) > 0⇔ t > t+ (Qρ+N(t− t)(ξ − 1)⇔ Qρ > −
(
(t− t)(N(1− ξ)− 1)
1− ξ
)
.
This is always satisfied given Q, ρ > 0, N ≥ 2, ξ ≤ −1.
4For ξ ∈ (−1, 0) I could neither show that the sufficient condition holds nor that it cannot hold. Therefore
my proof therefore does not contradict Ausubel et al. (2014) who allow for ξ < N−1N .
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Auxiliary Lemma 5 (Analogous to Part 1 of Lemma 3). There is a unique function that
satisfies the necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3. I show that there is exactly one
q for any fixed relevant price bi ≡ bi(q, ti) that guarantees that the necessary condition is
fulfilled. With decreasing hazard rate this was the case because
0 =
[
1− FZ (q + (N − 1)y(bi))
fZ(q + (N − 1)y(bi))
](
1
(N − 1)(−1)y′(bi)
)
− [v(q, ti)− bi] (E)
was strictly increasing in quantity for any fixed price bi. Now it is strictly increasing. To
show this, I will, as above go via the hazard rate of i’s winning quantity, which is drawn
from a GPD by assumption. It assumes the following hazard rate[
1− Fq∗(q)
fq∗(q)
]
= σ(ξ, ε) + qξ.
By definition Z = Nq∗i − (N − 1)η(ti) so that FZ(z) = Fq∗i (q) and fZ(z) = Nfq∗i (q) for any
z in the support of Z . Therefore[
1− FZ (z)
fZ(z)
]
=
1
N
[σ(ξ, ε) + zξ] for any z in the support of Z . (A.25)
In particular at realization z = q + (N − 1)y(bi)[
1− FZ (q + (N − 1)y(bi))
fZ(q + (N − 1)y(bi))
]
=
1
N
[σ(ξ, ε) + [q + (N − 1)y(bi)]ξ]. (A.26)
By assumption all other player’s than i play the equilibrium guess. We thus know that agents
j 6= i choose y(bi) = a∗− e∗bi with equilibrium coefficients as defined above. In addition the
true marginal willingness to pay is linear v(q, ti) = ti−ρq. Taken all together, condition (E)
becomes
0 =
1
N
[σ(ξ, ε) + [q + (N − 1)[a∗ − e∗bi]]ξ]
(
1
(N − 1)(−1)(−e∗)
)
− [ti − ρq − bi] .
Taking the derivative w.r.t. q, and simplifying one can show that the RHS is strictly increas-
ing in q given N ≥ 2, ξ ≤ −1, ρ > 0 and σ(ξ, ti) as defined in the corollary. Therefore, there
is at most one quantity q for this price bi that makes the condition bind.
This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
A.3.1 Corollary 1 vs. Proposition 7 in Ausubel et al. (2014)
The Corollary relates to Ausubel et al. (2014)’s Proposition 7. They derive the unique
linear equilibrium in a pay-as-bid auction in an environment without private types, where
bid offers may drop below 0 in equilibrium. In their set-up, all bidders draw the same type,
here called t, and are uncertain about the total supply Q. Both are drawn from a joint
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distribution F (Q, t), which is commonly known and has non-degenerate support. Different
to my framework with independent private types, the single type of all agents and total
supply may be correlated. With slight adaptation to my framework, their proposition reads
as follows:
Proposition 7 (Ausubel et al. (2014)) Let per-capita supply for any value be distributed
according to the Generalized Pareto distribution with α = 0, i.e. Fq∗(q|t) = 1 −
(
σ+ξq
σ
)− 1
ξ .
In the unique linear equilibrium, the strategy of bidder i is
b(q, t) = t−
(
ρ
N(1− ξ)− 1
)
[(N − 1)q +Nσ] for ξ < N − 1
N
. (A.27)
Notice that I impose a stricter bound on ξ ≤ −1. This comes from a difference in how we
verify sufficient conditions. Ausubel et al. (2014) rely on the Maximum Theorem for compact
intervals according to which a maximum (and a minimum) exists. I instead derive sufficient
conditions that guarantee that the critical function is a maximum. To compare their result
to mine not that the support of q∗ ≡ Q
N
is bounded when ξ < 0: q ∈
[
0, Q
N
]
=
[
0,−σ
ξ
]
.
Using Q
N
= −σ
ξ
their bidding function becomes
b(q, t) = t−
(
ρ
N(1− ξ)− 1
)[
(N − 1)q − ξQ] for ξ ≤ −1. (A.27)
It is identical to the function of my Corollary given all draw the lowest type ti = t.
A.4 Extension: Reserve Price
The main result extends to auctions with reserve prices with distributions that may have
unbounded support. The following extension is stated for distributions with unbounded
support. The case of bounded support is analogous.
Theorem 2b. Consider distributions of total supply and types such that the amount an agent
wins in the symmetric equilibrium q∗i is drawn from distribution Fq∗i with weakly decreasing
hazard rate on [0,∞) and strictly positive density on [0, qR], with v(qR, ti) = R.
There exists a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which bidders submit
b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ qR
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
]N−1
N
(−1)
(
∂v(q, ti)
∂q
)
dx for q ∈ [0, qR] (1.1”)
provided the resulting equilibrium demand schedule is additively separable in the type on
[0, R], and b∗(q, ti) = v(q, ti) for q ∈
(
qR,∞).
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The analogy with the first-price auction carries over. To see this, note that an agent of type
s, drawn iid from Fs(s) in a first-price auction with reserve price R > 0 chooses
β∗(s) = v(s)−
∫ s
sR
[
F (x)
F (s)
]N−1(
∂v(x)
∂s
)
dx for s ∈ [sR, S] (1.1b”)
where v(s) = s and v(sR) = R, and 0 otherwise. Comparing the bidding function in the
first-price auction to the one in the pay-as-bid auction in the way I illustrate in the main
text, one can derive the main result for this extension. One only needs to replace q∗i by q
R/
0 by sR. Both bounds are now determined by the reserve price instead of the upper/lower
bound of the distribution.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2. Here I only highlight what
changes. The support in Definition 6 is now [0, qR], no longer [0, qci ]. The difference is that
the upper bound of the support is now exogenously given by the reserve price R. The bidder
chooses this function so as to maximize his expected total surplus.
max
bi(·,ti)
V(bi(·, ti)) s.t. bi(0, ti) = p <∞ and bi(qR, ti) = R (M)
where
V(bi(·, ti)) =
∫ qR
0
[∫ q
0
v(x, ti)− bi(x, ti)dx
]
gi(q, bi(q, ti))dq.
The derivation of the Euler-Lagrange equation goes through without problems. One obtains
the following necessary condition
0 = −
(
∂Gi(q, bi)
∂bi
)
[v(q, ti)− bi]− [1−Gi(q, bi)] for q ∈ [0, qR] (E’)
together with the end-point condition: bi(q
R, ti) = R. Analogous to above, the next step is
to evaluate the Euler-Lagrange Equation at the symmetric solution. The difference now is
that i’s winning quantity q∗i has unbounded support [0,∞). If there was no positive reserve
price R > 0, one would need to deal with improper integrals. Showing that they converge
is not trivial. With a positive reserve price, however, the distribution that actually matters
for the agent is bounded. Following Pycia and Woodward (2017) I construct the following
auxiliary distribution
FRqi (q) =
{
Fq∗i (q) for q < q
R
1 for q ≥ qR.
With it the Euler-Lagrange Equation can be expressed exactly in the way it was expressed
above (N ′). The difference is that it now holds for q ∈ [0, qR) instead of q ∈ [0, q∗i ).
[v(q, ti)− b(q, ti)] = −
[
1− FRqi (q)
fRqi (q)
]
b′(q, ti) for q ∈ [0, qR) (NR)
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Analogous to above one can show that a function which fulfills the necessary condition is a
global maximum. The solution to this differential equation for q ∈ [0, qR) is
b(q, ti) = [F
R
qi (q)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
C +
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ q
q0
[FRqi (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fRqi (x)v(x, ti)dx
]
with q0 ∈ [0, qR).
The trick now is to choose C so that the solution goes through the end-point, i.e. b(qR, ti) =
R. For this approach qR from the left and solve
R = lim
y→qR−
[FRqi (y)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
C +
[
N − 1
N
]
lim
y→qR−
∫ y
q0
[FRqi (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fRqi (x)v(x, ti)dx
]
.
By definition limy→qR− F
R
qi
(y) = F (qR) so that
C = [Fq∗i (q
R)− 1]−[N−1N ] −
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ qR
q0
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx.
Inserting C into the bidding function and simplifying gives
b(q, ti) = [Fq∗i (q)− 1]−[
N−1
N ]
[
R[Fq∗i (q
R)− 1][N−1N ] −
[
N − 1
N
] ∫ qR
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]−[
1
N ]fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx
]
.
Integrate by parts to simplify the function
N − 1
−N
∫ qR
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]
1
−N fq∗i (x)v(x, ti)dx = −[Fq∗i (x)− 1]
N−1
N v(x, ti)
∣∣∣qR
q
+
∫ qR
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1]
N−1
N v′(x, ti)dx
Different to above Fq∗i (q
R) 6= 1, but strictly smaller.
= −[Fq∗i (qR)− 1][
N−1
N ]v(qR, ti)
+ [Fq∗i (q)− 1][
N−1
N ]v(q, ti) +
∫ qR
q
[Fq∗i (x)− 1][
N−1
N ]v′(x, ti)dx
The bidding function becomes for for q ∈ [0, qR)
b(q, ti) =M(q, R) + v(q, ti)−
∫ qR
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
(−1)v′(x, ti)dx
with mark-up
M(q, R) ≡ [R− v(qR, ti)]
[
1− Fq∗i (qR)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
= 0 by definition of qR = v−1(R, ti).
We are left with
b(q, ti) = v(q, ti)−
∫ qR
q
[
1− Fq∗i (x)
1− Fq∗i (q)
][N−1N ]
(−1)v′(x, ti)dx for q ∈ [0, qR]
where I extended the domain to include the point qR.
To complete the proof one can show as above that the solution fulfills the properties that I
have assumed to derive it.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3 and Lemma 2
Take the perspective of bidder i and let all other agents j 6= i play as in equilibrium.
Their bidding functions are denoted {b∗j,1(·), b∗j,2(·)} with corresponding demand schedules
{x∗j,1(·), x∗j,2(·)}. The proof proceeds in two main steps. The first part characterized bidder
i’s best reply to all others. The second solves for the symmetric equilibrium. Throughout
I drop subscript i for notational convenience whenever it is unambiguous, and restrict at-
tention to differentiable, strictly decreasing bidding functions that map from [0, Qm]→ R+.
Others may not be submitted by the rules of the auction.
As a starting point, I must set up bidder i’s maximization problem. Optimizing his expected
total surplus from winning {qc1 , qc2} when offering prices {p1(qc1), p2(qc2)}
V(p1(·), p2(·)) ≡ E
V (qc1 , qc2)− ∑
m=1,2
∫ qcm
0
pm(qm)dqm
 with qcm = Qm −∑
j 6=i
x∗j,m(pm(q
c
m)) (V)
bidder i solves a problem of variational calculus subject to two end-point conditions. One
of them comes from the feature that there is a highest amount that i can possibly win at
market clearing.
Definition 8. The maximal amount bidder i can achieve at market clearing when submitting
pm(·) is given by qcm = Qm −
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j,m(pm(q
c
m)) for m = 1, 2. Quantities qm ∈ [0, qcm) are
referred to as ‘relevant’ quantities. The upper bound of ‘relevant equilibrium’ quantities are
denoted by q∗i,m in any equilibrium, and q
∗
m in a symmetric equilibrium.
At qcm bidder i has no incentive to submit anything other than the (true) marginal benefit
he expects from winning qcm. The upper end-point condition is pm(q
c
m) = E[vm(qcm, qc−m)|qcm]
for m = 1, 2,−m 6= m. The lower end-point guarantees that the bidding function is bounded
from above. It says that the bid price for qm = 0 must some arbitrary finite price pm < 0.
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Taken together the maximization problem reads as follows
max
p1(·),p2(·)
V(p1(·), p2(·))
s.t. pm(0) = pm and pm(q
c
m) = E[vm(qcm, qc−m)|qcm] for m = 1, 2,−m 6= m. (MP)
The proof splits into a sequence of lemma. Lemma 2, 9 and 10. The first is stated in the
main text on page 24. Proven in Sections B.1.1 - B.1.3 the lemma characterize necessary
and sufficient conditions for a global maximum of bidder i’s optimization problem, assuming
that the solution is twice differentiable.
Lemma 2 (Necessary Conditions). A BNE in which agent i submits {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} and all
others {p∗j,1(·), p∗j,2(·)}Ni 6=j must for all {q1, q2} and i ∈ N satisfy
[E[vm(qm, q∗i,−m)|qm]− pcm]
(
∂Pr (RSm(p
c
m) ≥ qm)
∂pm
)
= Pr (RSm(p
c
m) ≥ qm) (2.9)
for m = 1, 2;−m 6= m, and clear both markets pcm = p∗m(qm).
Lemma 9 (Sufficient Conditions). Consider a pair {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that is twice differentiable
and let m = 1,−m = 2. If at any q1, q2 of relevant quantities where pc1 = p∗1(q1) and
pc2 = p
∗
2(q2) the following condition
[
v1(q2, Q2)− pc1
] ∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1)
∂2p1
− 2∂Pr(RS1(p
c
1) ≥ q1))
∂p1
−
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)
∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1 and RS2(pc2) ≥ q2)
∂2p1
dq2 ≤ 0
(S1)
and
v(q1, q2)
∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1 and RS2(pc2) ≥ q2)
∂p1∂p2
≤ 0
(S2)
as well as its analogue for m = 2,−m = 1 is satisfied, {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} is a local maximum.
Lemma 10. {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that locally maximizes the objective functional is a global solution.
Taken together Lemma 2, 9, 10 characterize the best reply of bidder i to all others choosing
an equilibrium strategy. The second part of the proof derives the symmetric equilibrium.
When imposing symmetry across bidders the necessary condition becomes a linear differen-
tial equation, and the local sufficient conditions of Lemma 9 prove to hold (Lemma 11 proven
in Section B.1.4). The final step is to derive the equilibrium bidding functions by solving
the linear differential equation, to show that there is a unique such function, and that this
function fulfills the assumed properties (Lemma 12 proven in Section B.1.5).
Lemma 11 (NC and SC under Symmetry). (i) If all bidders choose the same functions
{p∗1(·), p∗2(·)}, the necessary condition of Lemma 2 simplifies to
E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm]− p∗m(qm) = − [ NN − 1
] [
1− Fq∗m(qm)
fq∗m(qm)
]
p∗
′
m(qm) (N
′)
for qm ∈ [0, q∗m) and both goods m = 1, 2,m 6= −m.
(ii) The (local) sufficient conditions of Lemma 9 are satisfied at the symmetric solution.
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Lemma 12 (Existence and Uniqueness). (i) There is a unique function that satisfies the
necessary and sufficient conditions (N ′)
p∗m(qm) = E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm]+ ∫ q∗m
qm
(
∂E
[
vm
(
x,q∗−m
) |x]
∂qm
)[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
dx. (2.10)
on the domain of relevant equilibrium quantities [0, q∗m].
(ii) It is twice differentiable and strictly decreasing.
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1. The first step in solving i’s maximization problem is summarized in an auxiliary
lemma. It re-states the objective functional: V(p1(·), p2(·)) ≡ E
[
V (qc1 , q
c
2)−
∑
m=1,2
∫ qcm
0 pm(qm)dqm
]
,
using the following notation.
Definition 9. Let bidder i submit functions s.t. p1(q1) = p1 and p2(q2) = p2. Denote
G(q1, q2, p1, p2) ≡ Pr (RS1(p1) ≤ q1 and RS2(p2) ≤ q2) (B.1)
and
Gm(qm, pm) = Pr (RSm(pm) ≤ qm) for m = 1, 2 (B.2)
with residual supply RSm(pm) = Qm −
∑
j 6= x
∗
j,m(pm) as in Definition 2.
Refer to the corresponding joint and marginal density functions by g and gm.
Auxiliary Lemma 6.
V(p1(·), p2(·)) =
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
F (q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))dq1dq2 (V)
with
F(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q1)) =
∑
m=1,2
1
Q−m
[vm(qm, Q−m)− pm(qm)][1−Gm(qm, pm(qm))]
− v(q1, q2)[1−G(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q1))] (F)
Proof. With Definition 9 the objective functional reads
V(p1(·), p2(·)) =
∫ qc2
0
∫ qc1
0
[
V (q1, q2)−
∑
m
∫ qm
0
pm(x)dx
]
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))dq1dq2.
Notice that the bounds of integration vary in i’s bid choices, because the supports of i’s
clearing price quantities depend on the price he offers for these amounts pm(q
c
m) for m = 1, 2.
This is inconvenient because we will be looking for the optimal bid choices. Luckily there is
a way around this complication. Since gm(qm, pm(qm)) = g(q1, q2, p1(q2), p2(q2)) = 0 for any
bid price offers at qm /∈ [0, qcm] in either m = 1 or 2, I can extend the bounds of the integrals
to Q1 and Q2:
V(p1(·), p2(·)) =
∫ Q2
0
∫ Q1
0
[
V (q1, q2)−
∑
m
∫ qm
0
pm(x)dx
]
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), b2(q2))dq1dq2.
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The next step is to re-express the objective functional in terms of distribution functions,
such as G(·, ·, p1(·), p2(·)), rather than densities g(·, ·, p1(·), p2(·)). Who is not interested in
following all mathematical steps may skip the rest of the proof of the auxiliary lemma and
jump to page 82 (Step 2).
(a) Re-expressing the expected utility. Start by integrating the inner integral by
parts, taking the derivative of V (q1, q2) and integrating g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2)) w.r.t. q1.
Evaluate the first term at its bounds of integration und use
∫ 0
0
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2)) = 0
and
∫ Q1
0
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2)) =
∫ qc1
0
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2)) = g(q2, p2(q2)) to obtain∫ Q2
0
∫ Q1
0
V (q1, q2)g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))dq1dq2 =
∫ Q2
0
V (Q1, q2)g2(q2, p2(q2))dq2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
−
∫ Q2
0
[∫ Q1
0
[
v1(q1, q2)
∫ q1
0
g(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))dq1
]
dq1
]
dq2.︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
Consider term A: Integrate by parts w.r.t. q2, evaluate the first term at the bounds of
integration and use G2(Q2, p2(Q2)) = 1 and G2(0, p2(0)) = 0 for all p2(·) to obtain
A = V (Q1, Q2)−
∫ Q2
0
v2(Q2, q2)G2(q2, p2(q2))dq2. (A)
Now consider term B: Apply Fubini’s Theorem to revert the order of integration of the
two outer integrals, and integrate the inner integral corresponding to dq2 by parts. Once
more evaluate the first term at the bounds of integration and use that for any p1(·), p2(·),
G(q2, Q2, p1(q1), p2(Q2)) = G1(q1, p1(q1)) and G(q1, 0, p1(q1), p2(0)) = 0 to achieve
B =
∫ Q1
0
v1(q1, Q2)G1(q1, p1(q1))dq1 −
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)G(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))dq2. (B)
Combining A - B, and applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus one last time the
expected utility reads with m = 1, 2,m 6= −m
E [V (qc1 , qc2)] =
∑
m=1,2
∫ Qm
0
vm(qm, Q−m)[1−Gm(qm, pm(qm))]dqm
−
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)[1−G(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))]dq2dq1 (EU)
(b) Re-expressing the expected payments.∫ Qm
0
[∫ qm
0
pm(x)dx
]
gm(qm, pm(qm))dqm =
[∫ qm
0
pm(x)dx
]
Gm(qm, pm(qm))
∣∣∣∣Qm
0
−
∫ Qm
0
pm(qm)Gm(qm, pm(qm))dqm
Since Gm(Qm, pm(Qm)) = 1, Gm(0, pm(0)) = 0 for all pm(·) this simplifies to∫ Qm
0
[∫ qm
0
pm(x)dx
]
gm(qm, pm(qm))dqm =
∫ Qm
0
pm(qm)[1−Gm(qm, pm(qm))]dqm (EBm)
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→ The objective function
Combining (EU) -
∑
m=1,2 (EBm) the objective function can be written as
V(p1(·), p2(·)) =
∑
m=1,2
∫ Qm
0
[
vm(qm, Q−m)− pm(qm)
]
[1−Gm(qm, pm(qm))]dqm
−
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)[1−G(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2))]dq2dq1 (V)
Pulling everything insight the double integral gives the expression of the auxiliary lemma.
Step 2. The next step is to derive necessary conditions for the maximization problem:
max
p1(·),p2(·)
V(p1(·), p2(·))
s.t. pm(0) = pm and pm(q
c
m) = E[vm(qcm, qc−m)|qcm] for m = 1, 2,−m 6= m. (MP)
Before doing so, notice that V(p1(·), p2(·)) assumes value 0 as soon as one quantity, say q1 lies
outside the set of relevant quantities because G(q1, q2, p1(q1), p2(q2)) = G1(q1, p1(q1)) = 1 for
q1 6∈ [0, qc1). This implies that the bidder may choose any prices on amounts that cannot win
at market clearing provided that the bidding function is differentiable and decreasing (i.e. in
the set of functions that he is allowed to submit). For now I will ignore the end-point con-
ditions. In the end I show that they are satisfied at the solution (the symmetric equilibrium).
Suppose that {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} is a solution to maxp1(·),p2(·) V (p1(·), p2(·)). Fix two arbitrary
differentiable and decreasing functions {ξ1(·), ξ2(·)} that map from [0, Qm]→ R+. Construct
the following ‘varied’ function
(
p∗1(q1)
p∗2(q2)
)
+ ε
(
ξ1(q1)
ξ2(q2)
)
around the extremal. It is is, for every ε,
differentiable on [0, Q1]× [0, Q2]. Since {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} is a maximum,
I(ε) ≡
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
F (q1, q2, p∗1(q1) + εξ1(q1), p∗2(q2) + εξ2(q2)) dq1dq2 (B.3)
must take its maximum for ε = 0. In the remainder of the proof I compute the first variation
d
dε
I(ε) and derive conditions that guarantee d
dε
I(0) = 0.
d
dε
I(ε) =
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
ξ1(q1)
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1(q1) + εξ1(q1), p∗2(q2) + εξ2(q2))
∂p1(q1)
)
dq1dq2
+
∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
ξ2(q2)
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1(q1) + εξ1(q1), p∗2(q2) + εξ2(q2))
∂p2(q2)
)
dq2dq1.
Evaluating at ε = 0, applying Fubuni’s Theorem to reverse the order of integration of the
second integral, pulling ξ1(q1), ξ2(q2) out of the inner integral, and abbreviating p
∗
m(qm) =
p∗m, ξm(qm) = ξm for m = 1, 2 the necessary condition reads
d
dε
I(0) =
∫ Q1
0
ξ1
[∫ Q2
0
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1
)
dq1
]
dq2 +
∫ Q2
0
ξ2
[∫ Q1
0
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p2
)
dq2
]
dq1 = 0.
For d
dε
I(0) = 0 for any ξ1(·), ξ2(·) it must be that∫ Q2
0
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1
)
dq2 = 0 (B.4)
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and ∫ Q1
0
(
∂F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p2
)
dq1 = 0. (B.5)
Consider the condition for m = 1: (B.4). The other condition (B.5) is analogous. Given F ’s
functional form (B.4) rearranges to
− [v1(q1, Q2)− p∗1](∂G1(q1, p∗1)∂p1
)
+
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)
(
∂G(q1, q2, p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
∂p1
)
dq2 = [1−G1(q1, p∗1)] .
To obtain the condition of the lemma, apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus to
replace v1(q1, Q2) =
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)dq2+v1(q2, 0). In addition use G2|1(q2, p∗2|q1, p∗1)
(
∂G1(q1,p∗1)
∂p1
)
=(
∂G(q1,q2,p∗1,p
∗
2)
∂p1
)
to obtain[
v1(q1, 0) +
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)
[
1−G2|1(q2, p∗2|q1, p∗1)
]− p∗1
]
(−1)
(
∂G1(q1, p
∗
1)
∂p1
)
= 1−G1(q1, p∗1).
In a final step integrate by parts, usingG2|1(Q2, p2(Q2)|q1, p∗1(q1)) = 1 andG2|1(0, p∗2(0)|q1, p∗1(q1)) =
0 to verify that the first two terms are the conditional expectation of the partial utility
E
[
v1(q1, q
∗
i,2)
∣∣ q1]. The condition becomes[
E
[
v1(q1, q
∗
i,2)
∣∣ q1]− p∗1] (−1)(∂G1(q1, p∗1)∂p1
)
= [1−G1(q1, p∗1)]. (2.9)
This completes the proof. To match the notation of lemma and main text it suffices to
replace [1 − G1(q1, p∗1)] by Pr1(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1) and (−1)
(
∂G1(q1,p∗1)
∂p1
)
by
(
∂Pr1(RS1(pc1)≥q1))
∂p1
)
.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma 9 (Sufficient Conditions). Consider a pair {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that is twice differentiable
and let m = 1,−m = 2. If at any q1, q2 of relevant quantities where pc1 = p∗1(q1) and
pc2 = p
∗
2(q2) the following condition
[
v1(q2, Q2)− pc1
] ∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1)
∂2p1
− 2∂Pr(RS1(p
c
1) ≥ q1))
∂p1
−
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)
∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1 and RS2(pc2) ≥ q2)
∂2p1
dq2 ≤ 0
(S1)
and
v(q1, q2)
∂2Pr(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1 and RS2(pc2) ≥ q2)
∂p1∂p2
≤ 0
(S2)
as well as its analogue for m = 2,−m = 1 is satisfied, {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} is a local maximum.
Proof. A pair {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that satisfies the necessary conditions is a local maximum if
the second variation d
dε
(
d
dε
I(ε)
)
evaluated at ε = 0 is negative for all ξ1(·), ξ2(·). Taking the
second derivative of I(ε), dropping dependencies of q1, q2 for notational ease, and evaluating
at ε = 0 gives
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ddε
(
d
dε
I(0)
)
=∫ Q1
0
∫ Q2
0
[
ξ21
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂2p1
+ ξ1ξ2
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1∂p2
+ ξ2ξ1
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p2∂p1
+ ξ22
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1,p ∗2)
∂2p2
]
dq1dq2 ≤ 0.
Splitting up the integral, a stricter necessary condition that guarantees d
dε
(
d
dε
I(0)
) ≤ 0 for
all ξ1(·), ξ2(·) is
ξ21
∫ Q2
0
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂2p1
dq2 ≤ 0 and ξ22
∫ Q1
0
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂2p2
dq1 ≤ 0 and ξ1ξ2 ∂
2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1∂p2
≤ 0
point-wise for all ξ1(q1), ξ2(q1) at all q1, q2. Given that ξ1(·), ξ2(·) map into R+ by assumption
⇔
∫ Q2
0
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂2p1
dq2 ≤ 0 and
∫ Q1
0
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, b∗2)
∂2p2
dq1 ≤ 0 and ∂
2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1∂p2
≤ 0. (B.6)
Given F ’s functional form
∫ Q2
0
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂2p1
dq2 = 2
(
∂G1(q1, p∗1)
∂p1
)
− [v1(q2, Q2)− p∗1](∂2G1(q1, p∗1)∂2p1
)
+
∫ Q2
0
v(q1, q2)
(
∂2G(q1, q2, p∗1, p
∗
2
∂2p1
)
dq2
(S1)
with an analogous expression for m = 2, and
∂2F(q1, q2, p∗1, p∗2)
∂p1∂p2
= v(q1, q2)
(
∂2G(q1, q2, p∗1, p
∗
2)
∂p2∂p1
)
(S2)
This completes the proof. To match the notation of lemma and main text it suffices to
replace [1−G1(q1, p∗1)] by Pr1(RS1(pc1) ≥ q1) and (−1)
(
∂G1(q1,p∗1)
∂p1
)
by
(
∂Pr1(RS1(pc1)≥q1))
∂p1
)
and
so on.
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10. {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that locally maximizes the objective functional is a global solution.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. First I show that there is at most one set of
functions {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} within the class of strictly decreasing, differentiable functions that
satisfies the necessary conditions for a local maximum. Then I show that a pair {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)}
that locally maximizes the objective functional is a global solution.
Step 1. Consider auction 1 and assume bidder i chooses as in the symmetric equilibrium
p∗2(·) in auction 2. From Lemma 2 we know that an optimal bid in auction 1 must for all
relevant quantities q1 ∈ [0, qc1) satisfy
[E[v1(q1, q∗2 )|q1]− p∗1]−
Pr (RS1(p∗1(q1)) ≥ q1)
∂Pr(RS1(p∗1)≥q1)
∂p1
 = 0. (2.9)
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To show that there is a unique function that solves this necessary condition I must show that
there is a unique bid price at each quantity point. Since all candidate functions are strictly
decreasing this is equivalent to showing that there is a unique amount i demands for each
possible bid price. By Definition 2
Pr1 (RS1(p
∗
1) ≥ q1) = Pr (Q1 ≤ q1 + (N − 1)x∗1(p∗1)) . (B.7)
The necessary condition is therefore equivalent to
[E[v1(q1, q∗2 )|q1]− p∗1]−
(
1− FQ1(q1 + (N − 1)x1(p∗1))
fQ1(q1 + (N − 1)x1(p∗1))
)(
1
(N − 1)(−1)x′1(p∗1)
)
= 0. (B.8)
There is one quantity point q1 (if any) that makes the condition bind for any fixed p
∗
1 if the
RHS is strictly decreasing in quantity q1. By assumption E[v1(q1, q∗2 )|q1] is decreasing in q1.
Furthermore (−1)x′1(p∗1) > 0. Consequently, the RHS is strictly decreasing in q1 if
∂
∂q1
(
1− FQ1(q1 + (N − 1)x1(p∗1))
fQ1(q1 + (N − 1)x1(p∗1))
)
≥ 0.
This follows from the assumption that total supply is drawn from a (marginal) distribution
with weakly decreasing hazard rate.
The analogous argument hold for auction 2. Taken together the argument implies there can
at most be a set of functions that solves the necessary conditions.
Step 2. To show that a pair of functions that locally maximizes the objective functional
V (p1(·), p2(·)) is a global maximum it suffices to show that the solution cannot lie at the
boundaries of the functional set. This is the case as long as V (p1(·), p2(·)) is, for any pair
{p1(·), p2(·)}, bounded from above. To show this, let qo1, qo2 be the quantities at which the
utility function achieves its maximum on [0, Q1]× [0, Q2]. Since bids must be positive,
V (p1(·), p2(·)) ≡E
[
V (qc1 , q
c
2)−
∑
m=1,2
∫ qcm
0
pm(x)dx
]
≤ V (qo1, qo2) for any {p1(·), p2(·)}.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 11 (NC and SC under Symmetry). (i) If all bidders choose the same functions
{p∗1(·), p∗2(·)}, the necessary condition of Lemma 2 simplifies to
E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm]− p∗m(qm) = − [ NN − 1
] [
1− Fq∗m(qm)
fq∗m(qm)
]
p∗
′
m(qm) (N
′)
for qm ∈ [0, q∗m) and both goods m = 1, 2,m 6= −m.
(ii) The (local) sufficient conditions of Lemma 9 are satisfied at the symmetric solution.
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Proof. When all bidders choose the same strictly decreasing and differentiable functions,
they share the total supply quantities equally at market clearing, q∗m =
Qm
N
in m = 1, 2. The
necessary and sufficient conditions can be simplified by expressing (2.9) and its analogue for
m = 2 in terms of the underlying joint and marginal distribution of total supply F, FQm ,
instead of Gm and G: By market clearing Qm = Nqm =
(
qm +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
m(p
∗
m(qm))
)
for m =
1, 2, it must be that
G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2) = F (Nq1, Nq2) (B.9)
Gm(qm, p
∗
m(qm)) = FQm (Nqm) for any fixed q1 ∈ [0, q∗1], q2 ∈ [0, q∗2]. (B.10)
The first and second partial derivative of G,G1 w.r.t. to the bid prices can be expressed as
∂G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q1))
∂p1
=
[
∂F (Nq1, Nq2)
∂Q1
]∑
j 6=i
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
 (B.11)
∂2G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂2p1
=
[
∂2F (Nq1, Nq2)
∂2Q1
]∑
j 6=i
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
2 + [∂F (Nq1, Nq2)
∂Q1
]∑
j 6=i
∂2x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂2p1

(B.12)
∂2G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂p1∂p2
=
[
∂F (Nq1, Nq2)
∂Q1∂Q2
]∑
j 6=i
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
∑
j 6=i
∂x∗2(p
∗
2(q2))
∂p2
 (B.13)
∂G1(q1, p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
= fQ1 (Nq1)
∑
j 6=i
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
 (B.14)
∂2G1(q1, p
∗
1(q1))
∂2p1
=
(
∂fQ1 (Nq1)
∂Q1
)∑
j 6=i
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
2 + fQ1 (Nq1)
∑
j 6=i
∂2x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂2p1
 (B.15)
Now, since all players i choose the same function x∗1(p1) = (p
∗
1)
−1(q1), I can replace
∂x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
=
∂(p∗1)
−1(p∗1(q1))
∂p1
=
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]
(B.16)
∂2x∗1(p
∗
1(q1))
∂2p1
=
∂2(p∗1)
−1(p∗1(q1))
∂2p1
= −
[
p∗
′′
1 (q1)
[p∗′(q1)]3
]
for all j 6= i (B.17)
by the Chain Rule and obtain
∂G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂p1
= (N − 1)
[
∂F (Nq1, Nq−2))
∂Q1
] [
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]
(B.18)
∂2G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂2p1
= (N − 1)
[
(N − 1)
[
∂2F (Nq1, Nq2))
∂2Q1
]
−
[
∂F (Nq1, Nq2)
∂Qm
] [
p∗
′′
1 (q1)
p∗′(q1)
]] [
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]2
(B.19)
∂2G(q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂p1∂p2
= (N − 1)f(Nq1, Nq2)
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
] [
1
p∗′2 (q2)
]
(B.20)
∂G1(q1, p
∗
1(q1))
∂p1
= (N − 1)fQ1 (Nq1)
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]
(B.21)
∂2G1(q1, p
∗
1(q1))
∂2p1
= (N − 1)
[
(N − 1)
(
∂fQ1 (Nq1)
∂Q1
)
− fQ1 (Nq1)
[
p∗
′′
1 (q1)
p∗′(q1)
]] [
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]2
(B.22)
Conditions for good 2 are analogous.
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Statement (i) With (B.10) and (B.21) the necessary condition (2.9) for good 1 becomes
[E [v1(q1, q∗2 )| q1]− p∗1(q1)](−1)fQ1(Nq1)(N − 1)
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]
= [1− FQ1(Nq1)] (B.23)
or equivalently given FQ1(Nq1) = Fq∗1 (q1) and fQ1(Nq1) =
[
1
N
]
fq∗1 (q1)
[E [v1(q1, q∗2 )| q1]− p∗1(q1)](−1)
[
1
N
]
fq∗1 (q1)(N − 1)
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
]
= [1− Fq∗1 (q1)]. (B.24)
It rearranges to the expression of the Lemma
E [v1(q1, q∗2 )| q1]− p∗1(q1) = −
[
N
N − 1
] [
1− Fq∗1 (q1)
fq∗1 (q1)
]
p∗
′
1 (q1) for q1 ∈ [0, q∗1). (N ′)
The analogous holds for good 2.
Statement (ii). Consider the first sufficient condition (S1). Lengthly tedious but straight-
forward derivations, where I substitute out for all G,G1, G2 and their partial- as well as cross
partial derivatives, and insert the assumed functional form v1(q1, q2) = w1(q1)−δq2 rearrange
(S1) to
0 ≥ Nw′1(q1)− δ
[
∂E[q∗2 |q1]
∂q1
]
for qm = q
∗
m (S
′
B)
and
d
dx
ln
[
1− Fq∗1 (x)
fq∗1 (x)
]∣∣∣∣
x=q1
≥
Nw′1(q1)− δ
[
∂E[q∗2 |q1]
∂q1
]
E[v1(q1, q∗2 |q1)− p∗1(q1)
 for q1 ∈ [0, q∗1) (S ′)
The RHS is strictly negative negative for all q1 ∈ [0, q∗1] by the assumption that E[v1(q1, q∗2 |q1)]
and w1(·) are strictly decreasing. The sufficient condition thus holds at the end-point q∗m.
For lower quantities, where [E[v1(q1, q∗2 |q1)]− p∗1(q1)] > 0, it is fulfilled when the LHS of (S ′)
is weakly positive. This is always the case by the assumption that total supply is drawn
from a marginal distribution with weakly decreasing hazard rate.
Now consider the second (S2). With (B.20) it becomes
∂2F (q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂p1∂p2
= v(q1, q2)(N − 1)2f(Nq1, Nq2)
[
1
p∗′1 (q1)
] [
1
p∗′2 (q2)
]
≤ 0.
Since N ≥ 2, p∗1(·), p∗2(·) are strictly decreasing and f(Nq1, Nq2) > 0 by assumption, the
condition simplifies to
∂2F (q1, q2, p
∗
1(q1), p
∗
2(q2))
∂p1∂p2
= v(q1, q2) = −δ ≤ 0 (B.25)
which holds by assumption.
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B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12 (Existence and Uniqueness). (i) The unique functions {p∗1(·), p∗2(·)} that satisfies
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a local maximum are
p∗m(qm) = E
[
vm
(
qm, q
∗
−m
) |qm]+ ∫ q∗m
qm
(
∂E
[
vm
(
x,q∗−m
) |x]
∂qm
)[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
dx. (2.10)
on qm ∈ [0, q∗m] for m = 1, 2,−m 6= m.
(ii) Both are twice differentiable and strictly decreasing.
Proof. When condition (N ′) holds for all qm ∈ [0, q∗m] ≡
[
0, Qm
N
]
it becomes a linear dif-
ferential equation. Its unique solution is function (2.10) of the theorem. This solution is
determined in three steps. In part 1, I first solve the differential equation for qm ∈
[
0, Qm
N
)
.
I do so under the assumption that the solution p(·) is twice differentiable, bounded and
strictly decreasing. Then I consider the boundary point qm =
Qm
N
. In part 2, I verify that
the derived solution function indeed has the assumed properties. Finally I check that no bid
offer drops below zero.
For convenience I will drop subscript m and superscript ∗, and use
v˜(q) ≡ E [v (q, q∗−m) |q] .
Statement (i) Let q ∈
[
0, Q
N
)
and assume p(·) is is twice differentiable, bounded and
strictly decreasing on this domain. To simplify notation, let I refer to the hazard rate of the
equilibrium quantity in each market as
h(q) ≡
[
fq (q)
1− Fq (q)
]
(B.26)
and to the cumulative hazard rate of the equilibrium quantity as
H(q) ≡
∫ q
0
h(x)dx. (B.27)
Inserting (B.26) in the first-order condition (N ′) and rearranging I obtain
p′(q) + p(q)W (q) = R(q) with (B.28)
W (q) = −
[
N − 1
N
]
h(q) and (B.29)
R(q) = −
[
N − 1
N
]
v˜(q)h(q) (B.30)
This is a linear differential equation which can be solved with help of an integrating factor
P (q). Define it as
P (q) ≡ e
∫ q
0 W (x)dx = e−[
N−1
N ]
∫ q
0 h(q)dx
(B.27)
= e−[
N−1
N ]H(q) (B.31)
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Now multiply the differential equation (B.28) by P (q).
P (q)p′(q) + P (q)p(q)W (q) = P (q)R(q) (B.32)
⇔ [P (q)p(q)]′ = P (q)R(q) since P (q)W (q) = P ′(q). (B.33)
Integrating both sides, applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus gives
P (q)p(q) =
∫ q
0
P (x)R(x)dx+ C (B.34)
To determine the constant C let q → Q
N
.
lim
q→Q
N
P (q) = lim
q→Q
N
e−[
N−1
N ]H(q) = lim
q→Q
N
1
e[
N−1
N ]H(q)
→ 0 because lim
q→Q
N
H (q)→∞ due to lim
q→Q
N
Fq (q)→ 1
Since p(·) is bounded by assumption, this implies that the RHS goes to 0. Therefore
C = −
∫ Q
N
0
P (x)R(x)dx (B.35)
Summarizing the unique solution to differential equation (N ′) is
p(q) =
∫ q
0
P (x)R(x)dx+ C
P (q)
(B.36)
Inserting for P (z), R(z) for z = x, q as defined in (B.31) and (B.30), and rearranging gives
p(q) =
[
N − 1
N
]
e[
N−1
N ]H(q)
∫ Q
N
0
[
v˜(x)
[
e−[
N−1
N ]H(x)
]
h(x)
]
dx
−
[
N − 1
N
]
e[
N−1
N ]H(q)
∫ q
0
[
v˜(x)
[
e−[
N−1
N ]H(x)
]
h(x)
]
dx (B.37)
A tedious but straightforward simplification of this formula gives the function in the theorem.
First I simplify both integrals. I do so by integration by parts, integrating e−[
N−1
N ]H(x)h(x)
and taking the derivative of v˜(x). Here I am using again that lim
q→Q
N
H (q) → ∞. After
further simplifications where I am substituting out for H (z) and h(z), z = x, q according to
they definitions in (B.26) and (B.27) I obtain
p(q) = v˜(q)−
∫ Q
N
q
e−[N−1N ] ∫ x0 [ fq(y)1−Fq(y)]dy
e
−[N−1N ]
∫ q
0
[
fq(y)
1−Fq(y)
]
dy
 (−1)v˜′(x)dx
The final step is to simplify the numerator and denominator of the integral. Taking the
natural logarithm and applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we see that
e
−[N−1N ]
∫ z
0
fq(y)
1−Fq(y)dy = [1− Fq(z)]N−1N for z = x, q.
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This gives the functional form of the theorem for q ∈
[
0, Q
N
)
p(q) = v˜(q)−
∫ Q
N
q
[
1− Fq(x)
1− Fq(q)
]N−1
N
(−1)v˜′(x)dx (2.10)
Now consider the boundary point q = Q
N
. Since Fq
(
Q
N
)
=1, the first-order condition directly
gives us the solution for this point p
(
Q
N
)
= v˜
(
Q
N
)
. Because
∫ Q
N
q
...dx = 0 for q = Q
N
we can
extend the domain of function (2.10) to include the boundary point.
Statement (ii) To finalize the proof it remains to show that the solution p(·) indeed has
the assumed properties.
Twice differentiability of p(·) follows immediately from the assumptions that F (·) and v˜(·) are
twice differentiable. Moreover, since v˜(·) is bounded and strictly decreasing, p(·) is bounded
by p (0) = v˜ (0). It remains to show that p(q) is strictly decreasing in q. To do so, I take the
derivative of bidding function (2.10), where I multiplied the minus sign out of the integral
p′(q) = v˜′(q) +
d
dq
{∫ Q
N
q
[
1− Fq(x)
1− Fq(q)
]N−1
N
v˜′(x)dx
}
By the Leibniz-rule
p′(q) = v˜′(q) +
∫ Q
N
q
∂
∂q
{[
1− Fq(x)
1− Fq(q)
]N−1
N
v˜′(x)
}
dx−
[
1− Fq(q)
1− Fq(q)
]N−1
N
v˜′(q)
The first and last term cancel out.
p′(q) =
∫ Q
N
q
∂
∂q
{[
1− Fq(x)
1− Fq(q)
]N−1
N
v˜′(x)
}
dx
Taking the partial derivative inside the integral I obtain
p′(q) =
∫ Q
N
q
−
[
N − 1
N
]
[1− Fq(q)]−[
N−1
N ]−1 (−fq(q))[1− Fq(x)]N−1N v˜′(x)dx
which rearranges to
p′(q) =
[
N − 1
N
]
fq(q) [1− Fq(q)]−[
2N−1
N ]
∫ Q
N
q
[1− Fq(x)]N−1N v˜′(x)dx
Now, since
[
N−1
N
]
fq(q) [1− Fq(q)]−[
2N−1
N ] > 0 for any q ∈ [0, Q
N
)
p′(q) < 0 iff
∫ Q
N
q
[1− Fq(x)]
N−1
N v˜′(x)dx < 0 (B.38)
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Because 1 − Fq(x) > 0 and v˜′(x) < 0 on x ∈ [0, QN ) by assumption, this always holds. For
x = Q
N
, p(x) = v˜(x) which is strictly decreasing by assumption. In consequence, p(q) is
strictly decreasing on
[
0, Q
I
]
.
There is one property that p(·) must fulfill in addition which I have not emphasized so far
because I did not rely on it when solving the bidder’s maximization problem: Bids must be
non-negative. Since p(·) is strictly decreasing, it suffices to have
p
(
Q
N
)
= v˜
(
Q
N
)
≥ 0
This holds by Assumption 2 (ii).
B.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 follows directly from Theorem 3 under the additional assumptions that the joint
distribution is the FGM copula and marginal distributions are identical in both markets.
With v˜m(qm) ≡ E[vm(qm, q∗−m)|qm])
(2.2)
= wm(qm)− δE[q∗−m |qm], bidders choose
pm(qm) = v˜m(qm) +
∫ Qm
N
qm
[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
v˜′m(x)dx on q ∈
[
0, q∗m ≡
Qm
N
]
. (2.10)
To compute this function, let us first determine v˜m(qm)’s functional form under the FGM.
v˜m(qm) depends on E
[
q∗−m
∣∣ qm] = [ 1N ]E [Q−m |Qm] . Combining Schucany et al. (1978) (p.
651) and Crane and van der Hoek (2008) (p. 56)
E [Q−m |Qm] = E[Q−m ]− θ[1− 2FQm(Qm)]
∫
FQ−m(Q−m)[1− FQ−m(Q−m)dQ−m
with c−m ≡
∫
FQ−m(Q−m)[1− FQ−m(Q−m)]dQ−m and θ = ρ
(
σmσ−m
cmc−m
)
so that
E [Q−m |Qm] = E[Q−m ]− ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)
[1− 2FQm(Qm)].
Therefore
v˜m(qm) = wm(qm)− δ
{
E[q∗−m ]− ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
]
[1− 2Fq∗m(qm)]
}
(B.39)
with derivative
v˜′m(qm) = w
′
m(qm)− δρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
]
2fqm(qm). (B.40)
With (B.39) and (B.40) equation (2.10) becomes
pm(qm) = wm(qm)− δ
{
E[q∗−m ]− ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
]
[1− 2Fq∗m(qm)]
}
−
∫ Qm
N
qm
[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
[
w′m(x) + δρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
]
2fqm(x)
]
dx.
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Rearranging gives
pm(qm) = p
SA
m (qm)− δDm(qm, δ, ρ)
with
pSAm (qm) = wm(qm)−
∫ Qm
N
q
[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(qm)
]N−1
N
w′m(x)dx
and
Dm(qm, δ, ρ) ≡ δ
{
E[q∗−m ]− ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
]
J (qm)
}
where J (qm) ≡ [1− 2Fq∗m(qm)]−
∫ Qm
N
qm
[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(q)
]N−1
N
2fqm(x)dx.
According to Theorem 1, pSAm (qm) is the equilibrium function of a stand-alone auction with
marginal willingness to pay of wm(qm). Simplifying J (qm) by integrating by parts and using
Fq∗m
(
Qm
N
)
= 1, the discount factor rearranges to the expression of the Corollary. To do so,
compute the integral of J (qm):
∫ Qm
N
qm
[
1− Fq∗m(x)
1− Fq∗m(q)
]N−1
N
2fqm(x)dx = 2[1− Fq∗m(qm)]−[
N−1
N ]
− [ N
2N − 1
]
[1− Fq∗m(x)][
2N−1
N ]
∣∣∣∣
Qm
N
qm

= 2
[
N
2N − 1
]
[1− Fq∗m(qm)]
J (qm) simplifies to
J (qm) = [1− 2Fq∗m(qm)]− 2
[
N
2N − 1
]
[1− Fq∗m(qm)]
= −
[
1
2N − 1
] [
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
]
Inserting J (qm) into Dm(qm, δ, ρ) I obtain the expression as stated in Corollary 2:
Dm(qm, δ, ρ) = δ
{
E[q∗−m ] + ρ
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
] [
1
2N − 1
] [
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
]}
.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Fix some qm ∈
[
0, Qm
N
]
.
Statement (i). Let ρ 6= 0. The goal is to show that the term in curly brackets ofDm(qm, δ, ρ)
is positive:
E[q∗−m ] +
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
] [
1
2N − 1
] [
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
]
> 0 (B.41)
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For ρ > 0, where all terms are positive, this is easy to see. To show the property for ρ < 0,
define ρ¯ ≡ −ρ. I need to show that
NE[q∗−m ] > ρ¯
(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
2N − 1
] [
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
]
(B.42)
holds for all possible values of ρ¯ ∈
(
0,
(
cmc−m
σmσ−m
)]
and all relevant quantities qm ∈
[
0, Qm/N
]
.
This is the case if it holds for the values of ρ¯ and qm for which the RHS assumes its maximal
value. These are ρ¯ =
(
cmc−m
σmσ−m
)
and qm = Qm/N . Evaluating condition (B.42) at these values,
using Fq∗m
(
Qm/N
)
= 1, it remains to show that NE[q∗−m ] > c−m ⇔ E[Q−m ] > c−m. To
see that this always holds, recall the definition of c−m ≡
∫ Qm
0
FQ−m(y)[1 − FQ−m(y)]dy. In
addition express the expected value as E[Q−m ] =
∫ Qm
0
[1− FQ−m(y)]dy:
E[Q−m ] > c−m ⇔
∫ Qm
0
[1− FQ−m(y)]dy >
∫ Qm
0
FQ−m(y)[1− FQ−m(y)]dy
⇔
∫ Qm
0
{
[1− FQ−m(y)]− FQ−m(y)[1− FQ−m(y)]
}
dy > 0
⇔
∫ Qm
0
[1− FQ−m(y)]2dy > 0 which holds trivially.
Statement (ii) & (iii). Both properties follow immediately from the functional form of
Dm(qm, δ, ρ) in combination with property (i).
Statement (iv). The partial derivative of the discount factor w.r.t. ρ is
∂Dm(qm, δ, ρ)
∂ρ
= δ
{(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
] [
1
2N − 1
] [
1 + 2(N − 1)Fq∗m(qm)
]}
.
Since cm, σm, σ−m > 0, N ≥ 2 it is positive only if δ > 0.
Statement (v). Taking the derivative of Dm(qm, δ, ρ) w.r.t. qm gives
∂Dm(qm, δ, ρ)
∂qm
= δρ
{(
σmσ−m
cm
)[
1
N
] [
1
2N − 1
]
2(N − 1)fqm(qm)
}
.
By assumption the density of the total supply is strictly positive on its support. Therefore
fqm(qm) > 0 is strictly positive on
[
0, Qm
N
]
. Recalling that cm, σm, σ−m > 0, N ≥ 2 property
(v) follows.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 5
Proposition 1. Recall that the dealer expects the following payoff from owning q1, q2
V (q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) = U(q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) + E [revenue(x1 ,x2 |q1, q2)− cost(x1, x2 |q1, q2)] (3.8)
with revenue(x1, x2|q1, q2) =
∑2
m=1 pm(x1, x2|q1, q2)xm. Given the aggregate inverse demand
of the dealer’s clients (3.5)
V (q1, q2, s
g
i,τ ) = U(s
g
i,τ , q1, q2)
+
∫ κ1q1
0
∫ κ2q2
0
[p1(x1, x2)x1 + p2(x2, x1)x2]f(x1, x2)dx1dx2
+
∫ κ1q1
0
∫ 1
κ2q2
[p1(x1)x1 − γx2]f(x1, x2)dx1dx2 +
∫ 1
κ1q1
∫ κ2q2
0
[p2(x2)x2 − γx1]f(x1, x2)dx1dx2
−
∫ 1
κ1q1
∫ 1
κ2q2
[γx1x2]f(x1, x2)dx1dx2.
Inserting the assumed functional forms (3.4), (3.5), and f(x1, x2) = 1 + 3ρ(1− 2F1(x1)(1−
2F2(x2)) integrating and taking the partial derivative w.r.t. q1 we obtain
v1(q1, q2, s
g
1,i,τ ) =1/2γκ1(−1 + ρ)− 2γκ1κ32q32ρ+ 1/2γκ1κ22q22(1 + 3ρ)
+ q21(−6γκ31κ2q2ρ+ 3(3γ + 2e)k31k22q22ρ− 4(γ + 2e)κ31κ32q32ρ+ κ31(−b+ γρ))
+ q1(2(3γ + 2e)κ
2
1κ
3
2q
3
2ρ+ cκ
2
1κ2q2(1 + 3ρ) + 1/2κ
2
1(2a+ γ − 3γρ)− 1/2κ21κ22q22(γ + 2e+ 15γρ+ 6eρ))
+ (1− κ1)sg1,i,τ .
A Taylor expansion around
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
gives
v1(q1, q2, s
g
1,i,τ ) =(1− κ1)sg1,i,τ + h0(κ1, κ2, γ, ρ) + h1(κ1, κ2, γ, a, b, e, ρ)q1 + h2(κ1, κ2, e, ρ)q2
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with
h0(κ1, κ2, γ, ρ) =
1
16
(4bκ31 + 2eκ
2
1κ
2
2(2 + (6− 9κ1 − 6κ2 + 8κ1κ2)ρ))
+
1
16
(γκ1(8(−1 + ρ) + κ21(−2 + κ2)(2 + κ2(−11 + 8κ2))ρ)
+
1
16
(γκ1(+2κ
2
2(−1− 3ρ+ 4κ2ρ) + 2κ1κ2(−2 + κ2 − 3(−1 + κ2)(−2 + 3κ2)ρ))
h1(κ1, κ2, γ, a, b, e, ρ) =
1
8
κ21(8a− 8bκ1 − 2eκ22(1 + (−1 + 2κ1)(−3 + 2κ2)ρ))
+
1
8
κ21(γ(4 + 4κ2 − κ22 − (−2 + κ2)(−6 + 3κ2 − 6κ22 + 2κ1(−2 + κ2)(−1 + 2κ2))ρ))
h2(κ1, κ2, γ, e, ρ) =− 1
4
κ1k2(−2γκ1 + γ(−2 + κ1)k2 + 2eκ1k2)(1 + 3(−1 + κ1)(−1 + k2)ρ)
Corollary 5. Securities become more complementary when h2(κ1, κ2, γ, e, ρ) increases. For
any κm ∈ [0, 1] and any ρ that is within the allowed range of correlation parameters of the
Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern Distributions with uniform marginal distributions, [−1/3, 1/3]:
∂h2(κ1, κ2, γ, e, ρ)
∂e
= −(1/2)κ21κ22(1 + 3(−1 + κ1)(−1 + κ2)ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ 0
∂h2(κ1, κ2, γ, e, ρ)
∂γ
= −(1/4)κ1(κ1(−2 + κ2)− 2κ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
κ2(1 + 3(−1 + κ1)(−1 + κ2)ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0
∂h2(κ1, κ2, γ, e, ρ)
∂ρ
= −(1/4)κ1(κ1(−2 + κ2)− 2κ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
κ2(1 + 3(−1 + κ1)(−1 + κ2)ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proposition follows from Proposition 3 when all δ parameters are 0.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Take the perspective of bidder i who belongs to bidder group g ∈ {c, d}. Fix his type, a
time slot τ , as well as one of his information sets θgi,τ , and let all other agents j 6= i play a
type-symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium it must be optimal for the bidder to choose
the same set of functions {bg1(·, θgi,τ ), ...bgM(·, θgi,τ )} as all other bidders in his bidder group
with information θgi,τ . These M functions must jointly maximize the bidder’s expected to-
tal surplus. It must therefore be the case that each of the functions bgm(·, θgi,τ ) maximizes
his expected total surplus separately when fixing all the other bidding functions −m at the
optimum. To determine necessary conditions of the type-symmetric equilibrium we can con-
sequently fix the agent’s strategy in all but one auction at the equilibrium. Without loss
take this auction to be the one for security 1.
The remainder of the proof extends Kastl (2012)’s proof for a K-step equilibrium of a pay-
as-bid auction that takes place in isolation without difficulties. To facilitate the comparison
with the original proof (on pp. 347 - 348 of Kastl (2012)) we copy it as closely as possible
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but adopt the notation used in this article.
There are two main difference to the original proof. First, our framework allows bidders to
update their bids due to arrival of new information. Such information arrives at discrete
time slots τ = 1...Γ. Bidding functions do not (only) depend on the bidder i’s type sgi,τ
drawn at time τ but on the (entire) information set he has at that time θgi,τ . It includes the
type, sgi,τ ⊆ θgi,τ . Since only final bids count, bidders bid as if it was their last bid each time
they place a bid. We can just keep some τ fixed throughout the proof.
Second, following Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012) we allow for asymmetries in bidding behavior
between dealers and customers. They draw types from (potentially) different distributions
and may have different information available. The original proof extends to this set-up.
Simplified Notation. We drop subscripts τ, i as well as superscript g.
We refer to the amount a bidder with information θ wins at market clearing in auction m
(for a given set of strategies in the event that τ is the time of the bidder’s final bid) by qc1,
and the amount he wins in equilibrium by q∗1 .
Notice that both, qc1 and q
∗
1 are (for given strategies of all agents) functions of the total
supply Q1 and the information of all agents {θi}Ni=1. They are implicitly defined by market
clearing.
The proof of the proposition relies on three lemmas. The second and third are taken from
Kastl (2012).
Lemma 13. Fix a bidder with information θ.
Denote his marginal willingness to pay in auction m at step k when submitting some function
b′1(·, θ) with {(b′1,k, q′1,k−1), (b′1,k+1, q′1,k)} by
v˜1(q1, θ|b′1,k, b′1,k+1) ≡ E
[
v1
(
q1, q
∗
−1 , s1
)∣∣ b′1,k ≥ P c1 > b′1,k+1, θ] for q1 ∈ (q′1,k−1, q′1,k]. (C.1)
(i) v˜1(q1, θ|b′1,k, b′1,k+1) is bounded.
(ii) In equilibrium, where the bidder submits function b1(·, θ) with {(b1,k, q1,k−1), (b1,k+1, q1,k)},
(ii) v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) is decreasing in q1 and right-continuous in b1,k.
Proof of Lemma 13. (i) By Assumption 3
v˜1(q1, θ|b′1,k, b′1,k+1)
(3.3)
= α + (1− κ1)s1 + λ1q1 + δ1 · E
[
q∗−1 |b′1,k ≥ P c1 > b′1,k+1, θ
]
for q1 ∈ (q′1,k−1, q′1,k]. Since types and total supply are drawn from distributions with bounded
support by Assumptions 2 and 5, E
[
q∗−1 |b′1,k ≥ P c1 > b′1,k+1, θ
]
and with it v˜1(q1, θ|b′1,k, b′1,k+1)
is bounded.
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(ii) In equilibrium v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) must be decreasing in q1 or it could not give rise to a
decreasing bidding function that fulfills the necessary conditions of Proposition 3.
To see why v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) is right-continuous in b1,k note first that it can only jump dis-
continuously if changing b1,k breaks a tie between this bidder and at least one other bidder.
Since there can be only countably many prices on which a tie might occur, however, there
must exist a neighborhood at any b1,k for which for any price in that neighborhood there
are no ties. Therefore, when perturbing bk, there cannot be any discontinuous shift in the
conditional probability measure and thus in the object of interest.
Lemma 14. Fix a bidder with information θ.
If at some step k in auction 1, Pr(qc1 ≥ q1,k|θ) > 0, then b1,k ≤ v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1).
Proof of Lemma 14. The proof is analogous to Kastl (2012)’s proof of Lemma 2. It suf-
fices to replace v(q, s) in the original proof by v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) and rely on Lemma 13.
Lemma 15. (i) Ties occur with zero probability for a.e. θ in any K-step equilibrium of
simultaneous pay-as-bid auctions expect possibly at the last step (k1 = K1).
(ii) If a tie occurs with positive probability at the last step, a bidder with information θ must
be indifferent between winning or losing all units between the lowest share he gets allocated
after rationing in the event of a tie qRAT
1
and the last infinitesimal unit he may be allocated
in equilibrium, q1:
b1,K1 = v˜1(q¯1, θ|b1,K1) where q¯1 = sup
{Q1,θ−i}
y1(b1,K1 , θ|Q1, θ−i) ∀q1 ∈ [qRAT1 , q1].
Proof of Lemma 15. The proof is also analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in Kastl
(2012). In essence it suffices to replace the bidder’s true valuation v(q, s) in Kastl (2012) by
v˜1(·, θ|bk, bk+1) in equilibrium and v˜1(·, θ|b′k, b′k+1) for deviations and rely on Lemma 13.
To facilitate this conversion, we demonstrate the beginning of the proof: Suppose that there
exists an equilibrium, in which for a bidder i with information set θ a tie between at least
two bidders can occur with positive probability pi1 > 0 in auction 1. Since there can be only
finitely many prices that can clear the market with positive probability, in order for a tie
to be a positive probability event, it has to be the case that there exists a positive measure
subset of information sets Θˆ−i ∈ [0, 1]N−1 such that for some bidder j, and all profiles of
information sets θ−i ∈ Θˆ′−i ⊂ Θˆ−i (another positive measure subset) and some step k and
l we have b1,k(θi) = b1,l(θj) = P
c
1 . Without loss suppose that this event occurs at the bid
(b1,k, q1,k), and that the maximum quantity allocated to i after rationing is q¯
RAT
1 < q1,k. Let
S¯R1pi denote the maximal level of the residual supply at b1,k in the states leading to rationing
at b1,k.
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Consider a deviation to a step b′1,k = b1,k+ε and q
′
1,k = q1,k where ε is sufficiently small. This
deviation increases the probability of winning q1,k − q1,k−1 units. Most importantly in the
states that led to rationing under the original bid, the bidder with information θ will now
obtain qu1 > q¯
RAT
1 where q
u
1 ≥ min{q1,k, S¯R1pi}. Notice that since we hypothesized a positive
probability of a tie at b1,k, we need to have q1,k−1 < q¯RAT1 < q1,k due to rationing pro-rata
on-the-margin. Therefore, the lower bound on the increase in θ’s expected gross surplus from
such a deviation is
EDε = pi1
(
V˜ε(q
u
1 , θ)− V˜ (q¯RAT1 , θ)
)
(EDε)
where
V˜ε(q
u
1 , θ) ≡
∫ q¯RAT1
0
v˜1(q1, θ|b1(q1|θ)) +
∫ qu1
q¯RAT1
v˜1(q1, θ|b′1,k, b′1,k+1)dq1
and
V˜ (q¯RAT1 , θ) ≡
∫ q¯RAT1
0
v˜1(q1, θ|b1(q1|θ))dq1
with v˜1(q1, θ|b1(q1|θ)) denoting the true valuation when submitting b1(q1|θ) not just at step
k, as v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1), but including all previous steps (if any).
To continue, let us first focus on steps other than the last one, k < K1, and suppose that
v˜1(·, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) is strictly decreasing. The increased bid b1,k + ε also results in an increase
in the payment for the share requested at this step. This increase, however, is bounded by
(q1,k − q1,k−1)ε. Comparing the upper bound on the change in expected payment with the
lower bound on the change in expected gross utility, in order for this deviation to be strictly
profitable we need to obtain
(q1,k − q1,k−1)ε < pi1EDε. (C.2)
As b1,k ≤ v˜1(q1,k, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) by Lemma 14 and v˜1(q1,k, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) < v˜1(qu1 , θ|b1,k, b1,k+1),
the LHS of (C.2) goes to 0 and the RHS to a strictly positive number as ε → 0. Since
v˜1(q1, θ|b1,k, b1,k+1) is for any q1 ∈ [q¯RAT1 , q1,k] right-continuous in b1,k, the proposed deviation
would indeed be strictly profitable for the bidder with information θ. Moreover, there can be
only countable many θ’s with a profitable deviation otherwise bidder i could implement this
deviation jointly and thus for a.e. information sets θ ties have zero probability in equilibrium
for all bidders i.
Relying on Lemma 13, the remainder of the proof is analogous to the original proof. It
suffices to replace v(q, s) by v˜1(·, θ|bk, bk+1) in equilibrium and v˜1(·, θ|b′k, b′k+1) when deviating,
as well as V (q∗, s) − V (q¯RATi , s) by EDε. In our environment with updating, a tie may
occur with positive probability only at the last step and the bidder with information θ
(at the previously fixed time τ) must not prefer winning any units in
[
qRAT
1
, q1
]
where
q1 = sup{Q1,θ−i} y1(b1,K1 , θ|Q1, θ−i) is the maximal quantity the bidder may be allocated in
an equilibrium (in the event that τ is the time of his final bid).
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Proof of Proposition 3. At step k = K1 Lemma 14 specifies the optimal bid-choice. At
steps k < K1 Lemma 15 can be applied. Kastl (2012) pertubes the k
th step to q′1 = q1,k − 
and takes the limit as q′1 → q1,k. The original proof goes through without complications.
It suffices to replace the type s by the information set θ, E [V (Qci(Q,S,y(·|S)), si)| states]
by E
[
V (q∗1 , q
∗
−1 , s)
∣∣ θ, states] with all states as specified in the original proof, and similarly
E [V (Qci(Q,S,y ′(·|S)), si)| states] by E
[
V (qc1 , q
∗
−1 , s)
∣∣ θ, states] where qc1 denotes the amount
the bidder wins at market clearing under the deviation in our simplified notation.
C.2 Robustness
Robustness (1). Our main specification restricts the sample to bids submitted by dealers
within 30 minutes prior to auction closure. Tables C.1 - C.3 display the estimation results
of our main regression
vˆt,m,i,τ,k = ut,m,i,τ + λmqt,m,i,τ,k + δm · qˆ∗t,−m,i,τ,k + εt,m,i,τ,k for m = 3M, 6M, 12M (3.12)
over the full time period (2002 - 2015) in various other specifications. In the first column
we use all step-functions with more than one step, including customer and dealer bids. The
second column restricts attention to all such bids submitted by dealers. In the the third to
sixth column we narrow down the time period prior to auction closure, using bids by dealers
only. All findings are robust to these changes. The same is true when splitting the sample
into the time before the financial crisis, the crisis and the time afterwards.
Robustness (2). Tables C.4 - C.6 illustrate the robustness of our results with regards to
the markup of 0.05 bsp (as lower bound), 0.5 bsp (as our main specification) and 5 bsp (as
upper bound) and the restriction that v˜m(·, sgi,τ |θgi,τ ) is decreasing (referred to as “Sorted” or
“Unsorted” in the tables). Higher markups than 50 bsp are too large relative to the small
amount by which a dealer shades one unit of a bill on average (< 0.25 bps in our main
specification). We here show the estimation results when splitting the sample into the pre-
crisis/crisis/and post-crisis periods as an example, using the sample of dealer bids submitted
less than 30 minutes prior to auction closure. The same conclusions hold when using the full
time period instead.
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Table C.1: Robustness (1) 3M Auction
all dealers ≤1h ≤ 30min ≤ 10min ≤ 5min
λ 3M -0.704∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗ -0.744∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗ -0.784∗∗∗
(-193.76) (-189.47) (-180.74) (-165.83) (-111.90) (-82.97)
δ 3M, 6M 0.307∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗
(7.21) (7.05) (7.06) (6.80) (4.79) (2.93)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.347∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(7.54) (7.39) (7.86) (6.69) (4.30) (3.59)
Constant 995703.6∗∗∗ 995654.1∗∗∗ 995635.8∗∗∗ 995533.2∗∗∗ 995438.1∗∗∗ 995551.0∗∗∗
(3221068.68) (3007762.84) (2881372.45) (2574206.36) (1605259.59) (1150196.70)
Observations 62100 58542 54856 45994 19176 9592
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.2: Robustness (1) 6M Auction
all dealers ≤1h ≤ 30min ≤ 10min ≤ 5min
λ 6M -3.102∗∗∗ -3.114∗∗∗ -3.092∗∗∗ -3.095∗∗∗ -3.053∗∗∗ -2.941∗∗∗
(-158.76) (-155.55) (-147.41) (-132.97) (-91.53) (-66.09)
δ 6M, 3M 0.0551 0.0633 0.0533 0.00508 -0.0122 -0.0702
(1.61) (1.82) (1.48) (0.13) (-0.21) (-0.90)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.123 0.125 0.0430 0.0934 -0.185 -0.335
(1.24) (1.23) (0.41) (0.84) (-1.19) (-1.55)
Constant 991774.0∗∗∗ 991653.7∗∗∗ 991651.7∗∗∗ 991509.1∗∗∗ 991278.4∗∗∗ 991420.7∗∗∗
(1804001.79) (1705631.07) (1638079.00) (1494437.31) (1016043.88) (727979.83)
Observations 44768 42282 39871 34267 15903 7907
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.3: Robustness (1) 12M Auction
all dealers ≤1h ≤ 30min ≤ 10min ≤ 5min
λ 1Y -6.488∗∗∗ -6.517∗∗∗ -6.483∗∗∗ -6.476∗∗∗ -6.335∗∗∗ -6.234∗∗∗
(-177.56) (-175.89) (-168.18) (-154.51) (-111.44) (-86.29)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.499∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗ -0.892∗∗∗ -1.051∗∗∗
(-7.45) (-7.15) (-7.51) (-8.51) (-8.94) (-8.20)
δ 1Y, 6M 0.816∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗
(4.53) (4.60) (4.32) (4.34) (3.42) (2.88)
Constant 981740.1∗∗∗ 981611.8∗∗∗ 981560.9∗∗∗ 981316.6∗∗∗ 980497.0∗∗∗ 980254.1∗∗∗
(971863.17) (936542.88) (904564.02) (841131.53) (616248.14) (475127.80)
Observations 52806 50410 48132 42830 23255 12921
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.4: Robustness (2) 3M Auction
Sorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 3M -0.669∗∗∗ (-94.31) -1.038∗∗∗ (-97.69) -0.585∗∗∗ (-111.05)
δ 3M, 6M 0.229∗∗∗ (3.95) 0.426∗∗∗ (4.18) 0.384∗∗∗ (5.31)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.316∗∗∗ (5.38) 0.426∗∗∗ (3.59) 0.335∗∗∗ (4.43)
Constant 992189.1∗∗∗ (1924060.25) 994345.9∗∗∗ (1011800.72) 997786.5∗∗∗ (2139360.74)
Sorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 3M -0.677∗∗∗ (-95.27) -1.044∗∗∗ (-98.18) -0.589∗∗∗ (-111.95)
δ 3M, 6M 0.218∗∗∗ (3.77) 0.420∗∗∗ (4.12) 0.374∗∗∗ (5.16)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.310∗∗∗ (5.27) 0.419∗∗∗ (3.54) 0.328∗∗∗ (4.33)
Constant 992189.8∗∗∗ (1920929.74) 994346.6∗∗∗ (1011262.51) 997787.0∗∗∗ (2139133.26)
Sorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 3M -0.727∗∗∗ (-99.99) -1.089∗∗∗ (-101.64) -0.620∗∗∗ (-117.18)
δ 3M, 6M 0.140∗ (2.37) 0.364∗∗∗ (3.54) 0.287∗∗∗ (3.94)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.260∗∗∗ (4.33) 0.351∗∗ (2.94) 0.260∗∗∗ (3.42)
Constant 992194.4∗∗∗ (1879696.08) 994352.2∗∗∗ (1003982.65) 997790.7∗∗∗ (2128431.94)
Unsorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 3M -0.648∗∗∗ (-87.61) -0.993∗∗∗ (-89.62) -0.565∗∗∗ (-104.86)
δ 3M, 6M 0.181∗∗ (3.00) 0.304∗∗ (2.86) 0.362∗∗∗ (4.89)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.240∗∗∗ (3.93) 0.297∗ (2.40) 0.327∗∗∗ (4.22)
Constant 992188.3∗∗∗ (1847434.30) 994343.5∗∗∗ (970315.73) 997785.1∗∗∗ (2091115.06)
Unsorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 3M -0.655∗∗∗ (-88.26) -0.998∗∗∗ (-89.91) -0.569∗∗∗ (-105.46)
δ 3M, 6M 0.169∗∗ (2.80) 0.296∗∗ (2.78) 0.350∗∗∗ (4.72)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.232∗∗∗ (3.78) 0.288∗ (2.33) 0.320∗∗∗ (4.12)
Constant 992188.9∗∗∗ (1841104.44) 994344.2∗∗∗ (968824.13) 997785.6∗∗∗ (2088493.81)
Unsorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 3M -0.694∗∗∗ (-89.95) -1.032∗∗∗ (-91.37) -0.590∗∗∗ (-107.63)
δ 3M, 6M 0.0780 (1.24) 0.217∗ (2.01) 0.247∗∗ (3.27)
δ 3M, 1Y 0.159∗ (2.50) 0.202 (1.60) 0.246∗∗ (3.12)
Constant 992193.1∗∗∗ (1770957.30) 994349.1∗∗∗ (952226.10) 997788.7∗∗∗ (2054325.85)
Observations 10822 12530 22642
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.5: Robustness (2) 6M Auction
Sorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 6M -3.631∗∗∗ (-85.29) -4.809∗∗∗ (-75.46) -2.835∗∗∗ (-110.07)
δ 6M, 3M 0.0348 (0.53) -0.408∗∗∗ (-4.06) 0.272∗∗∗ (5.81)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.307∗ (2.29) 0.569∗ (2.13) 0.907∗∗∗ (5.32)
Constant 985572.7∗∗∗ (1030903.06) 990016.3∗∗∗ (536751.43) 995780.1∗∗∗ (1230965.02)
Sorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 6M -3.113∗∗∗ (-80.97) -4.328∗∗∗ (-70.30) -2.529∗∗∗ (-103.48)
δ 6M, 3M 0.0257 (0.43) -0.374∗∗∗ (-3.85) 0.231∗∗∗ (5.22)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.265∗ (2.19) 0.546∗ (2.11) 0.774∗∗∗ (4.79)
Constant 985555.4∗∗∗ (1141446.47) 989994.8∗∗∗ (555714.09) 995766.8∗∗∗ (1297220.30)
Sorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 6M -3.631∗∗∗ (-85.29) -4.809∗∗∗ (-75.46) -2.835∗∗∗ (-110.07)
δ 6M, 3M 0.0348 (0.53) -0.408∗∗∗ (-4.06) 0.272∗∗∗ (5.81)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.307∗ (2.29) 0.569∗ (2.13) 0.907∗∗∗ (5.32)
Constant 985572.7∗∗∗ (1030903.06) 990016.3∗∗∗ (536751.43) 995780.1∗∗∗ (1230965.02)
Unsorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 6M -2.914∗∗∗ (-74.17) -4.043∗∗∗ (-63.85) -2.399∗∗∗ (-96.03)
δ 6M, 3M -0.0218 (-0.36) -0.475∗∗∗ (-4.75) 0.179∗∗∗ (3.94)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.168 (1.36) 0.384 (1.44) 0.694∗∗∗ (4.20)
Constant 985549.9∗∗∗ (1117091.97) 989986.1∗∗∗ (540202.54) 995762.3∗∗∗ (1268981.08)
Unsorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 6M -3.011∗∗∗ (-75.92) -4.110∗∗∗ (-64.62) -2.443∗∗∗ (-97.18)
δ 6M, 3M -0.0231 (-0.38) -0.479∗∗∗ (-4.77) 0.179∗∗∗ (3.93)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.163 (1.30) 0.368 (1.38) 0.682∗∗∗ (4.10)
Constant 985553.4∗∗∗ (1106620.10) 989989.3∗∗∗ (537765.34) 995764.5∗∗∗ (1261419.48)
Unsorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 6M -3.373∗∗∗ (-73.86) -4.434∗∗∗ (-65.70) -2.615∗∗∗ (-94.85)
δ 6M, 3M -0.0884 (-1.25) -0.575∗∗∗ (-5.40) 0.153∗∗ (3.05)
δ 6M, 1Y 0.0485 (0.34) 0.246 (0.87) 0.639∗∗∗ (3.50)
Constant 985567.5∗∗∗ (961163.14) 990006.8∗∗∗ (506913.73) 995774.2∗∗∗ (1150239.48)
Observations 9072 9221 15974
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.6: Robustness (2) 12M Auction
Sorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 1Y -6.127∗∗∗ (-93.97) -8.905∗∗∗ (-81.03) -4.847∗∗∗ (-104.09)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.367∗∗∗ (-3.61) -1.742∗∗∗ (-9.93) -0.0194 (-0.21)
δ 1Y, 6M 1.164∗∗∗ (5.43) 3.209∗∗∗ (7.19) 0.949∗∗∗ (3.30)
Constant 969544.4∗∗∗ (666558.72) 977961.4∗∗∗ (322389.85) 990582.0∗∗∗ (680925.23)
Sorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 1Y -6.834∗∗∗ (-100.91) -9.482∗∗∗ (-84.46) -5.184∗∗∗ (-109.77)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.366∗∗∗ (-3.47) -1.748∗∗∗ (-9.76) 0.0180 (0.19)
δ 1Y, 6M 1.104∗∗∗ (4.96) 3.090∗∗∗ (6.77) 0.966∗∗∗ (3.31)
Constant 969569.1∗∗∗ (641567.61) 977987.2∗∗∗ (315592.78) 990597.3∗∗∗ (671392.12)
Sorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 1Y -10.06∗∗∗ (-77.16) -12.54∗∗∗ (-81.72) -6.898∗∗∗ (-101.13)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.340 (-1.68) -2.146∗∗∗ (-8.76) 0.182 (1.37)
δ 1Y, 6M 0.320 (0.75) 2.775∗∗∗ (4.45) 1.535∗∗∗ (3.64)
Constant 969685.6∗∗∗ (333426.55) 978127.9∗∗∗ (230996.06) 990675.7∗∗∗ (464853.53)
Unsorted Pre (0.05) Crisis (0.05) Post (0.05)
λ 1Y -5.914∗∗∗ (-87.97) -8.754∗∗∗ (-78.56) -4.669∗∗∗ (-97.69)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.461∗∗∗ (-4.40) -1.805∗∗∗ (-10.15) -0.0838 (-0.90)
δ 1Y, 6M 0.962∗∗∗ (4.35) 3.086∗∗∗ (6.82) 0.715∗ (2.42)
Constant 969540.1∗∗∗ (646376.42) 977957.8∗∗∗ (317969.66) 990577.1∗∗∗ (663474.17)
Unsorted Pre (0.5) Crisis (0.5) Post (0.5)
λ 1Y -6.519∗∗∗ (-91.91) -9.259∗∗∗ (-80.81) -4.896∗∗∗ (-99.38)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.509∗∗∗ (-4.61) -1.841∗∗∗ (-10.07) -0.0984 (-1.02)
δ 1Y, 6M 0.807∗∗∗ (3.46) 2.910∗∗∗ (6.25) 0.607∗ (1.99)
Constant 969562.8∗∗∗ (612682.90) 977982.0∗∗∗ (309204.52) 990589.4∗∗∗ (643634.43)
Unsorted Pre (5) Crisis (5) Post (5)
λ 1Y -8.768∗∗∗ (-62.68) -11.59∗∗∗ (-71.28) -5.500∗∗∗ (-72.13)
δ 1Y, 3M -0.883∗∗∗ (-4.05) -2.546∗∗∗ (-9.81) -0.460∗∗ (-3.08)
δ 1Y, 6M -0.935∗ (-2.03) 2.004∗∗ (3.03) -0.0816 (-0.17)
Constant 969659.8∗∗∗ (310709.69) 978105.4∗∗∗ (217973.47) 990637.5∗∗∗ (415792.81)
Observations 12753 10247 19830
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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